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competitiveness and integrating domestic economies into the world economy. In an effort to overcome
chronic deficiencies in telecommunication performance and distribution of services, many developing
countries have been engaged in liberalizing their telecommunication sectors. Liberalization here referring
to the movement away from the traditional state-owned monopoly structure and towards the introduction
of privatization and competition. This study examines the consequences of these developments by
analyzing telecommunication developments in 81 developing countries from 1977 to 1988. The study is
in two parts. The first part is theoretical and (a) identifies the technological and economic forces driving
change in the sector; (b) reviews the policy options available to developing countries; (c) critically
discusses the arguments both for and against the introduction of competition and privatization in the
sector; and (d) outlines the importance of governmental commitment to the growth of
telecommunications. The second part is empirical and presents the findings of a cross-national
longitudinal evaluation of the impact of changes in policies governing sector structure for the supply and
manufacture of telecommunications equipment, facilities and services, as well as the impact of
governmental commitment, on sector performance and distribution. The evaluation is conducted in the
context of the economic factors which are thought to condition the relationship between
telecommunication policies and outcomes. It finds that movement toward liberalization has had little
independent impact on telecommunications sector performance, but is associated with adverse
conditions of access to and availability of services. In contrast, governmental commitment to the growth
of the sector is found to be positively related with improvements in both sector performance and
distribution at all levels of national income and under different compositions of economic activity. The
findings suggest that if sector growth and development are important national priorities then attention
should be turned more toward stepping-up government investments rather than towards sector
restructuring.
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ABSTRACT
CHOICES AND CONSEQUENCES: A CROSS-NATIONAL EVALUATION
OF TELECOMMUNICATION POLICIES IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

NIKHIL SINHA
OSCAR H. GANDY JR.

Telecommunications are increasingly being recognized as
critical strategic infrastructure for ensuring the success
of national social and economic development plans and
programs, improving international competitiveness and
integrating domestic economies into the world economy.

In

an effort to overcome chronic deficiencies in
telecommunication performance and distribution of services,
many developing countries have been engaged in liberalizing
their telecommunication sectors.

Liberalization here

referring to the movement away from the traditional stateowned monopoly structure and towards the introduction of
privatization and competition.
This study examines the consequences of these developments
by analyzing telecommunication developments in 81 developing
countries from 1977 to 1988.

The study is in two parts.
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The first part is theoretical and (a) identifies the
technological and economic forces driving change in the
sector (b) reviews the policy options available to
developing countries (c) critically discusses the arguments
both for and against the introduction of competition and
privatization in the sector and (d) outlines the importance
of governmental commitment to the growth of
telecommunications.

The second part is empirical and

presents the findings of a cross-national longitudinal
evaluation of the impact of changes in policies governing
sector structure for the supply and manufacture of
telecommunications equipment, facilities and services, as
well as the impact of governmental commitment, on sector
performance and distribution.

The evaluation is conducted

in the context of the economic factors which are thought to
condition the relationship between telecommunication
policies and outcomes.

It finds that movement toward

liberalization has had little independent impact on
telecommunications sector performance, but is associated
with adverse conditions of access to and availability of
services.

In contrast, governmental commitment to the

growth of the sector is found to positively related with
improvements in both sector performance and distribution at
all levels of national income and under different
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compositions of economic activity. The findings suggest that
if sector growth and development are important national
priorities than attention should be turned more toward
stepping-up government investments rather then towards
sector restructuring.
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Telecommunications are increasingly being recognized as
critical strategic infrastructure for ensuring the success
of national social and economic development plans and
programs, improving international competitiveness and
integrating domestic economies into the world economy.

New

attitudes toward the economics of telecommunications and the
role it plays in overall growth and development are
gradually being translated into stepped-up investments in
the sector in many developing countries.

At the same time, telecommunications sectors the world over
are undergoing rapid change.

New information and

communication technologies, characterized by the convergence
of telecommunications and computers and the development of
integrated voice, video and data communication systems, are
creating opportunities for the introduction of new services,
changing the ways of delivering and accessing old services
and lowering costs across the board.

Reacting to these developments, governments, legislatures
and regulatory bodies in most developed countries are
engaged in rapidly transforming their telecommunications
sectors.

These administrations are also pressing for the
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restructuring of the international arrangement of
telecommunications and the opening up of telecommunications
markets in developing countries.

Governments in many

developing countries are themselves faced with the prospect
of pursuing internal policy reforms to overcome chronic
deficiencies in telecommunications performance and
distribution.

However, there is little knowledge on the conditions under
which telecommunications investments are best translated
into development benefits and the kinds of policies,
regulatory mechanisms and sectoral arrangements which
further the effective development of the sector.

Despite

this lack of awareness on the possible consequences of
telecommunication policies, many developing countries have
been engaged in the process of policy reform.

These changes

have almost unexceptionably been directed toward
liberalizing the sector.

Liberalization here referring to

the movement toward privatization and the introduction of
competition.

This drive toward liberalization is a marked departure from
the policy framework which has governed the
telecommunications sector in developing countries for a
number of years.

In the past, telecommunications was

considered a good example of a natural monopoly, an
essential public good that governments should provide in a
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non-commercial mode.

Consequently telecommunication

services were provided by public enterprises under monopoly
conditions.

Changes in the technology and economics of

telecommunications, it is argued, have eroded the condition
of natural monopoly.

Consequently, the state monopoly

structure is increasingly being held responsible for the
inadequate growth of the telecommunications sector in the
past, and is deemed likely to hinder expansion in the
future.

The theoretical underpinnings of this drive toward
liberalizing telecommunication policies are based on the
many virtues of the market mechanism that have been detailed
in neoclassical economics and which are being more or less
vigorously embraced by a number of countries.

Open

competition and the relatively unhindered operation of
market forces, it is argued, will result in stepped-up
sector growth and improved sector performance and
efficiency.

Therefore,

Saunders, Warford and Wellenius

(1983) argue that if the telecommunications sector in
developing countries were:
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" ... opened up to competition ... there should be few
reasons why large amounts of private capital would
not be attracted.
It is possible that if
governments backed away from total control of the
resources allocated to the sectoT ... that
telephones would begin appearing more rapidly in
response to the large unsatisfied demand ..... It
can also be argued on technological grounds that ,
during the next ten years in particular, extensive
government regulation of telecommunication
services in developing countries or a franchised
government monopoly may not be the best way to
create a dynamic, efficient, and responsive
telecommunications sector". (p. 283)

In short, the drive toward liberalization is based on the
assumption that private competition may be the most
appropriate mechanism for ensuring the growth and
development of telecommunications.

However, this belief in

the ability of markets to foster the growth of
telecommunications in developing countries, is not without
its critics.

Raul Katz

(1988) in his study of the information sectors in

developing countries, argues that -- in contrast to
developed countries where the development of
telecommunications is the result of economics forces -- it
is politics, rather than markets, that drives the growth of
telecommunications in developing countries.

There are two

main reasons for this, the first concerned with sector
efficiency, the second with sector equity.

First, despite the existence of some elements of
competition, telecommunication markets in developing
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countries are far from efficient.

Whether or not the

sector is a natural monopoly, there do exist significant
economies of scale which tend to be lost with the break-up
of the public network.

Additionally, the efficient

operation of the market depends upon effective competition
which is often difficult to achieve when economies of scale
are large.

Second, markets usually deal inadequately with the provision
of public goods or services like telecommunications.

The

market system works by putting a price on a service and the
allocation of that service between consumers is made by
their willingness to pay that price.

When prices reach

equilibrium it is assumed that demand for the service
matches supply.

This reliance on willingness to pay has

obvious consequences for equity since, as Sen (1990) points
out, "the willingness to pay also depends on the ability to
pay"

(p. 19; emphasis in original).

Hence, even under

conditions where competition can lead to improved sector
performance and efficiency, its introduction could
concurrently lead to a worsening of conditions of
distribution and equity.

Because of these dual shortcomings of the operation of
market forces, particularly with respect to developing
countries, Katz

(1988) argues that "the expansion of the
/

telecommunications infrastructure in most countries is a
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decision that pertains to political authorities"

(p. 58)

And one of the most effective instruments of political
commitment to sector growth is the amount of governmental
resources allocated to telecommunications.

Pool (1963)

argues that different investment practices may lead to the
development of very different communication systems and,
therefore, a major issue for most developing countries is
how much of their resources to invest in communications.

Thus we see that in seeking to find ways to further the
development of telecommunications in developing countries we
are faced with a number of competing approaches.

On the one

hand, there are those who argue that policy liberalization,
characterized by the movement toward the introduction of
private competition, -- i.e., the operation of market forces
-- may be the best solution for the problems of future
sector growth and expansion.

On the other hand,

governmental control and commitment to sector growth,
reflected in increased government investment in
telecommunications -- i.e., the operation of political
forces -- is also posited as the most appropriate mechanism
for telecommunications growth in developing countries.

At the same time telecommunication policies need to
reconcile the possibly conflicting objectives of performance
and efficiency vs. those of distribution and equity.

This

is an important issue since misplaced sector goals may run
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contrary to the strategies and objectives of the overall
development process.

Before we can determine what succeeds

in fostering sector growth and distribution and what
doesn't, we need to examine and define the role of
performance and distribution in the context of overall
development objectives.

This, in turn, requires the

delineation of the overall strategies and goals of the
development process.

In addition, the relationship between policies and sector
development needs to be examined in the context of the
economic environment within which it perforce operates.
There is considerable evidence from developed and developing
countries alike that the extent of economic growth and the
nature of economic activity are closely related to the
development of the information and communication sectors.
It appears probable, therefore, that different
telecommunications choices will have different consequences
for groups of developing countries differentiated from one
another on the basis of common characteristics and features
that impact significantly on the development of
telecommunications.

It follows that part of the challenge

of research is to construct such a typology which can assist
in the evaluation of the impact of telecommunications
policies in developing countries.
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This empirical study is a modest, albeit pioneering, attempt
to fill the knowledge gap that exists in the evaluation of
the policies that developing countries have followed with
respect to their telecommunication sectors.

It describes

the changes that have taken place in telecommunications
policies in 81 developing countries over a ten year period
as well as the ways in which their telecommunication sectors
have changed both in terms of performance and distribution.
It examines the relationship between policies and
telecommunication outcomes in the context of the economic
and political factors which condition the impact of policies
on performance and distribution.

The study identifies the technological and market forces
driving change and the pressures being faced by,governments
to restructure or reform their telecommunications sectors.
It details the choices available to developing countries in
terms of changes in policy, regulatory mechanisms and sector
restructuring

It is argued in the study that telecommunication sector
performance should be viewed not merely as improved
commercial efficiency, but that the importance of
telecommunications as developmental infrastructure requires
the definition of performance also in terms of developmental
objectives.

Through a historical and thematic review of the

literature of development economics and development
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communications, it formulates a perspective toward
development, establishes a mechanism for linking development
to telecommunications and lays down criteria for evaluating
policies.

Finally, it constructs a typology of countries based on
their telecommunication policies and relevant economic and
political factors and tests the usefulness of this
classification scheme in predicting telecommunication
outcomes.

The importance of evaluating telecommunication policies in
terms of their distributional consequences is laid out in
Chapter 2, in which the work in the sub-disciplines of
development economics and development communications is
reviewed in an effort to forge a link between
telecommunication policies and overall development
objectives.

In Chapter 3, the growing pressure on national governments
to re-evaluate their telecommunications policies and the
problems they face in reacting to these pressures are
discussed in the context of international developments in
telecommunications.

These pressures include: the need to

rapidly expand and improve basic services; to provide new,
less expensive services based on the latest technologies; to
raise investment levels by broadening the investment base
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and mobilizing new sources of capital; and to permit
domestic and international competition in the supply of
equipment, ownership of facilities and provision of
services.

Most developing countries, are severely constrained in their
ability to respond to the forces that are driving change in
the sector and, consequently, in their ability to cope with
these pressures.

Their problems are, inter alia, related to

investment levels, pricing policies, choices in sources of
equipment and provision of services and sectoral and
regulatory arrangements.

In addition, they are very often

faced with the difficult task of reconciling attempts toward
commercial efficiency with goals of distributional equity.

Chapter 3 also focuses on the economic dimensions of the
restructuring debate with particular emphasis on the
performance of state-owned or controlled monopolies and the
economic factors which condition the impact of policies on
performance.

It concludes with a discussion of the

different policy options available to and pursued by
developing countries.

In contrast, Chapter 4 is based on the contention that
economic factors are in and of themselves inadequate for
explaining telecommunications performance in developing
countries where the state is a critical factor in shaping
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economic outcomes.

This political dimension is implicit in

a study of policies, since policies are the expression of
political processes.

But the effective implementation of

policies in turn requires effective political commitment and
the importance of examining the impact of such commitment
(or lack of commitment as the case may be) in shaping the
telecommunications sector in developing countries is laid
out in this chapter.

This is done within a systematic

analysis of the role of the state in fostering industrial
growth in general, and in the telecommunications sector in
particular.

Chapter 5, lays the ground-work for the construction of the
classification scheme and ends with a statement of the_
research questions examined in the study as a whole.

The

next chapter lays out the methodological issues involved in
the selection and operationalization of the variables used
in the study.

Chapters 7 through 11 present the empirical

evidence and discuss the results.

Chapter 7 deals with

developments in telecommunications policies, outcomes and
commitment from 1977 to 1988.

Chapter 8 briefly looks at

economic changes over the same period.

Chapter 9 and 10

examine the relationships between policies, commitment and
economics first with telecommunications performance and then
with telecommunications distribution.

The results of the

classification analysis are discussed in Chapter 11, while
the conclusions are presented in the final chapter.
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The overall purpose of the study is to provide a theoretical
and empirical basis for developing countries to examine
issues relating to the restructuring of their
telecommunications sectors in the context of overall
developmental objectives.

In doing so it hopes to provide a

more informed basis for evaluating the consequences of the
various choices these countries have made with regard to
telecommunications pOlicies in the near past, thereby
providing guidance on the selection and implementation of
these policies in the future.
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Chapter 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Literature Review

The evaluation of policies followed by developing countries
with respect to the organization of their telecommunication
sectors is one of the central tasks of this study.

This

evaluation is based on the impact of these policies with
respect to two areas of telecommunications outcomes: sector
performance and distribution of services.

But before any

evaluation can be taken up it is essential to understand
\

just what exactly is meant by performance and distribution
and why the study of these two areas is important.

While

the next chapter deals in detail with issues relating to
sector performance, this chapter focuses on distributional
issues.

The review of literature that follows is guided by the
belief that sector policies in developing countries, whether
in the telecommunications sector or in any other sector of
the economy, must be framed in the context of overall
national developmental objectives and that corresponding
evaluatory criteria need to be derived from these overall
developmental objectives.

This requires, first of all, an

understanding and explication of goals and strategies of
development.
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Most explorations of the relationship between
telecommunications and development rarely attempt a
systematic definition, or even description, of the nature of
development.

For instance, in their influential review of

the role of telecommunications in development, Saunders,
Warford and We11enius (1983), identify three perspectives on
the relationship between telecommunication and development.

First, they suggest, there are those who feel that
telecommunications investments should be held well below
what is indicated through the operation of normal market
demand, particularly where such investments come at the
expense of outlays in other more "vital" sectors.

Second, there is the group that contends that
telecommunications should grow mostly as indicated by the
market, with operating entities behaving in most respects
like commercial enterprises with relatively unhindered
access to capital markets for investment funds, subject to
some governmental regulation to ensure wide access to basic
services and to protect the public's interest.

Finally, there is a more activist technology-oriented group
that promotes rapidly advancing telecommunications
technology as a prime means to achieve a wide range of
social and economic goals.

This group would not only

implement the growth of telecommunications as called for by
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market forces, it would push the growth further even if
supply outstripped demand and even if this called for
government subsidies for some services.

At the end of their

review, the authors ask:
Who is right? The importance of answering this
question can scarcely be exaggerated. If a strong
telecommunications infrastructure is indeed
essential for rapid and efficient development, its
neglect may severely hinder the success of
development efforts in both directly productive
and social sectors, and could impose inefficient
spatial settlement patterns on the rapidly growing
urban areas in the developing world.
If, however,
the present level of telecommunications service in
developing countries is sufficient (although'in
many towns, villages and semi-urban settlements it
is virtually nonexistent), then massive
investments in the premature expansion of a major
infrastructure would be not only a misdirection of
resources, but would create a serious burden of
unnecessary administration, training and
maintenance (p. 18).

This question is ill conceived without a detailing of what
comprises development.

This is not merely a classificatory

issue, but as will be brought out during the review of
literature, the definition of development determines not
only the strategy of development but the role various
sectors and policies within these sectors can play in the
development process.

Even if researchers have some operational definition of
development and relate telecommunications to that
definition, they rarely provide a framework which links
their definitions to the actual formulation of
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telecommunications policy in such a way as to provide a set
of criteria through which the objectives of those policies
can be laid down and/or their effectiveness in fostering
development can be evaluated.

As indicated in the introduction, commercial criteria for
measuring telecommunications performance (e.g.,
profitability or national density measures) may be
inadequate in the face of developmental objectives.

The

perspective toward development which will be established in
this chapter, requires the inclusion of distributional
outcomes as critical components of policy evaluation.

This

position is established in this chapter through a review of
the theoretical perspectives that have emerged from the two
sub-disciplines of development economics and development
communications.

It is difficult to make one-to-one correspondences between
the development of general intellectual traditions and
specific theoretical perspectives that have emerged in
different disciplines over time.

It is tempting however, to

explicate and describe trends in different disciplines in a
manner which suggests that they were historically coexistent
and shared the same intellectual roots, particularly while
dealing with two sub-disciplines that are concerned with the
same problem area.

However, poor historiography, may be too
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high a price to pay for contrived convergences, no matter
how well the glove appears to fit the hand.

In fact, it is far from easy to trace historical
developments in anyone field in a manner that precisely
delineates the periods during which one or another
theoretical position dominated.

This is equally true of

both development economics and development communication
where received "histories" of the field

do not always

reflect the fact that different theoretical approaches have
co-existed in the same historical periods. 1

Though such "histories" make for poor historiography, they
do, nevertheless, serve an important purpose: to distinguish
between different perspectives thus assisting in the
identification of the assumptions driving them and
furthering the growth of new perspectives that may modify or
extend the old paradigms.

What follows is not an attempt at

such a history but rather an effort at identifying different
ways of conceptualizing the economic foundations of
1. See for example Henriot

(1979); Stewart and Streetan
(1979) and Meier (1984) for historical perspectives on
development economics. And Lowery and DeFleur (1986) and
McQuail (1987) for received histories of the field of
communication in general and Rogers (1976); Schramm and
Lerner (1976) for development communication in particular.
More recently., a number of scholars have provided alternate
readings of the growth of the sub-field of development
communication, with an attempt to place its "history" in
political and ideological contexts, e.g., Golding (1974);
Beltran (1976); Narula and Pearce (1986); Jayaweera and
Arnunugama (1987).
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development and the role of communications in development,
based on thematic and/or postulatory commonalties.

The two

sub-disciplines will be considered separately before
attempting to identify congruences.

It should be emphasized

that the different perspectives which will be identified
within development economics and development communication
have not always been exclusive: theoretically, historically
or in their application.

Economics and DeveIopment

Dissatisfaction with the results of developmental efforts in
the Third World over the past four decades have led, in
recent years, to a refocussing and indeed redefinition of
the problems and strategies of development.

It is clear

that the manner in which the problem is defined has much to
do with the possible solutions which can be suggested.

In its earliest formulations, development economics viewed
the problem of development as a problem of growth.
capita gross national product

The per

(GNP/capita) was considered

the appropriate measure of the level of development and the
strategy of development aimed at boosting its growth rate
(Henriot, 1979).

This strategy

focussed upon the "creation

of conditions for self-sustained growth in per capita GNP
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and the requisite modernization of economic, social and
political structures implicit in the achievement of this
goal"

(Adelman, 1975, p. 306).

Influential accounts of

development in the industrialized countries, such as
Rostow's The Stages of Economic Growth (1960) served to put
the stamp of historical approval on the development-asgrowth assumption.

Consequently, the United Nation's First Development Decade
(1960-1970) set a quantitative target of a five percent
annual increase of GNP in developing countries.

Heavy

industrialization and capital accumulation through increased
national savings were the chosen instruments for achieving
this target.

The industrial sector was given prime

consideration in plans and programs.

This was usually

concentrated in or around cities and many countries
experienced rapid urbanization.

The strategy by-passed the

agricultural sector which was considered either a source for
primary products for export (e.g., cash crops like cotton,
sugar, coffee) or a support sector for the needs of the
industrial sector.

It is important to note that in this strategy for promoting
development, the question of income distribution and
equality were postponed.

The question of distributive

effects was subservient to the question of the rate of
growth.

It was expected that an ever increasing output of
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goods and services will in fact mean increased national
income which will "trickle down" to the masses.

That is,

given sufficient prosperity it was expected that benefits
would flow to the poorer sections because of increased
employment, redistributive taxation and the general health
and stability of the economy.

The second important dimension of this approach was its
treatment of developing countries in isolation.

Their

problems were seen to be primarily internal, the result of
local structures inadequate to the task of increasing
GNP/capita.

Essentially, the impact of colonialism and its

present-day legacy for underdevelopment were largely
neglected.

In terms of its own objectives, the strategy of growth-as
development was a remarkable success. As Owens and Shaw
observed in their 1972 book Development Reconsidered: "[t)he
5 percent annual increase in gross national product achieved
as a Third World average during the 1960s, and which was the
quantitative target for the United Nations' First
Development Decade, is roughly double the rate of economic
growth achieved in nineteenth century Western Europe and
North America" (p. 1).

Such a performance should have been

a indication of significant "development".

Yet even as

early as the end of the 1960s it had become clear that this
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"development" was not reaching the lives of ordinary people
in terms of any reduction of poverty.

One development economist put the issue in the following
way:
The questions to ask about a country's development
are therefore:
What has been happening to
poverty? What has been happening to unemployment?
What has been happening to inequality? If all
three of these have declined from high levels,
then beyond doubt there has been a period of
development for the country concerned.
If one or
two of these central problems have been growing
worse, especially if all three have, it would be
strange to call the result "development," even if
per capita income doubled. (Seers, 1969 p. 3)

Questions such as these led to the gradual emergence of an
alternate view of how to define the problem of development.
According to this view, the problem of development was not
the pace of growth but the relationship any increase in GNP
had to the poor -- especially the poorest 40 percent of the
population in the developing countries.

These poorest 40

percent were the marginals, people who neither contribute to
the productivity of a nation nor share in the benefits of
increased production (Henriot, 1979).

Their worsening situation was acutely brought out in the socalled "success stories" of Brazil, Mexico and India, which
had experienced relatively high growth rates of the national
product in the 1960s.

Writing of the growth-as-development
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approach, Adelman (1975) notes,

"[nJot only is there no

automatic trickle-down of the benefits of development; on
the contrary, the development process leads typically to a
trickle-up in favor of the middle classes and the rich"

(p.

302) •

The problem of "marginals", exacerbated by development
models aimed chiefly at GNP/capita increase and which
ignored distributive characteristics, was addressed directly
by Robert McNamara before the board of governors of the
significant World Bank Group meeting in Nairobi in 1973:
The basic problem of poverty and growth in the
developing world can be stated very simply.
The
growth is not equitably reaching the poor. And
the poor are not significantly contributing to
growth .... The data suggest that the decade of
rapid growth has been accompanied by greater
maldistribution of income in many developing
countries, and that the problem is most severe in
the countryside.
There has been an increase in
the output of mining, industry, and government -and in the incomes of the people dependent on
these sectors -- but the productivity and income
of the small farmer have stagnated.
One can
conclude that policies aimed primarily at
accelerating economic growth in most developing
countries, have benefitted mainly the upper 40% of
the population and the allocation of public
services and investment funds has tended to
strengthen rather than offset this trend
(McNamara, 1973, pp. 10-11).

When the strategy for the Second Development Decade of the
United Nations

(1970-1980) was devised, therefore, income

distribution, land reform and community organization were
given top priority along with objectives to develop social
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infrastructures like eduction, health and housing.

In

emphasizing the rural sector, this strategy did not neglect
industrialization.

But the criteria for evaluating the

success of developmental efforts were not simply the rate of
increase in GNP/capita.

Rather, this approach aimed at

ensuring that patterns of industrialization and rural
development led to the narrowing of income disparities and
improvement in the availability of key social resources.

Growth with redistribution, therefore, was the official
strategy of the Second Development Decade.

However, even

before the decade came to end, it had become clear that not
much headway had been made in most of the developing world
during the 1970s, particularly with regard to improvements
in the quality of life of the vast majority of the peoples
of these countries.

Writing in 1979, Norman Hicks and Paul

Streeten observed:
The disappointment with GNP per head and its
growth has led to a greater emphasis on employment
and redistribution. But it was soon seen, on the
one hand, that unemployment in the sense in which
the term is used in the developed countries was
not the problem in the developing countries and
that, on the other hand, redistribution from
growth yielded only very meager results (p. 568)

Moreover, new evidence from "model" countries like China
indicated that mass poverty can coexist with a high degree
of equality.

During the 1980s, equity-oriented countries

like China, Cuba, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and India found it
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necessary to give greater attention to economic efficiency
and growth.

An additional problem with this growth-with-

redistribution strategy was that, similar to the first
definition which emphasized "growth", it also located the
problem primarily as internal to the developing countries.
No effort was made in the analysis
policy response recommended --

or in the consequent

to place the problem of

development in any kind of international context.

A number of analysts, however, particularly from Latin
American developing countries, preferred a definition of the
problem which was much more historical in its emphasis upon
the evolving relationships between developed and developing
countries.

They saw the focus of the problem not located

principally within the developing world, but rather in
patterns of international economic interaction.

The basic issue, for these researchers, was not so much the
quantity of economic growth (as per the growth-asdevelopment perspective) or even the quality of social
growth (as per the growth-with-redistribution perspective)
but the quality of the process by which development was
achieved.

Economic and social development was important,

but the key question to be asked, according to this third
alternative was: who is controlling the process of
development?

To apply Paulo Friere's (1970) terminology of

the educational process to the international economic
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process, are Third World countries objects of development -at someone else's hand, or are they subjects of development
in control of their own destiny?

Attempts to answer

these questions gave rise to the theories of "dependency"
and "underdevelopment."

The different variations of theories of dependency and
underdevelopment are well represented in the writings of
Celso Furtado (1972); Andre Gunder Frank (1972); Theotonio
Dos Santos (1970) and Immanuel Wallerstein (1974).

All of

them pay serious attention to the colonial relationships
which have historically marked the growth of the countries
of Latin America, Asia and Africa.

They argue that outside

of an explicit recognition of the consequences of that
relationship no accurate understanding of the present
situation of these countries, characterized by "dependency"
and "underdevelopment," is possible.

"Dependency" means that the major decisions which affect
socioeconomic progress within developing countries
decisions, for example, about commodity production and
prices, investment patterns and monetary relationships
are made by individualS, institutions (including corporate
enti ties) and governments outs.ide these countries.

It is a

situation in which, according to Dos Santos, "the economy of
certain countries is conditioned by the development and
expansion of another economy to which the former is
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subjected .... The concept of dependence permits us to see the
internal situations of these countries as part of the world
economy"

(pp. 289- 9 0) .

"Underdevelopment" is the obverse of "development".

It

refers to the process whereby a country, characterized by
subsistence agriculture and domestic production,
progressively (or rather retrogressively) becomes integrated
as a dependent unit into the world market through patterns
of trade and/or investment.

The production of that country

thus becomes geared to the demands of the world market, in
particular the demands dictated by the industrialized
nations, with a consequent lack of integration within the
country between the various parts of its own domestic
economy.

Consequently, the dependicistas strategy of development
aimed at reducing dependency by taking greater control of
the functioning of domestic economies and insulation from
what they saw as the deleterious effects of external
economic relationships.

In its most extreme form, the

specific policies aimed at these objectives involved
delinking national economies from the world economy by
promoting self-reliance in production through importsubstitution, development of indigenous technology,
protectionist and restrictive trade practices and resistance
to integration in world trade.
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In its more moderate manifestations

(this is not to suggest

that elements of the above policies are not followed, but
that they are more flexibly and leniently applied) this
approach called f'or the reform of the international economic
order under the recognition that some degree of integration
is essential for growth.

In fact, under the pressure

exerted by developing countries adhering to this
international economic-reform-as-prerequisite-to-growth
strategy, the Sixth Special Session of the UN. General
Assembly adopted, in April 1974

(over the objections of the

industrialized democracies), a declaration on the
establishment of a New International Economic Order.

What is emphasized, therefore, in this third "alternative to
defining development, is the problem of the international
economic order, the structured relationships between rich
and poor nations.

"What is at stake," wrote an African

political scientist,

"is indeed the belated but still sorely

needed transition from an interdependence based on hierarchy
and Western charity, to an interdependence based on symmetry
and mutual accountability"

(Mazrui, 1975, p. 134).

Despite the ideological appeal of this conceptualization of
the problem of development, efforts to validate many of the
basic postulates of dependency theory, particularly as
explicators (as different from descriptors) of continuing
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underdevelopment have had little success. 2
argues, validation of dependency

As Lall

(1975)

requires that two criteria

be satisfied: that there be identified certain
characteristics of dependent economies which are not found
in non-dependent ones; and, that these characteristics be
shown to affect adversely the pattern of development in the
underdeveloped countries.

It appears, from his analysis of

both developed and developing countries that neither of
these criteria are fully satisfied

leading him to conclude

that:
"dependence" is defined in a circular manner: less
developed countries are poor because they are
dependent, and any characteristics that they
display signify dependence (p. 800).

Furthermore, the development performance of "exportoriented" countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and
Singapore is held out as a telling indictment of import2. These problems of empirical validation exist even after
accepting that the concept of dependency holds together as a
theory of underdevelopment and one that is useful for
explaining the continuation of underdevelopment in third
world countries.
In fact, this is far from being
established. As Laclau (1971) and Brenner (1977) attempt to
show, the ways in which the dependency theorists use the
concepts of development and underdevelopment are not only
incorrect from a Marxist point of view (the intellectual
tradition from which many of the dependency theorists
explicitly or implicitly derive inspiration) but also do not
very well succeed in demonstrating what they attempt to
demonstrate.
For example, Lac1au (ibid) points out that the
only way in which Gunder Frank can "demonstrate" that all
the periphery is capitalist and has been since the colonial
period is by using the concept of capitalism in a sense
which is erroneous from a Marxist point of view, and useless
for his central proposition, that of showing that a
bourgeois revolution in the periphery is impossible.

29

substitution, insulation and self-reliance -- the strategic
offshoots of dependency theory.

Technology importation,

export orientation and above all integration into the world
economy, it is argued, have been the underpinnings of the
performance of these countries, which has been marked by
growth as well as the lowering of inequality (Meier, 1984).

Perhaps equally important is the fact that in the process of
establishing inequities in the international economic order,
dependency theorists tend to gloss over and even ignore the
problems in domestic economic situations.

Though Dos Santos

(1970) does make an attempt to recognize, at the outset,
that there is no mechanical determination of internal by
external structures, as he proceeds in his analysis he
gradually re-establishes the primacy of the latter over the
former leading up to an analysis typified by antecedent
causation and inert consequences.

This all too brief

exposition of the main tenets of the

divergent approaches to identifying and defining the problem
of development has perhaps suggested that they were
incorporated into the process of development exclusive of
each other or that they represent a historical succession in
the formulation of ideas in this area.

This is not so.

In

fact, most developing countries have manifested some of the
strategies indicated by all three approaches in their
development plans and programs through the 1960s, 1970s and
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well into the '80s.

In fact, it is possible to isolate some

common features of these approaches which have been
propounded, in one form or another and with differential
degrees of emphasis, since the earliest formulations of
development economics.

In his illuminating, and rather controversial, essay,

"The

Rise and Decline of Development Economics," Albert Hirschman
(1981) identifies two major ideas with which development
economics came into being, namely, "rural underdevelopment"
and "late industrialization."

The former idea led naturally

to a focus on utilization of underemployed manpower and to
growth through capital accumulation.

The latter called for

an activist state and for planning to overcome the
disadvantages of lateness through what Hirschman (1981)
calls "a deliberate, intensive, guided effort .... with new
rationales for protection, planning, and industrialization
itself,"

(pp. 10-11) in short -- an economically active

state.

Within these themes, differential emphasis was placed on
growth, redistribution, and self-reliance at different times
in different countries.

These themes, particularly the

notion of planning and state action (which was perhaps the
single common strategy applied by all countries) were
closely linked to criticisms of traditional neoclassical
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economics as applied to developing countries. 3

It was

argued that neoclassical economics did not apply terribly
well to underdeveloped countries.

But, as Sen (1984) points

out, this was no surprising contention, since neoclassical
economics did not appear to apply very well anywhere else
either!

However, the role of the state and the need for

planning and deliberate public action seemed stronger in
underdeveloped countries,4 and the departure from
traditional neoclassical economics was, in many ways, more
radical.

As indicated earlier, the failure to substantially improve
the condition of the people of developing countries over the
past three decades, has encouraged the formulation of
alternatives to the traditional definitions and strategies
of development followed during this period.

The main

attacks have come from three very different directions.

The first, which may be termed the basic or minimum needs
approach, grew out of the earlier growth-with-redistribution
strategy.

The second approach, focussing on structural

3. See, for example, Rosenstein-Rodan (1943); Dobb (1951);
Nurkse (1953).
4. Primarily because it was believed that the neoclassical
mechanism for the processing of social claims, i.e., the
market (at least in the rudimentary form it existed) was
incapable of maximizing welfare since the assumptions on
which the maximization function was based did not hold in
developing countries. For detailed critiques of the market
mechanism see Rosenstein-Rodan (1955) and Chakravarty
(1973) .
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constraints, gets its inspiration from neomarxist and
radical political-economy positions.

The third perspective,

increasingly popular (or perhaps fashionable may be a better
description) and influential in terms of deciding the future
direction of development in general and the development of
telecommunications in particular, emphasizes economic
liberalization and deregulation and has emerged as an almost
natural outcome of the resurgence of neoclassical economics
in recent years.

These three positions will be considered

in reverse order.

The discrediting of traditional development economics that
has lately taken place, and to which Hirschman made
reference, is undoubtedly partly due to the reestablishment
of neoclassical economics, both in theory and in
application, at the forefront of national and international
development.

The market, it is argued, has the many virtues

that standard neoclassical analysis has done so much to
analyze, and state intervention could be harmful to the
efficient operation of this "natural" domain of economic
exchange (Johnson, 1984; Mckinnon, 1984).

Moreover, state

ownership, monopolization and/or regulation of economic
activities detract from the establishment of a market
equilibrium, promote inefficiencies in the allocation of
resources, underprice capital and overprice labor, and
encourage disguised unemployment

(Gurley, 1979).
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The attack on state activism and planning has been combined
with criticism of some of the other features of traditional
development economics.

It has been argued that enterprise,

is the real bottleneck, not capital (Sen, 1984).

Therefore,

capital accumulation through state intervention -- as was
suggested by Maurice Dobb (1951, 1960) and Paul Baran (1957)
was not only to bark up the wrong tree but also to climb
it, since the concurrent impact of state intervention is to
throttle free enterprise.

Externally, the isolation or

semi-isolation of nations pursuing import-substitution and
restrictive trade practices has contributed to the decline
of economic efficiency and technological development.
Liberalization, deregulation and the promotion of
competition (both domestic and international) are,
consequently, the key to future development strategy.

The neoclassical resurgence has drawn much sustenance from
the success of some countries and the failure of others.
The decade of unprecedented growth for the industrialized
democracies in the 1980s was coincidental with the
liberalization of state control over many economic
activities and the rolling back of the welfare state,
particularly in the U.S.A. and the U.K., constructed so
painstakingly during the Keynesian Revolution.

The collapse

of the state controlled economies of Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union at the very end of the last decade has probably

'~

1
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done little to alter the perception of the "naturalness" of
the free enterprise system.

In the developing world, the high performance of economies
like South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore -- based
on markets and profits and trade -bringing Adam Smith back to life. 5

has been seen as
On the other hand, the

low performance of a great many countries in Asia, Africa
and Latin America has been cited as proof that it does not
pay for the government to mess about much with the market
mechanism.

In fact, the neoclassical position has been

instrumental in instigating telecommunication sector
restructuring in developing countries.

The economic

arguments for such restructuring and the potential benefits
of liberalization of telecommunications are discussed in
detail in the next chapter.

Neomarxist analysts of the development process attempt to
adapt a system of thought that was initially formulated for
5. However, the attempt to interpret the South Korean
economic experience as a triumph of unguided market
mechanism, is not easy to sustain. As Sen (1981) points
out, aside from having a powerful influence over the
direction of investment through control of financial
institutions (including nationalized banks), the government
of South Korea fostered export-oriented growth on the secure
foundations of more than a decade of intensive importsubstitution, based on trade restrictions, to build up an
industrial base.
Imports of a great many items are still
prohibited or restricted.
The pattern of South Korean
economic expansion has been carefully planned by a strong
government.
This is true of a number of the other so-called
'Isuccess stories. 11
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the study of industrialized societies, to the less developed
countries.

Inspired perhaps by Paul Sweezy's (1964)

assertion that "capitalist development inevitably produces
development at one pole and underdevelopment at the other,"
the argument runs that the process of development in what
are essentially capitalist economies, will lead to (and has
in fact led to) the exacerbation of economic inequalities
(Gurley, 1979).

Whether due to the deliberate policies of

governments controlled by domestic or foreign capitalist
interests or due to the structural constraints imposed by
the existing power structure in societies, the result of
developmental efforts will be to promote the interests of
the dominant classes to the detriment of the emerging
proletariat or extant peasantry.

Thus capitalism, or state

capitalism as is usually the case in developing countries,
produces polarization day in and day out (Amin, 1976).

The only real path to development, from this position, lies
in the radical redistribution of power in developing
societies.

The redistribution of income or resources is

impossible as long as the structure of power remains intact
and inimical to the interests of the vast majority of people
in these countries (Stewart and Streetan, 1979).

Only

through such "structural" changes, whether peacefully and
gradually or through revolution and quickly, can growth and
equality be achieved.
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Within the mainstream of development economics, the failure
of the growth-with-redistribution strategy of the 1970s led
to a shift in concerns to the eradication of absolute
poverty, particularly by concentrating on basic human needs.
Meeting these needs in health, education, food, water
supply, sanitation and housing provides the new focus
and Streetan, 1979; Streetan, et. al., 1981).
Streetan (1981) points out,

(Hicks

As Paul

"the basic needs concept is a

reminder that the objective of the developmental effort is
to provide all human beings with the opportunity for a full
life"

(p. 21).

Basic needs are defined in terms of commodities
services) required to achieve certain results
nutrition, education, etc.).

(goods and

(adequate

Its essential premise is that

some needs can be satisfied only, or more effectively,
through public services, through subsidized goods and
services, or through transfer payments.

Mere redistribution

of income is not enough to ensure that these needs will be
met.

The consequences of not meeting these needs may,

in

fact, be an increase in inequalities in income distribution.

Policies should, therefore, be directed toward the provision
of those goods and services which meet basic needs and the
yardstick for measuring the progress and. effectiveness of
development should be some index of the extent to which
basic needs are fulfilled.

For example, indicators of
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infant mortality, life expectancy and basic literacy have
been used as the components of a composite "Physical Quality
of Life Index"

(PQLI) that is designed to measure results in

the meeting of basic needs, rather than inputs such as
income (Morris, 1979).

Recently,

the Indian economist Amartya Sen, has proposed an

approach that ties together and extends many of the ideas of
the "new" thinking embodied in the above approaches.
According to Sen, it is important to focus on what people
can do or can be, and development should be seen as a
process of emancipation from the enforced necessity to "live
less or be less.,,6

The capabilities approach relates to but is fundamentally
different from characterizing development as either (1)
expansion of goods and services (as was emphasized by the
growth-as-development economists and the early dominant
paradigm of development communications) or (2) structural
reform (as radical scholars insist upon)
needs

(3) meeting basic

(the current orthodoxy in both sub-disciplines) or (4)

liberalization through the operation of market forces

(as

emphasized by the emerging neo-classicists in both
development economics and development communications)

The

next few paragraphs will consider the differences between
the capabilities and these other approaches and will lead up
6. See Sen (1979, 1980, 1982, 1983 and 1985).
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to a formal definition of development in terms of
capabilities.

It has already been discussed how economic development was
thought of in terms of the expansion of the availability of
goods and services in a country, as measured by growth of
GNP/capita.

In fact, GNP/capita remains an important

indicator of development even today.

The World Bank

classifies countries according to this criterion and GNP
growth rates are still among the most oft quoted statistics
in any discussion of development.
are not altogether useless.

And indeed such measures

It is, if nothing else, a good

antidote to the temptation of building castles in the air
through overlooking the material basis of prosperity.

However, as Sen (1983) points out, while goods and services
are valuable, they are not valuable in themselves.

Their

value rests on what they can do for people, or rather, what
people can do with these goods and services.

This

distinction is important because "commodity fetishism" - to
borrow an expression from Marx (1887) - is such a widespread
phenomenon, and the role that exchange of commodities plays
in modern society tends to sustain that fetishism.

If the

.capabilities of each person were uniquely (and positively)
related to the national availability of goods and services,
then there would have been perhaps no great harm in focusing
on the total supply of goods and services.

But that
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assumption is a non-starter simply because,

if for no other

reason, the distribution (or rather maldistribution)

of

national income ensures that the ability to acquire control
over those goods and services is highly skewed.

For example, the nutrition of people depends not merely on
the national availability of food per head, but also on
distributional characteristic of the supply of food.

Hence

the capability of a person to be well nourished cannot be
identified or linked in a straight forward way with the
national availability of food.

Similarly, in the case of

communications, the right of individuals to be informed and
their right to access communication facilities cannot be
simply satisfied by increasing the number of media channels
(TV/Radio Stations; Newspapers)
per thousand population.

Or the number of telephones

Development, therefore, is not a

matter, ultimately, of expanding supplies of commodities or
services, but of enhancing the capabilities of people.

Analysts of the structural causes of underdevelopment take
as their starting point the problem of unequal distribution
of goods and services
countries.

(or, more generally, resources)

in

They trace this inequality to the distribution

of power in these countries.

This inequality exists because

some groups (usually a small

minority)

own and/or control

more of the resources (like land or income) of a country
than other groups

(usually comprising the majority of the
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people)

This uneven distribution and the institutional

mechanisms it depends upon is the root cause of continuing
underdevelopment.

Therefore, it is suggested that

development can only take place through changes in the power
structure of these countries manifest through an
equalization of resources.

However, as evidence from land reforms in a number of
countries has shown equalization of resources does not
necessarily lead to either meeting of basic needs or
improvements in the capability of persons to meet those
needs.

The problem with the structural approach is that it

takes the unequal distribution of goods, services and
resources as an indicator of the unequal distribution of
power rather than treating power as the relationship
between persons (or groups, regions or whatever the unit of
analysis) and goods, services and resources.

Consequently,

it fails to consider structural reform as only a means to an
end, namely, equality, and even when it does,then equality
is treated as an end in itself.

The

capabilities approach

also considers structural reform in relation to its ability
to foster equality, but equality, in turn, is considered
only as a means to improve the lives of people.

The approach of meeting "basic needs" which has emerged as
an important strategy of development (both for economists
and for communication scholars), has some similarities with
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the capabilities approach.
differences.

There are, however, significant

First, "basic needs" are defined in terms of

commodities,7 even though attention is paid to differences
in the commodities needed by different persons to satisfy
the same human requirements.

Thus the focus remains on

commodities even though the contingent nature of commodity
requirements is fully acknowledged (Streetan, 1981).

But

often the requirements for goods or services may not be at
all derivable from a specified set of capabilities, since as
Sen (1985) points out, the relation between a bundle of
commodities and a bundle of capabilities may quite possibly
be a many-one correspondence, with the capabilities being
achievable by more than one particular bundle of goods and
services.

For example, different combinations of media and

telecommunication services and interpersonal networks, may
deliver the same level of information.

Second, the commodity requirements for specific capabilities
may not be independently decidable for each person, group or
community, due to structural constraints and social
interdependence.

For instance, caste membership may be an

important constraint on the capability of an individual to
fully take part in the life of an Indian village.

Part of

this problem arises from an identification of "needs"
largely from the point-of-view of policy makers.

It is

7. In Streetan's (1981) words, "particular goods and
services required to achieve certain results."
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possible, therefore, that though "basic needs" may be
fulfilled, basic capabilities may remain unimproved.

Third, the notion of basic needs continues to view
individuals as passive targets of development.

The

objective of fulfillment of basic needs leads to the asking
of the question of what can be done for a person?

While the

capabilities approach leads to asking what can the person
do?8

Though this distinction may appear to be merely a

matter of outlook and emphasis, it can be quite important in
analyzing both the general objectives of development and the
specific policies pursued toward the attainment of those
objectives.

In one form or another, all the above approaches are
concerned with the supply and distribution of goods and
services, i.e., commodities.

In modern consumer theory in

economics, the nature of commodities has been seen in terms
of their "characteristics"

(Gorman, 1956; Lancaster, 1966).

For instance, rice has nutrition giving characteristics, but
other characteristics as well, e.g., satisfying hunger,
providing stimulation, meeting social conventions, offering
the opportunity to get together, etc.,
Isherwood, 1979).

(Douglas and

Not all these characteristics are easy

to pursue through the market particularly when dealing with,

8. Both now and in the future.
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what economists call, a public good, such as information
and, by extension, information technologies.

Even if the market could capture all the characteristics of
telecommunications

(or for that matter any other good or

service), it would still treat them in terms of goods or
services (in the interest of preventing tedious repetitions
goods and services will subsequently be clubbed together
under the label of goods) and would not indicate their value
beyond the monetary figure attached to them.

The

capabilities approach seeks to go beyond this by bringing
the user of the good into the equation.

A capability, then,

can be defined as a feature of a person (group, community,
region or any other form of social and/or economic division
which will subsequently be referred by the general term
"social entity")

in relation to a good.

(Sen, 1982).

This

rather, simple sounding definition contains within it a
number of different notions.

There is the notion of a good

- its total and distributional availability; that of the
different characteristics of the good; that of the
functioning of a social entity-and the limitations placed on
it through either individual of social factors; that of the
fulfillment of a need.

Taking the telephone as an example, the capabilities
approach to development is concerned with whether or not the
service is available (and the conditions of availability);
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its characteristic as an information channel (and other
characteristics, e.g, as a status symbol); the use social
entities can make of the service because of individual
characteristics related to age, gender, class, income,
education, social relationships, values and beliefs, etc.,
and social factors related to community norms, access to
other resources, the nature of the economic environment
(e.g., competitive, cooperative or collective) etc; and
fulfillment of needs like the acquisition of desired
information.

The capabilities approach sees development as

the outcome of the complex interrelationships between these
factors.

Te~ecommunications

and

Deve~opment

Like the initial formulations of mainstream development
economists, early communication scholars also tended to
locate the roots of underdevelopment within developing
countries.

These endogenous causes, to which communication

solutions were considered to exist, included traditional
value systems, lack of innovativeness, lack of
entrepreneurial ability and lack of a national
consciousness.

In short, the problem was one of old ideas

hindering the process of social change and modernization.
As Rogers and Svenning (1969) asserted,

"[d]evelopment is a
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type of social change in which new ideas are introduced into
a social system" [emphasis added].

Consequently, the role of communication in development was
to provide an inlet for the flow of ideas.

And what better

way to do this then to utilize the relatively modern
technology of mass communication.

As Katz and Wedell (1977)

point out, radio-listening and newspaper-reading were
considered "as the sociopsychological bricks of nation
building."

The role of the mass media was perceived at two

levels.

At the individual or community level they served,

firstly,

to introduce new ideas so as to overcome

traditional normative and psychological barriers.

Thus

Lerner (1958) wrote: "what is required to motivate the
isolated and illiterate peasants and tribesmen who compose
the bulk of the world's population is to provide them with
clues of what the better things in life might be"

(p. 19).

Secondly, to introduce innovations which could change
traditional modes of economic activity and result in what
Rogers and Svenning (1969) thought would be

"higher per

capita incomes and levels of living through modern
production methods and improved social organization"

(p.

9).

At a society wide level, the mass media are thought to aid
in the process of national integration, Thus Schramm (1963)
claims:
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In the traditional society a village is selfcontained.
Its news is the gossip of the
neighborhood.
Its concerns are those of the
families that live there.
In the process of
economic development the news becomes national
news.
The neighborhood interest persists, but now
must be related to the national interest.
The man
who had been chiefly a citizen of the village is
now self-consciously a citizen of the nation
(p. 38).

Second, the mass media were considered an important
instrument of social change.

Schramm (1964) again

emphasizes this point:
Free and adequate information is not only a goal,
it is also the means of bringing about social
change. Without adequate and effective
communication, economic and social development
will be retarded, and may be counter-productive.
with adequate and effective communication, the
pathways to change can be made easier and shorter
(p. ix).

With such emphasis being placed on overcoming behavioral and
attitudinal obstacles to development through the injection
of new ideas, it was inevitable that the early proponents of
development communication promoted the growth of the mass
media rather than telecommunications.

Karl Deutsch (1957)

did consider the role of telecommunications (or more
generally point-to-point communications) in the process of
nation building, but even for him the intensity of the use
of mail and telephones was more an indicator of national
integration than a cause of it.

Consequently, the

developmental emphasis in terms of communication was on the
rapid growth and penetration of the mass media (particularly
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radio) and the implementation of informational and
motivational campaigns through these channels.

The failure of these early approaches to fostering
development through communication has now been fairly well
documented and the reasons for the failure outlined in some
detail.

These critical reviews range from the self-

flagellation of the early theorists (Schramm, 1972, 1976;
Rogers, 1976), to the radical fulminations of Marxist
scholars in the west and in the developing countries
(Golding, 1974; Beltran, 1976); and from critiques from the
practitioner's point-of-view (Hornik, 1988) to critiques of
normative assumptions (Krippendorff, 1988).

The reformulation of the main tenets and goals of
development communication, within the mainstream of the subdiscipline, was put forward by Rogers and Schramm.
(1972)

led the way by admitting that,

Schramm

" [tJhe Western model

did not work as its proponents had expected."

In 1976,

Rogers attempted to bury the mistakes of the past (by
announcing the "passing of the dominant paradigm")

and claim

authorship of the new wave by redefining development as:
a widely participatory process of social change in
a society, intended to bring about social and
material advancement including greater equality,
freedom, and other valued qualities for the
majority of the people through their gaining
greater control over their own environment (p.
225) .
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The degree to which this definition is substantively
different from the old one is debatable.

However, in its

shift in focus to the distributional effects of development,
it was not unlike the growth-with-redistribution approach in
development economics and its extension the basic-needs
strategy.

And in similar fashion it was quickly elevated to

the position of the new orthodoxy in development
communication literature.

Thus Hudson (1974)

identifies the

two fundamental aspects of development as: "provision of
services to meet basic human needs, and shifting
responsibility for such functions from trained outsiders to
the people themselves"

(p. 35).

And Parker (1976) speaks of

the reduction of economic disparities through the provision
of increased opportunities through telecommunications.

However, conceptualization of the role of telecommunications
in development and the relationship between economic growth
and development was hampered at the outset by the lack of
past theorizing in this area. 9

In a review of literature on

the subject conducted by Hudson, et. al.,

(1978)

for the

9. This is not to suggest that the relationship between
telecommunications and development was not being examined in
other areas. As early as 1963 Jipp was writing about "The
Wealth of Nations and Telephone Density", and by 1964 the
International Telecommunication Union's Consultative
Committee on International Telephone and Telegraph had
launched its decade long GAS-5 studies. However, even these
studies were more concerned with identifying statistical
relationships and generating hypotheses for research with
particular attention to industrialized countries, rather
than developing theories about the role of
telecommunications in development in the third world.

49

International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the authors
write:
The role of telecommunications in developing
regions andcovntries within this new
"development"lU framework is uncertain.
The lack
of anything approaching definitive studies
concerning how telecommunications may affect, and
be used in economic development, and in particular
rural development, has caused difficulties for
national planners, telecommunications planners,
and international lending agencies such as the
development banks, in determining both investment
and price policies in the telecommunications
sector to make the best use of limited capital
resources for promoting national development
(p.

5).

Though this shortfall in theory was never quite remedied,ll
there emerged,

soon enough, a proliferation of literature on

the advantages of promoting the growth of telecommunications
in the development process.

A representative selection of

work in this area can be found in the works of Philip Okundi
(1975), Ithiel de Sola Pool (1976), Edwin Parker (1978),
Heather Hudson (1984), Melvin Webber (1980) and Manfred
Kochen (1982).

For instance, Pool argues that telecommunications can bridge
the gap between the North and South in terms of access of
scientific knowledge; Kochen contends that teleconferencing
would assist in the efficient allocation of resources; and
Webber suggests that telecommunications. enables countries to
10. As put forward by Rogers (1976).
11. Indeed the issue of what comprises development seemed to
fade almost as quickly into the background.
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more rationally organize and control the process of
urbanization.

Parker maintains that telecommunications is

critical to national cohesion defined as the ability of
diverse segments of society to communicate with one another,
while Hudson concentrates on telecommunication applications
in rural development in general and in health and education
in particular.

These diverse applications of

telecommunications indicate that they may be vital to the
ability to provide the "basic needs· that development
economists are currently focussing upon and are, therefore,
a vital infrastructure for development.

While these scholars take an "activist" stance toward the
development of telecommunications, another set of scholars,
influenced perhaps by the resurgence of neoclassical
economics, call for the development of telecommunications in
line with the operation of market forces.

In contrast to

the "activist" school, which implicitly or explicitly
recognizes the role of the state in accelerated development
of telecommunication facilities, this "market oriented"
group argues that the introduction of privatization and
competition are the most optimal ways to develop
telecommunications and the growth of telecommunication
services should be in response to market demand (Saunders,
et. al., 1983; Nulty, 1989; Wellenius, .1989; Aronson and
Cowhey, 1988).
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This view suggests that at least the demonstrated market
demand for telecommunications should be met and that new
technical applications should be provided when they are
demonstrated to be the most cost-effective way to meet
registered demand and to provide minimum telephone access to
more provincial areas. Here again policy prescriptions take
the place of a theoretical discussion because of an implicit
or explicit assumption that telecommunications form a vital
part of the national economic infrastructure and result in
widespread benefits

(ITU, 1976).

However, the concern here

is more with the role of telecommunications as
infrastructure for the successful conduct of commercial
activities (including industrial production, provision of
services and trade) both domestic and international.

These two groups of scholars rely on a common body of
empirical research to support their position that
telecommunications are beneficial to the development
process.

This research falls into four main categories:

o analysis of aggregate national data to identify the
relationship between key development indicators,
and investments in telecommunications;
o input-output analysis of national economic data to
determine the sectoral benefits of telecommunications;
o cost-benefit analyses of telecommunication project or
program specific data to determine the rate of return
on investments or consumer surplus ach.ieved by these
projects;
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o case studies of the application of telecommunications in
various sectors including health services, education,
agricultural production and marketing, fisheries and
primary industries.

Perhaps the most extensive survey of the impact of
telecommunications was conducted by the Consultative
Committee on Telephones and Telegraphs

(CCITT) of the

International Telecommunications Union (ITU) between 1964
and 1976.

Known commonly as the GAS-5 studies (ITU, 1976),

they identified a number of benefits accruing from
investments in telecommunications.

1.

These include:

Improved productivity in secondary manufacturing and
service sectors;

2. Potential energy savings through travel

substitution;
3. Decentralization of business and industry through
capability to transfer information quickly and
rapidly;
4. Benefits to consumers in providing information and

facilitating accurate ordering and delivery of
services;
5.

Increased efficiency and geographic coverage for
government administration and delivery of services;

6. Maintenance and expansion of tourism;
7. Organizational impacts on agricultural production

through improvements in ordering and delivery of
supplies and equipment, more timely access to
information and increased availability of marketing
information.

The GAS-5 studies suffer from two major deficiencies. First,
most of the discussion is nonempirical.

While the
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hypotheses generated in the reports about what
telecommunications may do for a society seem reasonable, the
high level of aggregation militates against their validation
through the provision of systematic or reliable data.
Second, the research and writing are almost exclusively
oriented toward industrialized nations.

The studies present

telecommunications as essential to mass production and mass
consumption societies.

countries which depend largely on

agriculture and primary sector industries, due to the
simplicity of production processes, may have little need for
this set of benefits associated with telecommunications.

The most common

national or cross-national studies of the

impact of telecommunications have been correlational in
nature.

A typical procedure has been to correlate

telephones per 100 population with GNP or GDP

(sometimes per

capita) with the ensuing coefficient always being of a high
magnitude (Marsh, 1976; Shapiro, 1976; ITU, 1968, 1972)
Unfortunately, national level indicators of telephone
density are inadequate, in themselves, for linking telephone
development with overall development objectives.

These

figures do not fully indicate the conditions of access and
availability of telephone service for different social and
geographical groups.

Moreover, statistical indicators in

this area are often heterogeneous, as with. the case of
telephone density where the figures for industrial nations
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reflect demand, while for developing countries they reflect
supply.

Also, no causal inferences may be made from these studies
since it is impossible to parse out the degree to which
telecommunications are influencing development or
development is influencing telecommunications.

Cross-

sectional correlational analysis does not permit for the
specification of the direction or magnitude of
telecommunications contribution to socioeconomic
development.

More recently, several studies have attempted to use more
sophisticated statistical techniques to uncover the nature
of the relationship between telecommunications and
development.

Hardy (1980, 1981) used a cross-national,

time-series regression analysis to analyze data for 37
developing countries over a 14 year period (1960-1973).

He

used GDP as a development indicator and telephone density as
a telecommunications indicator.

His results indicate that a

1 percent rise in the number of telephones per 100
population between 1950 and 1955 contributed to a 3 percent
rise in per capita GDP between 1955 and 1962.

However, the

lack of significant control variables undermines the
strength of these findings.

For instance, it is quite

possible that increases in installed industrial capacity

55

during this period resulted in a growth of both GDP/capita
and telephone density.

Perhaps more importantly, Hardy's study also suffers from
some of the same problems as do the correlational studies
cited earlier.

His analysis used national indicators which

does not indicate distribution within a country.

Income is

not likely to be evenly distributed and the number of
beneficiaries of economic growth may be very small.
Telephones are likely to be clustered in cities, so that
rural telephone densities (especially in countries in which
the vast majority of the people live in villages), may be
many times lower than national average.

While aggregate studies relate telecommunications with
national indicators like GNP, input-output analyses
(referred to by Saunders, et. al.

(1983) as structural

economic analyses) concentrate on the role of
telecommunications in the production process.

The typical

approach involves determining which sectors of the economy
utilize how much of telecommunications services

(ITU, 1965;

Lonnstrom, et. a1., 1975) or the extent to which the output
of the telecommunications sector goes to final demand (i.e.
to consumers whether individuals or businesses) and how much
of it is used as an intermediate service.that contributes to
the production of other goods and services in different
sectors (ITU, 1976; Kaul, 1979).
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Saunders, et. al.

(1983) report the findings of a World Bank

cross country input-output analysis which computed
communication input coefficients (the amount of
communication services purchased by each sector per unit of
sales of that sector), communication inputs to each sector
as a proportion of total purchases of that sector and
communication output distribution coefficients (the
proportion of total output of the communications sector
purchased by each of the other sectors) for several
developed and developing countries.

They found that the communications industry serves as an
input to nearly every other industry; most intermediate
communications output is utilized by the service sector; and
that most communication intensive industries have high
value-added and produce goods primarily for final
consumption.

Differences between developed and developing

countries in their sectoral use of communications inputs are
highest in the agriculture sector, and lowest in the
services sector with manufacturing occupying a middle
position.

Input-output analyses suffer from a number of short-comings.
Methodologically, such analyses rely on national income
accounts that generally do not have the level of
disaggregation of economic activities required to accurately
estimate the contribution of communications to various
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sectors. 12

In addition, the variance in prices of

communication services among countries and the fact that in
most cases prices bear little relation to costs, make crosscountry comparisons based on conventional input-output data
in terms of value of transaction, highly suspect.

More generally, input-ouput analyses are based on the
assumption that there exists an equilibrium between demand
and supply.

But, as Saunders, et. al.

(1983) point out, the

amount of telecommunications services consumed in developing
countries usually reflect supply not demand.

This is

because of the acute and persistent shortages in the supply
of telecommunications services as well as the poor quality
of most of these services, in many developing countries.

Cost-benefit analyses of telecommunication projects in
developing country are based on a variation of the
prescription of economic theory that financing of projects
in any sector should continue until as long as the rates of
return on investment of such projects exceeds the
opportunity cost of capital.

They claim that the real

opportunity cost of capital in these countries can be
determined only by comparing the rate of return of a
telecommunication project with the rate of return of the
12. For a general discussion of the problems associated with
using national income accounts for estimating the
contribution of information activities in economies see
Machlup (1980); Rubin (1986).
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best alternative investment program that would be
implemented if the funds were not spent on
telecommunications (see for instance Chapter 8 in Saunders,
et. a1., 1983).

Thus Kamal

(1981) found that the use of telephones in 146

Egyptian villages resulted in cost-benefit ratios ranging
from 69:1 to 126:1 (depending on the user) based on monetary
savings

(difference between the cost of a phone call and the

next "best" alternative), savings in time, indirect monetary
savings

(value of losses avoided in emergency situations)

and monetary savings from the efficient use of capital and
equipment.

Similarly Kaul (1981) computed cost-benefit

ratios ranging from 4:1 to 10:1 for a group of villages in
India.

The problem with the two studies reported above, problems
which they share with other cost-benefit studies, is that
they assume that the communication activity will take place
in the absence of telecommunications and that such
communication will necessarily be of a face-to-face type.
Consequently, when the "best" alternative to
telecommunications is identified as taking a bus to the
point where the phone-call waS made to, the cost-benefit
ratio is bound to be of a high order.

In fact, when users

are allowed to determine whether or not they will still
perform the communication activity in the absence of
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telephones, as well as to specify the alternative channel
they will use (e.g. travel by bus, train or write a letter
as set up by Chu, et. al., 1985, in their study of rural
telephone service in Thailand) the cost-benefit ratio was
rather low.

Case studies claim to offer considerable evidence of the
beneficial impact of telecommunications in specific areas of
socioeconomic development.

Such studies have focussed on

areas as diverse as market information, transport
efficiency, spatial isolation, trade, agriculture, health
and education.

To give just a few examples, the introduction of telephone
service into several rural towns and villages in Sri Lanka
allowed farmers to obtain, among other things, current and
direct information on wholesale and retail prices of fruits,
coconuts and other produce in Colombo (Saunders, et. al.,
1983) .

In Ethiopia, radio checkpoints between the port of

Assab and Addis Ababa to monitor the progress of trucks
carrying essential supplies for the capital have cut the
average journey time in half by providing early information
of breakdowns etc.

(Hudson, 1981).

In Guyana, weekly

conference calls between rural health workers and physicians
in Georgetown facilitate early diagnosis, treatment and
evacuation of patients (Goldschmidt, et. al, 1982)
copper mining company in Papua New Guinea uses

A
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telecommunications to manage its international investment
portfolio while remaining headquartered close to the mine
(Hudson, 1984; for a full review of case studies see Hudson,
1984; Saunders"et. al., 1983).

Case studies in the area of telecommunications and
development suffer from the same problems as do case studies
in other fields: they are not easily generalizable and the
lack of quantitative data makes it virtually impossible to
rule out other explanations for the relationships described.
More specific to the area is the fact that there may be,
quite conceivably, some threshold or take-off point below
which the country, region or sector simply does not have the
resources in terms of capital, trained workers and
infrastructure to apply telecommunications constructively.
For example, installing telephones in a semi-arid region
sparsely populated by nomads living at a subsistence level
would, in all likelihood, contribute little to the economic
development of the region.

Unlike the "activist" and "market-oriented"

approaches just

discussed, structuralist approaches are far from optimistic
about the role of telecommunications in development.

Their

basic tenet is that communication processes cannot be seen
in isolation from the societal arrangements under which they
have developed and the structural constraints which
determine both the outcome and the nature of the process
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through which they exert their influence.

Structural

constraints are defined as societal obstacles that restrict
the opportunities of an important number of individuals to
participate fully and equitably in the development process
and in the sharing of benefits of a given social system
(McAnany, 1980).

Clippinger (1977) sums up the position as

follows:
Telephony development ... is generally by and for
the elite groups ... primarily confined to the more
modern and urban areas of society .... By creating
an urban-based communications infrastructure,
which is only accessible to a limited segment of
society, economic opportunity becomes further
concentrated in urban settings, and hence urban
migration is encouraged (p. 23).

For instance, Karunaratne (1982) points out that
telecommunications investment in a country must be examined
in terms of who is served.

For example, in Papua New

Guinea, the density of telephones is nearly 1.3.

However,

only 0.6 percent of the total indigenous population are
telephone subscribers, while over 30 percent of the
expatriates have telephones.

About 70 percent of Brazil's

telephone lines, in 1985, were in cities that accounted for
only 20 percent of the country's population; in Thailand, in
1981, 89 percent of administrative subdistricts with 75
percent of the country's population, had no telephone
(Wellenius, 1989).
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In its more radical manifestations, this approach maintains
that revolutionary structural and institutional reform must
precede the introduction of telecommunications in developing
countries.

Thus Schiller (1989)

argues that:

[i]t is a mistake to believe that the changes
required to overcome the global and local
disparities in human existence will be facilitated
by developing telecommunication systems.
In fact,
the opposite result may be expected.
Existing
differentials and inequities will be deepened and
extended with the new instrumentation and
processes, despite their loudly proclaimed and
widely pUblicized potential benefits.
Only after
sweeping changes inside dozens of nations, in
which ages-old social relationships are uprooted
and overturned, can the possibility of using new
communication technologies for human advantage
begin to be considered (p. 112).

As in the sub-field of development economics, there exists
in the development communication literature a group of
scholars who examine the role of communications in the
context of the structure of the asymmetrical relationships
between developed and developing countries.

The main

foundations of the dependency approach in development
communications are generally similar to those in development
economics.

The main thesis of these scholars is that the

dependency relationship, including the communication aspect,
has been historically imposed on the developing countries
and external structural factors play a dominant role in
determining underdevelopment.

Therefore, it is necessary to

remove the ways in which communication dependency is being
maintained.
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Two main approaches exist within this tradition.

There are

those who consider that communication dependency leads to
"cultural imperialism" (Schiller, 1973, 1976; Mattelart,
1979; Beltran 1975) and those who view communication
development as following the impulses of capitalist
expansion by seeking out new markets in developing countries
(Guback and Varis, 1982; McAnany, 1984, Schnitman, 1981).
For both, the developed countries use communication to
recolonize the developing countries in ideological or
economic terms.

It is apparent from the above review that most of the
theoretical and empirical research in development
communication has been done with respect to the impact of
mass media or diffusion of innovations.

Consequently,

whether the work is in the now much maligned "dominant
paradigm" of development communication or whether
representative of one of the many extensions, modifications
or critiques of this tradition, the role of communication in
development is assessed almost entirely in relation to
information which comes from outside of the unit of
analysis.

In similar fashion, much of the work in the

emerging telecommunication and development sub-field also
focuses on the impact of telecommunication with respect to
their ability to bring information from distant areas,
usually from urban to rural areas.

Information, information

64

technology and communication processes are treated as
exogenous to the development process.

More recently some scholars have begun to formulate models
in which communication plays an endogenous role in
development.

For example, the convergence theory of

communication (Kincaid, 1988) views communication as "a
dynamic process of convergence and social systems as
networks of interconnected individuals who are linked by
patterned flows of information"

(Kincaid, 1988, p. 209).

From this perspective, the extent of exchange of information
between social entities is a circular or interactive process
leading to systemic equilibrium, social-structural unity or
development.

By extension, this paradigm enhances the role

of interactive communication technologies, i.e.,
telecommunications, in the development process.
Kincaid writes,

Thus

"a two-way flow of information would

represent a much more 'unrestricted' flow of information,
according to the convergence theory.

In other words,

dialogue is a less restrictive flow of information than
monologue"

(Kincaid, 1988, p. 219).

Kincaid (1988) maintains that the level of information that
a society can support is a function of the amount of
resources and time that it can devote to the processing and
sharing of new information while maintaining the minimum
amount of cultural cohesion necessary for sustaining the
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society.

Modern communications technology, which both

increases the amount of energy that can be expended for
information sharing and reduces the time, would enable a
society to support higher levels of information and
information sharing.

Telecommunications also increase the possibility of many
more members of society being engaged in this process of
"information sharing."

However, this possibility is

realizable only when telecommunication resources are
distributed evenly within countries.

Skewed distributions,

whether vertical (e.g., class based) or horizontal

(e.g.,

region based) may lead to the isolation and marginalization
of deprived groups.
The role of telecommunications in increasing societies'
developmental potentialities is also implicit in
Krippendorff's

(1988) discussion of autopoietic systems.

Krippendorff distinguishes between the ecosphere and
noosphere of a social system.

The ecosphere is "the

totality of observable behaviors" in a social system and the
noosphere "is the information (pattern, difference,
knowledge) which underlies the observable phenomena"

(1988,

p. 132)
Changes in the ecosphere are essentially allopoietic,
tending toward equilibrium and integration, but
communication plays an important role in these processes
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too.

For example, interactive technologies bring dispersed,

distant or otherwise independent elements into interaction.
But essentially, elements in the ecosphere are the
realization of the patterns of information existing
noosphere.

in the

These patterns contain specifications or

blueprints for the organization of processes in the
ecosphere.
Information processes in the noosphere give rise to the
rules or codes which govern observable behavior in the
ecosphere.

These communication processes are called

"multisexual" by Krippendorff in that they may be assembled
by connecting or linking a multiplicity of different parts
or domains, thus creating new specifications or codes for
the subsystems in the ecosphere.
point out,

Thus, as Krippendorff

"information processes in the noosphere can limit

or create the potentiality of behaviors that are realizable
in the ecosphere ... information processes applied to the
noosphere expand society's potentialities"

(1988, p. 135).

Telecommunications can possibly expand those potentialities,
and that of society, by making possible more and new
combinations of the multisexual reproduction of information.
The amount and variety of communicative interaction
sustainable in the noosphere may possibly be increased many
times through the multiplicity of communication channels
made possible by telecommunications, and the multiplicity of
nodes linked by it through these channels.
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Summary

The preceding review of the development of theoretical
positions in development economics and development
communications has traced how the earlier approaches in both
subdisciplines gradually gave way to new perspectives.
These perspectives have either extended the old orthodoxies
or critiqued them from what may be termed radical, liberal
and neoclassical perspectives.
It is apparent that there is a wide divergence between these
views as to what constitutes development and the strategies
required to bring it about.

Perhaps the most critical

difference is that the first two strategies place emphasis
on the equitable distribution of resources, while the third,
the neoclassical position, view the operation of market
forces as the best mechanism for the achievement of
developmental goals.

It is apparent that the movement of thought in development
economics and development communications (except for the
neoclassical perspective) has been mainly toward recognizing
the importance of distributional outcomes of development
processes.

While the earlier approaches focussed mainly on

growth through exogenous forces, the more recent approaches
underscore the importance of the equitable distribution of
resources, goods and services, i.e., the importance of
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balanced growth.

A major reason for this change has been

the shift in the overall perspective of development from the
national level to the development of regions, groups and
individuals within countries.

It is now increasingly recognized that regional, economic
and social entities can play an important role in the
development process, as long as they are provided the means
and resources to fully participate in the lives of their
nations.

The role of governments, and by extension of the

policies governments formulate to govern various sectors
like telecommunications, must therefore be to ensure that
the conditions necessary for such participation are
available and that no regional, economic or social entity is
systematically deprived of access to those resources.
It is only from the neoclassical perspective that the
operation of market forces is considered the most
appropriate mode of allocation of resources, largely
irrespective of the distributional consequences of market
mechanisms.
Based on this review it is possible to establish a general
criterion for the evaluation of telecommunication policies:
telecommunication policies should foster the growth of
telecommunications so as to achieve equitable conditions of
access to and availability of services among regions,
communities and individuals with the aim of increasing their
potential for capability enhancement.
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This important understanding -- that the equitable
distribution of telecommunication services is an important
component in the development process -- is one that has been
ignored in most studies of telecommunications.

It follows

that the evaluation of telecommunications policies in terms
of developmental objectives should necessarily include
distributional outcome measures in addition to the usual
evaluatory criteria of commercial performance and/or
national level indicators of the availability of
telecommunication services.
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Chapter 3

DEVELOPMENTS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Despite the importance of examining the distributional
consequences of telecommunications policies, most of the
debate on sector restructuring has centered around issues of
performance and commercial efficiency.

This policy debate

has been triggered by recent changes in the technology and
economics of telecommunications.

Telecommunications, Technology and Economics

The world environment of telecommunications has changed
dramatically in recent years and is continuing to do so at
an accelerating rate.

Merging communication and computer

technologies have sparked innovations that are transforming
global and local activities of all sorts.

No economic,

political, or social entity is exempt from the influence of
the telecommunications revolution.

The pressure on

traditional telecommunications systems stemming from changes
in technology first became acute in the United States about
fifteen years ago.

During the last five to seven years,

they have manifested themselves throughout the
industrialized world and have instigated profound changes in
the policy and structure of the telecommunications sector.
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It was inevitable that these forces would also impact upon
the developing countries.
In developed countries, policy formulators have responded by
rolling back regulatory mechanisms and permitting different
degrees of competition in the supply of equipment and
services.

This is the same prescription that is being

suggested to developing countries for two main reasons.
First, because as neoclassical economists argue,
telecommunications can no longer be considered a natural
monopoly.

Therefore, the state monopoly structure, which

has characterized the supply of telecommunications in
developing countries for decades is now seen as the main
hurdle to sector growth.

Second, because of the belief that

competition will result in the realization of the social
benefits of cost based pricing.

The Demise of Natural Monopoly

Telecommunications have traditionally been viewed as the
quintessential public utility.

Economies of scale, combined

with political sensitivity created high entry barriers and
large externalities (Nulty, 1989; Aronson and Cowhey, 1988).
Telecommunication was believed to be a natural monopoly, an
essential public good that governments should provide in a
noncommercial mode.

Put briefly, a natural monopoly is said
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to exist where the economies of scale are such that to have
more than one entity in the market would increase costs to
an extent that would be detrimental to society.

That is, it

is a situation in which one entity can supply the entire
market at lower cost than two or more entities.

The second

major characteristic of a natural monopoly is large sunk
costs, or capital investment.

That is, the development of

the infrastructure or facilities required to provide
telecommunication services requires such high capital
investment that it would be a waste of societal resources to
duplicate these facilities.

Such high sunk cost also

function as a very real barrier to entry for potential
competitors.

As a consequence telecommunication services in

most countries were provided by public sector enterprises
under monopoly conditions.
This situation pertained not only to the provision of
services but also to the ownership of facilities and the
manufacture and supply of equipment.

Within this

environment, development activity focused primarily on the
extension of standard service, the building of basic
networks and improvements in the performance of operating
entities.

Recent developments in information and

communication technologies, it is argued, have dramatically
changed this situation.
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First, it is argued that technological developments have
dramatically lowered barriers to entry in the manufacture of
telecommunication equipments, establishment of
telecommunications facilities and provision of
telecommunication services.

The plummeting cost of basic

network components (switches, microwave links, cables,
multiplexers, etc.) as well as the development of
alternative facilities

(cellular radio, DES systems) have

made it easier and cheaper for customers and competitors to
communicate by means other than the traditional public
switched telephone network.

The second important impact of the "telecommunications
revolution" has been the creation of new services and new
ways of delivering traditional services.

As information and

communication techniques are extended, they have been
continuously adapted to the specific needs of widely
differing activities.

The result has been a proliferation

of new services.

judicial opinions, for example, are

U.S.

abstracted and entered into an electronic data base by
clerical workers in South Korea, are stored in Mead Data
Central's computers in the United states, and are accessed
by lawyers allover the world.
in medicine and agriculture.

Similar data networks exist
Computer programmers in India

write software for Texas Instruments in Dallas (Feketekuty
and Hauser, 1984).

In short, the real impact of the

telecommunications revolution has been the transformation of
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world markets into integrated global information systems
based on electronic interchange.

Participation in

international finance at the present time, for instance
as a major borrower, investor or banker -- requires access
to telecommunications and information systems that connect
the financial centers around the world twenty-four hours a
day.

The same goes for the tourism and travel industries,

commodities exchange, fashion design and many other
activities. 13

In other words, the global economic system is increasingly
being electronically integrated: without adequate access to
the systems by which the world's business is done, no
country can do business in the world.

Access to reliable

telecommunications appears to have become an economic
necessity for commercial interests in every country, while,
at the same time, the "technological revolution" has
multiplied the available, or potentially available, forms of
telecommunications access and has drastically altered their
costs.

These two developments are generating enormous

pressures, from both the demand and the supply sides of the
industry, on existing telecommunications organizations in
all countries.

13. The foregoing discussion does not intend to suggest that
the emergence of new technologies by itself necessitates new
structural arrangements, but rather that technological
change creates the pressures and opportunities for
regulatory reform of existing structures.
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On the demand side, as more and more companies and
individuals perceive that access to adequate
telecommunications services is essential to their
livelihood, they try to make telecommunications entities
(usually PTTs) provide the needed services.

If the latter

are unable to respond adequately and at prices the customers
consider reasonable, customers are driven to seek other
remedies.

Not infrequently, these unsatisfied customers

include some branches of government -- the military,
railways, power utilities, major state enterprises and so
on.

For instance, the Indian Railways are currently in the

process of installing a multi-million dollar optical
communications net that will almost completely by-pass the
domestic telephone system.

In short,

in the face of

unresponsive systems, some of the biggest and most important
users may well by-pass the public network, leaving it
without some of its most lucrative customers.
On the supply side, sources of telecommunications services
that represent alternatives to the offerings of PTTs
increasingly available.

are

Aggressive suppliers of equipment,

systems and services are proliferating and are actively
seeking new customers, especially, but not solely, among
large, internationally active firms.

Examples of

alternative service providers, licit or otherwise, abound
(Nulty, 1989).

Customers apparently need more and better
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telecommunications and have more alternatives for acquiring
them.
In the changing telecommunications environment, it is
argued, no monopoly enterprise can provide efficiently and
at reasonable cost all the services that all its customers
may demand.

Nor are the sunk costs so high that duplicate

facilities cannot be maintained.
al.,

Therefore, Saunders, et.

argue:
The concept of a natural monopoly producing well
defined service outputs and achieving lower unit
costs because of economies of scale may no longer
be the dominant factor in dictating sector
organization ... the introduction of private
enterprise and competitive stimulus may be the
option to consider (1983, p. 283).

This analysis of the impact of the so-called information
revolution on the condition of natural monopoly may well be
based on a misunderstanding on the ways in which
technological developments impact upon economic conditions.
As Hall and Preston (1988) have argued in their book The

Carrier Wave: New Information Technology and the Geography
of Innovation,

it is the swarming of innovations across the

economy that lead to upswings in economic cycles, not
isolated technological applications in anyone sector.
Secondly, the lowering of sunk costs may not be enough to
warrant the duplication of infrastructure, given the low
levels of capital formation and limited foreign exchange
situations that characterize most developing countries.
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Finally, there is little evidence to suggest that the
introduction of private competition will result in
improvement in sector performance.

Indeed, the United

States, which is often held up as the exemplar of the
advantages of a competitive market structure, in fact
provides evidence of the benefits of a regulated monopOly.
By the time the Bell System was broken up telephone service
was available to over 90% of all households in the country.
This was made possible through
the monopoly system.

cross-subsidization within

Businesses subsidized residences,

long

distance subsidized local, urban subsidized rural and large
users subsidized small users.

The monopoly system may still

be the best way of achieving affordable universal service.
It appears probable that the main lesson to be learned from
the U.S. experience is that if there are advantages to be
realized by introducing private competition they may be
achieved only after a certain level of development has been
reached.

That is, the impact of policies on performance may

be conditioned by the general level of economic development
and the composition of economic activity.

The high

correlations between per capita GNP and telephone density
have been well established by a number of studies that have
analyzed aggregate national data to identify the
relationship between key development indicators and
telecommunications performance, suggesting that perhaps a
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certain level of growth is a necessary condition for
expansion of telecommunications.

Similarly,

the input-output analyses of national income

accounts cited earlier, have found that much of the
intermediate and final demand for telecommunication services
goes to the service and manufacturing sectors and very
little to the agriculture sector, suggesting that the
composition of economic activity may be an important factor
in the growth of telecommunications.

The Benefits of Cost Based Pricing

The second plank of the restructuring argument rests on the
much wonted social welfare benefits of cost based pricing.
According to economic theory resources are allocated
efficiently when markets are permitted to operate free of
distortions.

When prices are aligned with costs, there are

fewer distortions in the information received by markets and
greater overall efficiency is achieved because decisions are
made on a rational basis.

When prices are not determined by

costs, i.e., when subsidies are in play, there is no
assurance that demand is being met efficiently.
first instance, if prices are higher than.cost

In the
(as they are

for most domestic long-distance and international services
in developing countries) then lowering prices to cost will
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result in an increase of demand the value of which is more
then the cost of the increase in production of the service.
This expansion is socially beneficial to the extent that the
value of the incremental demand is greater than the value of
the incremental cost.
Second, if prices are set below cost, as they are for most
local, residential and rural services,14 then raising prices
to cost will lower demand whose value to consumers is less
than the decrease in cost now not incurred because the
service is no longer being provided.

Again society gains.

In short, the gains to social welfare from moving
telecommunication rates to cost consist of the net increase
in value associated with increased demand for those services
currently priced higher than cost combined with the savings
in cost associated with the reduction of those services
currently priced lower than cost.
Economic theory, therefore, suggests that social welfare is
maximized when prices equal marginal costs and any deviation
from marginal cost-based pricing results in a net loss in
social welfare.

And the best mechanism for achieving this

situation is competitive market.

Thus, Saunders, et. al.,

maintain that:

14. Usually through subsidies from excess profits made from
tariffs for long-distance and business service.
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" ... in a developing country, a primary objective
of deregulating the [telecommunications] sector
and allowing competition and private enterprise to
develop would be to mobilize financial resources
... and achieve both short- and long-run
allocative efficiency by allowing prices to equal
the marginal cost of further expanding the
services ... "(p. 2831
Most discussions of the social benefits of cost base pricing
usually omit the most important assumption on which its
effectiveness is based, i.e., that demand matches supply.
This is not the case with respect to telecommunication
services in developing countries where demand clearly
outstrips supply.

This study, for instance, found the

following means for waiting lists for telephone lines
expressed as a percentage of total installed telephone lines
in 64 developing countries (Table II.

Clearly, the demand

meets supply assumption is being violated here.

TABLE I
SIZE OF WAITING LIST AS A PROPORTION OF SIZE OF SYSTEM
MEANS BY GNP/CAPITA
LOW

55.84
Source: Appendix IV

MIDDLE

40.49

HIGH

32.34
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Even if there are gains to be had from-cost based pricing in
particular and liberalization in general then to whom do
these gains accrue?

Lewis Perl

(1986) in his prospective

analysis of the 'consequences of cost-based pricing in the
United States shows that while the average gains in consumer
welfare would be about $77 per year per household, the gains
for households with incomes over $25,000 would be as much as
$182 while for households with incomes less than $6000 there
would be a net loss in consumer welfare of about $68 per
year.

The distributional consequences for countries in

which income and telephone use patterns are even more skewed
and demand for telephone services, particularly among lower
income households, is extremely elastic, could be even more
deleterious.
Certainly one of the consequences would be to reduce the
number of subscribers and, consequently, the network
externality associated with telecommunications.

Network

externality may be described as a condition in which the
social value of a service for any subscriber increases as
the number of total subscribers increases.

In the case of

telecommunications, network externality dictates that there
is a direct relationship between allocative efficiency and
the number of consumers.

If the goal of telecommunication

policies is maximizing social welfare through increasing
allocative efficiency then policies which reduce the number
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of actual or potential subscribers may be deemed
inefficient, even by the economist.

Clearly, a

c~.

dimension of telecommunication policy evaluation is its
impact on price,particularly the price of basic residential
service.

If prices are too high (thereby reducing the

number of potential subscribers) then the policies have
reduced allocative efficiency in addition to worsening the
distributional situation.

Telecommunications Policies: Constraints and Options

Telecommunications entities in developing countries find
themselves in a serious bind.

On the one hand, technical

degradation of the network from overload and inadequate
maintenance, potential diseconomies from proliferating and
fragmented systems and loss of revenue to cross-subsidize
the extension of the basic network are particularly acute
problems.

Loss of revenue from large customers looms even

larger as a potential problem for these countries than it
does for industrialized countries because the proportion of
total traffic concentrated in such customers is greater
(Nulty, 1989).

On the other hand, it is becoming

increasingly difficult for PTTs to provide the services
large customers need and demand.

Proponents of sector

restructuring (usually considered synonymous with
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liberalization, i.e., movement toward privatization and the
introduction of competition) identify three factors, partly
interrelated and endogenous to the sector that, they claim,
are inhibiting the growth of telecommunications in
developing countries (see for example Wellenius, 1989)

The first factor relates to sector policies.

The argument

runs that telecommunications enterprises are usually viewed
as traditional public sector utilities without regard to
their business character or resource mobilization potential.
In particular, they often lack financial and administrative
autonomy, have little incentive to improve performance, are
not allowed to remunerate and promote staff as necessary to
attract and retain specialized personnel, are denied tariffs
that reflect costs, cannot access capital markets despite
being profitable businesses and suffer from government
interference in management.

Second, telecommunications investment is constrained by
countries' limited capital resources, especially in foreign
exchange.

On average, about US$2,000 is needed to provide

one additional telephone line, of which 50-80 percent is in
foreign exchange in most countries (Wellenius, 1989).
Furthermore, like other public or para-public entities,
telecommunications enterprises are subject to investment
ceilings related to broader efforts to contain public sector
spending.

From this perspective a major policy objective
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needs to be improving the profitability of telecommunication
entities and this is employed as an important criteria in
evaluating telecommunication policies.

Third, weaknesses in the organization and management of
telecommunications enterprises result in high expansion and
operating costs, poor maintenance and limited capability for
project preparation and implementation.

As a result,

telecommunications development often cannot be accelerated
even when more funds are made available.

Consequently,

improvements in network capabilities is another major goal
for sector policies.

This includes not only increasing

telephone and line densities but also increasing traffic
densities.

The pressure on telecommunication entities to improve and
expand basic services and provide new, more advanced
services, comes precisely as governments find themselves
increasingly strapped for funds.

The inability of

governments and PTTs to react to these pressures is causing
real political difficulty.

Dissatisfaction with

telecommunications is becoming front page news in many
developing countries.

Governments are beginning to feel

that failure to deal with this discontent threatens not only
development in general but even, at times, their own
political survival.
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Though developing countries are looking closely at the
reforms initiated in industrialized nations, movement toward
a market-driven system is not altogether easy.

Access to

telecommunications services is, and will always be, a
politically sensitive issue because it confers differential
commercial and political advantages on those who have it.

A

purely market-driven system of development and allocation
could tend to produce a system that concentrates
disproportionately in the main cities and on the wealthiest
and largest customers.

This concentration not only can

cause political problems, but can also impede the
realization of important socioeconomic goals, such as the
decentralization of economic activity and the development of
rural areas.

But the commercial pressures that are

reflected by concentration on high-density, high-income
customers, sectors and regions can not also be ignored.
Goals of distributional equity and commercial efficiency are
difficult to reconcile and developing countries will have to
look toward policy mechanisms that will, at the least,
minimize the conflict between the two and thereby simplify
the political choices.

Finally, there is the issue of the policy options available
to most governments.

There are three major policy areas

where decisions are likely to be made in .the near future:
physical components including manufacture and supply of
equipment; structure of communication facilities; and,
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services offered, including terms and conditions of use of
facilities.

Telecommunicatiohs equipment manufacturing is attractive to
many of the larger or more advanced developing countries
because it is the one high-technology electronics-based
subs ector for which there is a large, stable and assured
domestic market.

It is thus seen as both a good investment

in itself and a good springboard into advanced technology in
general.

Policies to promote telecommunications

manufacturing vary from direct public sector investment
(India), private domestic manufacturing (Brazil) and private
domestic and foreign competition (Mexico).

But direct

competition from imports (until recently) has seldom been
allowed.

In this respect, developing countries are largely following
the examples set by most advanced countries at a similar
stage of development.

However, this situation has been

changing over the past decade or so as more and more
countries turn toward importing equipment as well permitting
foreign collaborations in an effort to overcome
technological backwardness.

Developing World

Communications (1989) estimates that by the year 2000 over
50% of the new demand for telecommunications equipment would
be from developing countries.
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In principle, domestic manufacturing can benefit the PTT in
terms of delivery coordination, after-sales support, tailormade products, and joint research, development and
engineering.

Additional benefits of domestic manufacture

include savings on foreign exchange through import
substitution and protection of an infant industry.

A fully

protected manufacturing industry can become a major
constraint on telecommunications development, however, if
the domestic industry (a) produces outmoded products;
does not meet international quality standards;

(b)

(c) is a high

cost producer; or (d) is unable to meet delivery schedules
(Wellenius, 1989).

Alternatives to a fully protected industry include
subjecting domestic equipment manufacturers to full
international competition.

Another option could be to

provide sufficient protection to encourage investment by
guaranteeing that a certain portion of the domestic output
would be purchased by the PTT (provided it met standards of
price and quality), while subjecting the remainder to open
competition.

The issue of facilities sector restructuring is probably at
the core of the policy decisions that governments will have
to make in relation to the development of
telecommunications.

The available options fall along a

continuum ranging from minor loosening of bureaucratic
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constraints on the state-owned PTT to open competition and
private ownership.

Real or potential competition creates a

number of policy dilemmas.

On the one hand, if no

competition is permitted, increased autonomy for the PTT may
simply lead to greater exploitation of monopoly power.

On

the other hand, if unrestrained competition is permitted,
either (a) the PTT may destroy the competition by abusing
its dominant market position and its control over
bottlenecks or (b) competitors may succeed in selecting only
highly profitable customers, i.e., engage in cream skimming,
so that the PTT retains the loss makers.

There are also other options in facilities restructuring.
National monopolies can be divided into separate regional
operations.

Another way could be to set up separate

entities for local, national and international facilities.
However, most of the options now being contemplated by
policy makers, generally occupy some point on a continuum of
compromises between absolute monopoly for the traditional
enterprise and completely open competition.

This seems to

be true also for the third area of policy interest -- the
provision of services.

Aronson and Cowhey (1988) have provided a useful typology of

telecommunication services.
basic and enhanced services.

They differentiate between
Basic services can be local or
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long-distance.

Enhanced services can be further divided

into value-added and information services (Table II).

TABLE II
Classification of Telecommunication Services

Basic

Value-added

Telephone
Telex/
Teletext (without
store and forward)
Telegraph
Facsimile
Centrex (b)

Information (a)

Videotex
Telex/Teletext
(with store
and forward)
Electronic mail (b)
voice Mail (b)
Centrex (b)
Protocol Conversion
Packet Switching
video conferencing

Data-base
Services
On-line
computer
services
E-mail
V-mail

(b)
(b)

Information
brokers

Source: Aronson and Cowhey (1988)
(a) Value-added services require basic services to function.
Information services require both value-added and basic
services to operate
(b) Classification in dispute

Basic services are telephone, telex and telegraph services
in which messages transmitted by the carrier are not altered
in any way by the carrier.

Value added and information

services are gradually being provided by telecommunication
entities in developing countries. Enhanced services are
differentiated from basic services when the information
provided by the sender is changed, stored, manipulated or
otherwise acted upon in the network, before the recipient
receives it.
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In the changing telecommunications environment it is argued
that no monopoly PTT can provide efficiently and at
reasonable cost all the services that all its customers may
want.

Too much attention given to special (mostly large

business) customers will detract from the delivery of basic
service.

But if too little attention is given to special

services,

large users will either obtain them elsewhere or

will not get them at all.

Governments appear to have little

choice but to seek a balanced regime consisting of some
combination of monopoly and other providers of services.
How such a system should be structured requires findings
answers to a number of questions.

Which services should remain,

on economic or political

grounds, the exclusive preserve of the telecommunications
entity?

Which should be open to other providers rather

then, or in addition to, the existing entity?

What rules

should govern interaction within the competitive sphere and
between the monopoly and competitive spheres

(e.g., rules

regarding conditions for entry, interconnection standards
and prices, and permissible competitive practices)

so as to

create a level playing field and promote efficiency.

For most developing countries there are four main ways of
restructuring the supply of services:
separate business networks;
to offer services to others;

(a) establishing

(b) allowing dedicated networks
(c) diversifying the provision
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of value-added services; and (dl

subcontracting services.

The final shape of the telecommunications environment in
developing countries will be a product of the choices
governments make in these three areas over the coming years.

Sununary

Despite the economic arguments being put forward for the
liberalization of telecommunication sector policies in
developing countries, it is not altogether clear that
liberalization alone will lead to improved sector
performance.

The main areas in which policy changes are

being made in pursuit of significant improvements are in the
expansion of the public network, operational efficiency, and
demand and financial performance.

This study examines the

impact of policy developments over the past decade in each
of these areas.

No matter what the nature of this

relationship, there is considerable evidence that the impact
of policies on performance is conditioned by the level of
development and composition of national economies.

The

effect of these economic conditions and their interaction
with policy choices needs also to be examined.
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Chapter 4

POLITICAL COMMITMENT AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

As detailed in Chapter 2, part of the reason that little
attention was paid to the development of telecommunications
during the earlier phase of developmental efforts in the
Third World was due to the lack of theoretical perspectives
on the relationship between telecommunications and
development.

This resulted in the relative absence of

studies in this area and consequently a dearth of evidence
on the social and economic benefits to be derived from
telecommunications.

Consequently, telecommunications was a

low priority investment area for both national governments
and international lending agencies.

But in recent years, as

discussed in Chapter 3, responsibility for the relatively
backward state of telecommunications in

developing

countries has been increasingly laid at the door-step of the
state monopoly structure that characterized the sector for a
number of years.
The state-owned monopoly structure is held responsible for
the many ills that plague the telecommunications sector in
developing countries.

It is held responsible for the unmet

registered demand for services, for being unable to improve
and expand basic services, for excessive concentration of
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services in urban areas, for the sector's inability to meet
the needs of large commercial users through the provision of
enhanced and value-added services and for failing to raise
investment capital.

The solution now being suggested to

this problem is nothing short of the removal of
telecommunications from the public sphere.

Thus Nulty

maintains

" ... Before telecommunication entities can improve
their performance ... they must be permitted - and
required - to behave like commercial businesses
under conditions of competitive market
discipline ... "(1989, p. 56)
And Wellenius argues
" ... Merely increasing the share of public funds
and external aid will not nearly suffice to
redress these shortfalls.
Improving the
efficiency with which existing telecommunications
enterprises use scarce resources is at best a slow
process - and more importantly is unlikely to
produce significant results .... alternatives to the
traditional state telecommunications monopoly must
include private participation, competitive
discipline and the autonomy and commercial
discipline of the enterprise ... "(1989, ~. 23)

This ascription of blame for the present ills of the sector
on the public enterprises, is based in part on a selective
reading of the history of telecommunications development.
Heather Hudson in her book When Telephones Reach the Village
(1984) argues that a major part of the reason why basic
services could not be expanded, registered demand not met,
and facilities concentrated in urban areas was because
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national planners and international lending agencies
considered telecommunications an urban luxury utilized
mainly by large businesses and corporations.

Telephone

utilities, whether privately or publicly owned, were
generally required to set rates that covered their costs and
allowed for an additional fixed rate of return.

Much of the

excess revenues over costs were reinvested in expanding and
upgrading the system; the rest became profits for private
companies, or revenues that could be used to subsidize other
sectors, such as postal services, for government-owned
entities.

As revenues easily exceeded costs by a

comfortable margin, there was little incentive to look for
benefits beyond those which turned up on the balance sheets
(Hudson, 1984).

In developed countries like the United States, there was an
implicit assumption about the benefits of
telecommunications.

Most countries, until recently, had

policies designed to provide universal and affordable
services.

Consequently, regulatory policy in these

countries ensured that high revenue areas and services cross
subsidized high cost users and services.

In developing countries, however, both national planners and
international lending agencies took the position that
telecommunications should be generally self-supporting in
the short-term and loans were approved only if there was a

95

high likelihood of a healthy internal financial rate of
return (Hudson, 1984).

For instance, World Bank policy was,

for a long time, that utilities should be financially viable
and recover the full cost of service from their tariffs
(Saunders, 1982).

In practice, these requirements led to

financial support primarily for installing and

upgrading

urban facilities and interurban trunk routes with less
support for rural service.

As Chasia (1976) points out, the

effects of domestic policy and foreign finance, so far, have
been to widen the "cleavage between the rural and urban
areas in the field of telecommunications"

(p. 15).

The lack of a well developed rural economic sector seems to
suggest that there is little need, in developing countries,
for the types of telecommunications seen in more
industrialized nations.

While this argument may reflect the

actual distribution of telecommunications among and within
nations, it is important to note that the technology of
telecommunications has primarily been oriented toward urban
usage and telecommunications were considered more important
for urban rather than rural areas.

It is not certain, given

these circumstances, whether the low level of rural
telecommunications reflects actual differences between rural
and urban areas in their needs for certain types of
communication systems or whether it reflects a series of
self-fulfilling prophecies which have systematically
oriented policy makers in developing countries toward
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concentrating on telecommunications development in urban
rather than rural areas.

Policy evaluation requires the

systematic analysis of the impact of different choices on
the distribution of telecommunications in rural as compared
to urban areas.

It appears that the slow growth and skewed development of
telecommunications in developing countries is more a
condition of deliberate domestic policy supported (if not
directed) by international development agencies.

If this is

case, the solution to the problems that ail the sector may
lie in the exercise of political commitment in increasing
the growth rate of telecommunication investments rather than
in the economic solution of liberalizing the sector.
fact,

In

it is increasingly being recognized that political

factors play an important role in shaping information and
communications in developing countries and the state plays a
pivotal role in this process.

Katz maintains that the growth of "telecommunications
technology [in developing countries] is strongly determined
by government policy"

(1988, p. 58).

Similarly, Jonscher

argues that improvements in the information sector "may not
be realizable without active intervention by governments and
other policy makers"

(1983, p. 27).

In short, states may be

the active drivers of growth in telecommunications, apart
from and/or in addition to economic variables like market
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structure.

Katz

(1988) cites related examples of the

computer industries in Brazil and India where government
intervention had significant results.

Conversely, states

can play a restraining role by denying sectors resources and
investment opportunities.

In short the extent of state

commitment to growth of a sector may be critical in
determining the extent of its growth.

This argument is in keeping with the emerging body of
literature on the role of the state in development.

For

instance, Evans (1985) has argued that the state may act as
a relatively autonomous actor which helps shape the
development of local productive forces.

Indeed, the

importance of the state in the development of the industrial
sector in Asian countries like India, Pakistan, Malaysia and
Sri Lanka (Pattnayak, 1990) and in Latin America (Cardoso
and Faletto, 1978) cannot be overestimated.

Moran (1974)

has studied the evolution of the state's role in the
extractive industries in Peru,

He argues that even modest

attempts by the government to shift resources to the sector
resulted in rapid growth and the formation of a trained pool
of workers.

Similarly, in South Korea, an aggressive state

helped rapidly increase industrial production (Sen, 1981;
Frieden 1987).

In fact,

if we compare the performance of the industrial

sector in Brazil and South Korea to that of Argentina and
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Chile, the importance of state commitment becomes all the
more apparent.

During the 1970s highly active governments

committed to stepping up industrial production in Brazil and
South Korea fared better than those in Argentina and Chile
where the intent was more to allow the unhindered operation
on market forces

(Diamond, 1983).

Diamond (1983)

argues

that the productivity of the industrial sector in developing
countries depends considerably upon government behavior.
This behavior is manifest not just through sector policies
but, even more importantly, through the amount of resources
it allocates to different sectors.

The role of the state in economic development is neither new
nor limited to developing countries.

Since the depression

of the 1930s there has been a steady growth of the state's
role in countries across the globe.

In the industrialized

democracies, the emergence of the managerial state to combat
the crises and resolve the contradictions of capitalism has
been one of the significant developments of the present
century (Dahrendorf, 1959; 1977).

In addition, growing

state regulative and welfare functions since World War II
have contributed to an enormous expansion of the state
apparatus and corresponding state activities in the
industrial and related sectors.

This expansion is even clearer in the structuring of
economic and social systems in Third World countries in
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general

(Skocpol, 1979; 1985), and in the process of

industrialization in particular (Stepan, 1978; Evans, 1985).
The role of states in the industrialization process can be
multi-layered.

In its most rudimentary form states set the

legal and institutional environment for the operation of the
rules of property and commerce.

In its most usual form,

states regulate markets since the effective operation of
markets in developing countries often requires the presence
of strong and interventionist states.

In their most powerful manifestation states assume to
themselves the task of industrial development by
establishing public sector enterprises.
Evans

Reuschemeyer and

(1985) argue that through public enterprises the state

becomes an active participant in production and market
exchange and partially supersedes the way in which markets
combine information, incentives and economic power.

Through

such enterprises the state itself becomes an agent of
capital investment.

This is justified by the need to

overcome impediments to private investment created by high
sunk costs, long gestation periods and large externalities.

For instance, Jones and Mason (1980) point out that stateowned enterprises tend to be located in sectors where high
capital requirements and longer paybcack periods suggest the
disciplines and incentives of competition cannot be counted
upon to produce optimal behavior on the part of private

100

capital.

The effectiveness of state participation in the

market is further enhanced if such sectors have important
forward or backward linkages.

Typically, these sectors are

usually part of the economic infrastructure like power,
health, education, transport and communications.

Finally, state enterprises also permit states to most
effectively control the growth and development of the
sector, by keeping enabling them to control the allocation
of the resources.

In addition, it also enables them to

pursue distributional outcomes by directly influencing the
allocation priorities within the sector.

As Reuschemeyer

and Evans (1985) point out, states engaged in redistribution
efforts cannot rely on the mechanism of the market but must
seek the same results through administrative means.

One way

to overcome the problem is through the establishment of
public sector enterprises.
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Chapter 5

RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

Towards a Telecommunication Typology

The technological and economic forces that are driving
c~angein

the telecommunications sector in the more advanced

countries are also, clearly, having an important impact on
developing countries.

These forces are resulting in new

opportunities, as well as new pressures, for developing
countries to overcome protracted constraints on sector
performance and distribution.

While the particular timing and nature of the solutions may
vary, no country can afford to ignore the broader range of
strategic options that are emerging.

Unresponsive

structures in the telecommunications sector may
hinder economic and social development.

continue to

Responses to these

changing conditions raise broad policy issues that were,
until recently, thought to be relatively unimportant.

However, even if the appropriate responses in the forms of
policies are identified, it is not all together clear
whether these are easily generalizable throughout the
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developing world.

Critics argue that cross-national

quantitative research is superficial and does not contribute
to an accurate understanding of the complexity of the
interaction of the variables involved (Walton, 1984). Some
are in favor of choosing, at the very most,

"a small number

of nations that provide maximum leverage for testing
theoretical issues"

(Kuhn, 1987, p. 726).

On the other hand, country specific research provides
insights that are little help in translating experiences and
lessons across countries.

Such studies, by focussing on

individual country histories, highlight crossnational
inconsistencies.

But it is normal to find similar outcomes

among countries.

Slomaczynski (1981) argues that the most

efficient way to explain and use such similarities is to
focus on what is structurally similar in the countries under
study and not on the often divergent historical processes
that have resulted in the structural similarities.

These divergent positions are outlined by Ranis

(1977) who

points out that there were two major prevailing views about
development across countries in the early years after the
Second World War.

One, that every developing country is sui

generis and that only country-intensive studies are likely
to contribute to the understanding of the development
process; the other, that a general theory of
underdevelopment applicable to all such countries existed
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and that strategies based on such a theory could be as well
applied in Afghanistan as in Argentina.

In more, recent years, there has been a marked convergence
between these positions via the acceptance of the notion of
halfway houses or subfamilies of developing countries.

This

convergence is not just the result of adopting a compromise
position, nor are such typologies merely heuristic in
nature.

They are the consequence of the recognition that

grouping countries according to certain characteristics not
only aids in the identification of conditioning factors in
development processes, the appropriate specification of
development models, and evaluation of policy prescriptions,
but can also assist in the transfer of relevant acquired
knowledge, experiences and lessons from one country to
another.

As Adelman and Morris (1973) point out, "the

solution of many theoretical problems in the social sciences
requires the development of adequate typologies of societies
or social traits"

(p. 112).

In development economics, this trend toward typology
construction is exemplified, on the one hand, by the work of
Horace Chenery (1980) and Montek Singh Ahluwalia (1984),
which has moved away from homogeneous 50-country samples and
toward the attempt to differentiate empirically among
different country types; on the other, traditional
expositors of development typologies, for example, of the
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land-surplus and labor-surplus school, have begun to open
their models to other inputs like trade.

It is maintained, here, that cross-country studies of
telecommunications need to do both of the above. 15
Consequently, this study will attempt to empirically
construct a typology of the countries selected for analysis
which differentiates these countries not only in terms of
telecommunication policies but also on the basis of the
economic and political factors that have been identified as
both differentiating characteristics in their own right and
as conditioners of the impact of telecommunication policies.

A major objective of this study, then, is to provide some
basis upon which governments and policy makers can evaluate
the potential consequences of pursuing different policy
options in the context of the state of both their country's
political and economic development and the state of its
telecommunications systems.

While it is obvious that the

same choices may have different consequences for different
types of countries it is hoped that the classification
scheme developed here will permit for an evaluation of
telecommunications performance at a more generalized level
than would be possible through a country specific approach
15. No study reviewed has so far used a typological approach
to cross-comparison in telecommunications, and few of them
have included other variables in differentiating between
countries.

105

and at the same time more specifiable than would be possible
if the developing countries were treated as a single group
or even as smaller groups differentiated on the basis of
characteristics not directly related to their
telecommunications systems.

Research Questions

The main intention of this study is to evaluate the policies
that governments in developing countries have pursued with
regard to the ways in which their telecommunications sectors
are structured and organized.

These consequences relate to

two sets of outcomes: the first to the performance of the
sector in terms of network expansion and commercial
efficiency; the second to the distributional consequences of
policies in terms of access to, and availability of, basic
services.

This evaluation is informed by the inclusion of the domestic
economic and political factors that are thought to condition
the relationship between telecommunication policies and
telecommunication outcomes.

However, before presenting the

specific research questions examined in this study, it is
perhaps appropriate at this stage to identify the main
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related areas excluded from the study, and the rationale for
their exclusion.

Though this study is concerned with the evaluation of
national telecommunication policies, domestic policies are
themselves conditioned and affected by the international
environment within which they are, perforce, formulated.

As

Bruce (1989) points out, national telecommunication policies
seldom evolve in isolation from the international economic,
technological and political pressures.

It has already been

pointed out how technological changes have led to the
integration of international economic activities to the
extent that access to reliable worldwide communications is
becoming an economic necessity for businesses as well as
governments in many developing countries.

Moreover, multinational corporations (MNCs), seeking to
expand into markets in the third world, and relying
increasingly on telecommunications to control and coordinate
their the global activities, are pressing national
governments to provide new facilities, enhance flexibility
in the use of those facilities, offer new services and lower
prices.

Many of these MNCs are prominently represented in

organizations of telecommunications users such as the
International Telecommunications Users Group

(INTUG) from

where they are in a position to apply considerable leverage.
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These pressures are beginning to disrupt the traditional
arrangement for providing telecommunications services in
developing countries.

For instance, the reduction of

tariffs for many international services is eroding what was
once a highly profitable business for many countries (Bruce,
1989).

As revenues drop, administrations must find new ways

for maintaining revenues.

Most of the ways being considered

involve the break-up of the state monopoly structure.

In summary, many governments in developing countries, in an
effort to respond to global pressures are revamping their
telecommunication policies.

Naturally, these developments

have an important bearing on domestic telecommunication
outcomes.

But whatever be the nature of the international

pressures, it must not be forgotten that their effect on
domestic telecommunications systems are channeled through
the policies that national administrations adopt.

An

underlying premise of this study, therefore, is that while
international developments constitute a context for the
formulation of domestic policies, they do not determine them
in any straight-forward manner.

Policy-makers in developing

countries have some degree of flexibility and leeway in
defining the shape of their telecommunication sectors.

Moreover, the fact that global changes are taking place in
the technology of communications, and that economic or
political pressures are increasingly being felt by
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governments to alter the arrangement through which they
provide telecommunications services, does not mean that
policy makers are forced to adopt anyone set of options.
The choice is not a simply between a monopoly environment
and unrestrained competition in all areas in the
telecommunications sector.

There are a host of options falling along a continuum
between these two poles in each of the equipment, facilities
and services sub-sectors.

The effectiveness and

consequences of these different arrangements for
telecommunications performance and distribution could be
considerable and need to be empirically determined -- which
is the focus of this study.

In short, while recognizing

that international developments may have an important
bearing on the formation of policies, it is the impact of
the policies themselves, that is the central concern of this
study.

If the impact of international developments on the evolution
of domestic telecommunication policies is a major area
excluded from the empirical analysis in this study, the
other major area is the consequences of telecommunications
outcomes for development within countries.

It has been

suggested in Chapter 2 that the equitable distribution of
telecommunication services is an important criterion for the
evaluation of telecommunication policies.

This criterion
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was developed through a review of theoretical developments
in the two sub-fields of development economics and
development communications.

In development economics, the capabilities approach put
forward by Amartya Sen argues for the equitable distribution
on the grounds that the availability of resources is
essential to the enhancement of the capabilities of
individuals, groups, regions, etc., and, by extension, to
the process of national development.

In development

communications, the network-convergence theory (Kincaid,
1989) and Krippendorff's theory of autopoeitic systems both
suggest that access to telecommunications can increase both
individual and societal potentialities, again contributing
to the development process.

These theoretical propositions, however, are not directly
analyzed in this study since the impact of telecommunication
policies on the enhancement of capabilities or
potentialities is not examined.

The primary reason for this

exclusion is that it is premature to address these issues
when the relationship between polices and distributional
outcomes has not even been established.

If indeed, as

theorized, the equitable distribution of telecommunications
has important consequences for the development process, then
the relationship between policies and distributional
outcomes must be established before the impact of different
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policies on development can be evaluated -- and that is what
this study hopes to accomplish.

It is apparent that the study of the telecommunications
sector involves a number of different dimensions and levels
of analysis.

Taken as a whole the national

telecommunication systems consist of telecommunication
policies which evolve under pressures from domestic and
international political, economic and technological factors.
These policies have consequences for telecommunications
performance and distribution which in turn affect the
development process as defined as the enhancement of
capabilities and potentialities.

The inter-relationships between these different dimensions,
as depicted in the figure,

seem to suggest that they

together comprise different components of a single dynamic
system and research be conducted accordingly.

However, as

Ashby (1956) argues, research, more often than not, involves
the "restriction of the study of a dynamic system to some
homophism of the whole ... [so as to] achieve a partial
knowledge that, though partial over the whole,
less complete within itself"

(p.

is more or
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A system, therefore, can be defined as a list of variables
selected by the researcher that is relevant to his or her
interests.

In this case the issue of relevance is the
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impact of national telecommunication policies on
telecommunications performance and distribution as
conditioned by national economic and political factors.
This does not suggest that the international context of
policy formulation or developmental impact of outcomes are
unimportant, but rather that they are beyond the scope of
the present effort.

Consequently, the following set of

specific research questions are addressed in this study:
1. What are the varieties of telecommunications policy

with respect to the supply and manufacture of equipment,
sector structure and supply of services that exist among
these countries? How have these policies changed over
past decade?
2. What has been the pattern of state commitment to

telecommunication sector development?
3. What are the patterns of telecommunication

performance and distribution that exist in developing
countries?

4. Is there a relationship between policies and performance
and policies and distribution?
5. Is there a relationship between commitment and
performance and commitment and distribution?
6. Do these relationships hold after accounting for the

level of economic growth and the composition of
economic activity?
7. Are these relationships conditioned by the level of

economic development and the composition of economic
activity?
8. Are performance and distribution explainable by the

interaction of policies with level of economic
development and composition of economic activity?
9. Is it possible to construct a classification scheme which
would differentiate between groups of countries in
a manner that would aid the evaluation of telecommunications policy options?
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Chapter 6

METHODOLOGY

Sample

A total of 81 developing countries were selected for
analysis on the basis of the following criteria: they are
described as developing or newly industrialized countries as
defined by the World Bank (World Development Report, 1990);
they all have had indigenously owned and operated domestic
telecommunications systems continually between 1977 and 1988
(Yearbook of Common Carrier Statistics, 1988); and, they
have had a significant market component to their economy.

The period selected for analysis was 1977 to 1988.

1977 was

the earliest year for which reliable data were available and
1988, the latest.

Ten years, though not ideal, will allow

us to examine the consequences of policies over time.

For

reasons discussed in the analysis section, the dependent
variables were measured in 1977 and 1988 and the independent
variables in 1977 and 1987.
in alphabetical order.

Appendix I lists the countries

113

Variab1es

The research questions posed in the preceding section
suggest four sets of variables involved in the study.

The

first set, the dependent variables, relate to
telecommunications outcomes.

The second, third and fourth

sets, the independent variables, relate to telecommunication
policies, and the political and economic factors that are
thought to condition the relationship between policies and
outcomes.

Telecommunication Outcome Variables

Telecommunication outcome variables (relevant to this study)
are of two kinds:
1) variables measuring commercial performance and national
level indicators, together referred to as performance
variables;

2) variables measuring the conditions of availability and
access to services, together referred to as
distributional variables.
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Performance

Variab~es:

We1lenius

(1989) identifies four

main areas in which policy makers are seeking to make
improvements in telecommunication performance: expansion of
basic telephone service; improvement in network efficiency;
reduction of outstanding demand for basic telephone service;
and, improved financial performance.

Five variables were

selected that, given the constraints of data availability,
best represent performance in these four areas.
Basic Service:
(TelDen)

Line density (LinDen)

and telephone density

are the two most commonly used measures of the

availability of basic telephone service.

Jipp (1963) used

telephone densities in his pioneering analysis of the
relationship between economic development and
telecommunications.

The l.T.U.'s Consultative Committee on

Telecommunication and Telegraphs

(CClTT) used line densities

in its long-term study of telecommunications known as the
Gas-5 studies.
There is no indication in the literature why some
researchers prefer line densities while others prefer
telephone densities.

Examination of studies that have used

one or the other suggest that the two variables are probably
highly correlated and relationships between them and other
variables could be very similar.

This study used both

variables partly in order to ensure comparability with
studies that have used either one, and partly to discover
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whether there are any systematic differences between
telephone and lines densities.
Line density (LinDen) was measured as the number of main

lines per 100 persons.

A main line is defined by the ITU as

a connection line linking a local telephone exchange and a
subscriber telephone with a distinct calling number
(including public call offices).

Telephone density (TelDen)

was measured as the number of telephones per 100 persons.
Network efficiency (TraDen):

There are two major ways in

which network efficiency could be measured: the extent of
call congestion or the extent of traffic density, i.e., call
completion rates.

While declines in call congestion would

perhaps be the best indication of improved performance, the
lack of reliable data for a significant number of countries
generally prevents the use of this measure.

Researchers

usually use some measure of traffic density to
operationalize network efficiency.

For example, Bebee and

Gilling (1976) used average annual number of telephone calls
per telephone lines; similar measures were used in the GAS-5
studies in 1965 and 1972.

Consequently Traffic density

(TraDen) was used in this study to measure operational

efficiency and was measured as the average number of
telephone calls completed per line per year.
Demand Performance (DemPer):

In developing countries there

is typically a large gap between the supply and demand for
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telephone services, with the number of potential subscribers
for telephone lines on waiting lists representing a high
proportion of lines already in service (Saunders, et. al.,
1983).

Also the amount of waiting time for a new line can

run into years.

Finding ways to overcome these chronic

deficiencies in performance is a high priority of sector
policies (Stern, 1989). The extent to which countries have
reduced this outstanding demand is referred to in this study
as Demand Performance (DemPer).
Okundi (1974) and Saunders, et. al.

(1983) use the size of

the waiting list for new basic telephone service as an
indicator of outstanding demand.

However, it may not be a

good idea to compare absolute measures like size of the
waiting list because this may vary according to the size of
the existing network.

Therefore, demand performance was

measured as the size of the waiting list for a telephone
line as a proportion of the total number of existing
telephone lines.
Financial Performance (FinPer): The inability of

telecommunication entities in developing countries to raise
internal revenues for investment in sector expansion is
causing great concern in a number of countries (Wellenius,
1989).

Responsibility for this failure is usually placed at

three different levels: sector structure or, more
specifically, the public monopoly system; management and
operational inadequacies; and, tariff policies.

Wellenius
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(1989) maintains that liberalization may be the only way to
remedy the problem of financial performance at all three
levels.

Even if we do not agree with this contention,

financial performance is certainly an important indicator of
sector performance.
The most commonly used measure of financial performance
(FinPer) are annual sector profits, measured as the current
annual revenue from telecommunications minus the current
annual expenditure on telecommunications (not including
capital investment).

However, it is possible that this

measure is effected by the size of the sector which can
result in significant differences between countries not
related to actual performance.

There are two ways in which

this measure could be standardized so as to make crossnational comparisons more meaningful: return on investment
(ROI) or return on expenditure (ROE).

While measuring

profits as a proportion of investments in the sector, i.e.,
the ROI method, is perhaps the most straight forward method
of standardizing the financial performance measure, this
procedure would be inappropriate in this study because
annual investments are one of the predictor variables, thus
resulting in a clear part-whole problem.

Therefore, a

simple return on expenditure (ROE) formula was employed to
measure financial performance: P
P

financial performance

R

current revenue

E

current expenditure.

=

(R - E)/E where:
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Distributiona~

Variab~es:

The selection of distributional

variables was circumscribed by the availability of data.
One of the major objectives was to explore differences in
the availability of, and access to, services between rural
and urban areas.

But the only area in which reliable

urban/rural data could be collected was network expansion,

i.e., rural and urban line densities.

The other main area

of concern was price, i.e., the affordability of basic
residential service.

In addition, two other variables were

used to measure different aspects of distribution: the
extent to which telecommunications are owned by residences
as opposed to business, i.e., the extent of residential
density; and, the extent of public access.
Urban/RuralDensities (UrbDen & RurDen):

Differences between

rural and urban areas in distribution and access to
infrastructural resources is a major area of concern in a
number of areas.

Both national governments and

international lending agencies have launched programs to
attempt to rectify regional imbalances in a number of areas
including education, health services, power and
transportation (World Development Report, 1990; Human
Development Report 1990).

Despite earlier perceptions of

telecommunications as mainly an urban-oriented service, the
importance of rural telecommunications is being increasingly
recognized.
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There are three major approaches that argue for increasing
rural telecommunications.

The first approach, based on the

work of Innis (1950) and Deutsch (1956) maintains that the
extension of communication facilities is essential for the
process of nation building and pOlitical integration and
participation (Katz, 1988).

The second argues that

telecommunications are essential for the effective and
efficient delivery of other essential basic services in
rural areas

(Hudson, 1983).

The third, based on the work of

economists and regional scientists maintains that reliable
communications is a significant predictor of the location of
economic activity and, therefore, of regional development
(Christaller, 1966; Dakin, 1973; Kilgour, 1982;)
As a consequence of this emerging recognition of the
importance of rural telecommunications, a major policy
objective in many devel.oping countries has been to not only
improve both rural and urban line densities, but also to
bring rural densities closer to those that exist in urban
areas.

Therefore, both Urban line density (UrbDen)

(measured as the average number of telephone lines per 100
persons in urban areas) and Rural line density (RurDen)
(measured as the average number of telephone lines per 100
persons in rural areas) were used in the study as indicators
of regional distribution.
Residential density:

Saunders, et. al.,

(1983) point out

that for tariff purposes some telephone entities divide
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subscribers into business and residential subscribers.

The

practice of charging lower rates for residential service has
existed in most developed countries for some time.
businesses often subsidized residential users.

In fact,

Quite apart

from considerations of equity, the economic rationale for
cross-subsidization stemmed from the assumption that the
demand for business telephone service was relatively
inelastic compared to that for residential service (Taylor,
1980).

Therefore, businesses could absorb higher tariffs

more easily than residential users.

Lower residential rates

would enable more users to subscribe to the service, thereby
increasing network externality and moving toward the goal of
affordable universal service.
In developing countries too, residential service has
traditionally been priced lower than business service.

But

there is concern that with liberalization leading to the
aligning of tariffs to cost and the elimination of crosssubsidy mechanisms, there may be an increase in residential
tariffs.

Some evidence of this has already been found in

the United States after deregulation (Perl, 1986).

The

distributional consequences of such an increase in countries
where the demand for residential services is extremely price
sensitive could be severe and lead to a situation where only
very high income households or organized groups could afford
the service.
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This is not only a distributional issue but also an
efficiency issue, since slowing the rate of the expansion of
telephone service through the elimination of a large number
of potential subscribers could also lower network
externality.

Clearly, the extent of residential density

(ResDen) is an important indicator of the distributional
impact of policies.

It was 'measured as the number of

residential lines as a proportion of the total number of
main lines.

Public access (PubAcc):

For the vast majority of people in

developing countries, the only access to telephone service
is through the local public call office (PCO).

The

provision of PCOs is taking place with high frequency in
many developing countries and the effort to do so is
generally supported by international development agencies
(Saunders and Warford, 1979; Saunders and Dickenson, 1979).
Availability of PCOs has been positively correlated with
relatively higher levels of local development
Chung, 1979).

(NCAER, 1978;

There is also some evidence that PCO use is

more evenly distributed in terms of the economic and social
characteristics of users when compared with characteristics
of household subscribers (Saunders and Warford, 1979).
However, other studies maintain that PCO user
characteristics may not be that different from household
subscriber characteristics (Nicolis, 1979; McDowell, 1991)
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In any case, the volume of PCO use, both in terms of number
of calls and number of callers, is higher than the
corresponding figures for household telephones in almost all
countries

(Saunders, et. al., 1983).

On the whole, it

appears that expanding PCO availability leads to improved
conditions of public access to telephone service.
Consequently,

Public Access (PubAcc) was measured as the

number of public call offices per 100,000 persons.

Average Price (AvgPri):

The price of basic residential

telephone service to consumers is perhaps the most telling
indicator of the conditions of access to the service.
Despite the unmet registered demand for phone service in
many countries, there is considerable evidence that demand
is extremely price elastic in most of the developing world,
particularly among lower income households.

Setting tariffs

is an extremely complex and sensitive issue and needs to
satisfy a number of objectives including maintaining the
financial viability of the telecommunication entity,
contributing to government revenues and promoting an
equitable allocation of resources.
A number of different pricing practices can be found within
the public sector monopoly system, the choice of anyone
usually reflecting the particular compromise worked out with
respect to these varying objectives.

However, with the

introduction of private competition, one of the most
difficult problems has become the choice of pricing
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practices.

It is clear that new mechanisms have to be put

into place when sector structure polices are revamped.

What

is not clear is whether or not such restructuring will
affect the price of telephone service.
There are no studies of the relationship between
liberalization and price in developing countries.

What

evidence there is comes mostly from the United States where
the break-up of the Bell system appears to have led to
higher prices for local service and lower prices for long
distance service.

Taken together it appears that the

average residential phone bill (in the U.S.) has gone up
significantly after deregulation (Aufderheide, 1987).

A

major contribution of this study is the use of average price
to evaluate the impact of policies in developing countries.
Cross-country comparisons of the real price of telephone
service need to be expressed in a common metric and one that
will not be affected by variations in purchasing power.
The calculation of Average Price (AvgPri) , therefore,
involved a multi-step process.

First, the average price for

basic residential service (rental and local and longdistance toll) was obtained at current prices in the local
currency by dividing the annual revenue from residential
service by the number of residential subscribers.

This

amount was then converted to U.S. Dollars using the
conversion factor developed by the World Bank for converting
GNP figures estimated in local currencies using the Atlas
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method.

The Atlas conversion factor for any year is the

average of the exchange rate for that year and the exchange
rates for the preceding two years, after adjusting them for
differences in relative inflation between the reporting
country and the United States (World Development Report

1990).

This three year average smooths fluctuations in

prices while expressing the result in constant values.
The obtained values were then multiplied by the
International Comparisons Project's
parity (PPP)

U.N.

(ICP) purchasing power

conversion factor which is the number of units

of a country's currency required to buy the same amount of
goods and services in the domestic market as one dollar
would buy in the U.S.

The final amount is expressed in

International Dollars. 16

The stepwise procedure and

formulae used are provided in Appendix II.

Telecommunication Policy Variables

As outlined in Chapter 2 the three main areas in which
telecommunication policy needs to be examined are:
telecommunications equipment; telecommunication facilities;
and, telecommunication services.

The measurement of these

16. Technical details of the PPP method can be found in
World Comparisons of Purchasing Power and Real Product for
1980. New York: United Nations, 1986.
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variables involved the coding of policies, regulations and
rules governing the extent of privatization and competition
in each of these areas.

Each variable measured the extent

of competition and privatization permissible in each of the
three areas on a ten point scale with 1 representing state
owned and controlled monopolies and 10 representing open
competition, both domestic and foreign.

Complete coding

schemes for the three policy variables are presented in
Appendix III.

Because the operationalization and measurement of the three
policy variables involved a considerable amount of
individual judgement, there could be problems of reliability
involved in the measurements.

To make some attempt to

overcome this problem both the coding schemes and the final
coded variables were referred to two experts at the World
Bank.

An attempt was made to reach a consensus for all

measurements.

If a consensus could not be reached a

majority rule was applied.

This happened in the

codification of the services sub-sector in the Philippines
and the rules for the procurement of equipment in the Ivory
Coast.

Due to the exploratory nature of this study and the
rudimentary state of a priori knowledge about ways to define
and evaluate telecommunication policies, the exact
operationalization of variables could take place only after
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a detailed examination of the available data.

These

variables, measured as far as possible on the basis of
theory and previous research, were examined in order to
judge how well country situations fit the a priori
formulations.

If there were inadequacies in the initial

match within any sub-sector, these measures were
reformulated to fit better the actual characteristics of the
countries under study.

This process of confronting

successive reformulations with information on actual country
situations was maintained until the variables could be said
to have been operationalized with reasonable confidence.

The process of successive definitions is a procedure well
tried in the history of scientific inquiry. In The Conduct

of Inquiry, Abraham Kaplan (1964, pp. 77-78) says:
In short, the process of specifying meaning is
part of inquiry itself.
In every context of
inquiry we begin with terms that are undefined
not indefinables, but terms for which that context
does not provide a specification. As we proceed,
empirical findings are taken up into our
conceptual structure by way of new specifications
of meaning, and former indications and references
in turn become matters of empirical fact .... What I
have tried to sketch here is how such a process of
"successive definition" can be understood so as to
take account of the openness of meaning of
scientific terms.
For the closure that strict
definition consists in is not a precondition of
scientific inquiry but its culmination. To start
with we do not know just what we mean by our
terms, much as we do not know just what to think
about our subject-matter. We can, indeed, begin
with precise meanings, as we choose; but so long
as we are in ignorance, we cannot choose wisely.
It is this ignorance that makes the closure
premature. [emphasis added]

127

An example of this process of conceptualization and
definition was the measurement of the facilities policy
variable.

The initial scheme allowed for three types of

ownership patterns: a government department; a state-owned
company; and, a wholly or mostly private company.

However,

these three categories could not cover the case of Morocco
where facilities were owned by a government board.

The

scheme had to expanded to include this type of ownership.
Similar situations arose in the Pakistan, where facilities
are owned by a parastatal enterprise and, in the case of Sri
Lanka and Jordan, where there are mixed private-public
ownership companies.

The initial three categories were thus

expanded to six during the process of examining the data.

This is not to suggest that the entire process of
operationalization and measurement was post hoc, but only to
emphasize that at the exploratory stage in the development
of new measures of institutional phenomena, the method of
successive definition can be applied in order to obtain
operational definitions consistent with observable phenomena
and therefore suitable for classifying them.

Telecommunications equipment policies (EqPol):

The

arrangements for manufacturing and acquiring
telecommunication equipment play an important part in
determining the nature of the system for providing
telecommunication services.

Equipment manufacture is
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important in its own right as well, because its production
and sale, both home and abroad, are significant for economic
growth, employment and trade.

Telecommunications equipment policies were operationalized
along two dimensions: policies regulating the structure of
the industry and rules governing procurement arrangements.
Policies regulating industry structure were measured along
two axes: a) the extent of permissible competition (e.g.,
monopolistic, oligopolistic or competitive; and, b) the
extent of privatization allowed.

Procurement arrangements

could be singular (from a single entity), domestic multiple
or competitive (including foreign competition).

The two

variables were then combined into a single scale. 17

Telecommunications facilities policies (FacPol):

Until

recently, telecommunications facilities in developing
countries were owned and operated by partly or wholly owned
government monopolies organized in ways ranging from
government departments

(Pakistan, Sri Lanka) to a semi-

independent branch or board within a department (Bangladesh,
Fiji, India) to a regulated public sector corporation
(Nepal, Kenya, Costa Rica) .

17. Results of the reliability and factor analysis for the
scale as well as results of the tests for assumptions of
interval measurement of all three policy variables are
presented in Appendix III.
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However, in recent years, this picture has been altered by
moves toward privatization or, at the very least, movement
toward greater autonomy from government control.

This has

introduced two additional entities in the facilities
picture: the mixed ownership company (Nigeria, Malaysia)
the mostly or wholly private company (Mexico, Chile).

and

One

final option relates to splitting national monopolies into
regional entities including dividing them along urban-rural
lines.

This variable was measured through determining the

extent of private ownership and the number of independent
owners of facilities permitted.

Telecommunication services policy (SerPol):

Provision of

services by entities independent of the PTTs is one of the
main policy changes being recommended to developing
countries, particularly for the provision of enhanced
services.

The options in this area include provision of all

services by the PTT; splitting-up the provision of services
between basic and enhanced services and letting the latter
be provided by either another public enterprise or by the
private sector and permitting independent use of the public
network by large users.

Other options relate to establishing independent or separate
business networks, allowing dedicated networks to offer
services to third parties and sub-contracting services.
Another set of choices include splitting supply between
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local, national and international services and/or urban and
rural services.

This variable too was measured along the

permissible privatization/competition dimensions.

Commitment

Variab~es

In Chapter 3, the main political factor in the growth of
telecommunications was identified as government commitment
to the expansion of the sector.

Commitment can be

operationalized as state activism in fostering the growth of
telecommunications.

Though states play a leading role in fostering industrial
development in developing societies the presence of the
state within the industrial sector can vary (Stepan, 1978;
Evans, 1986).

States therefore, need to display a certain

amount of activism in fostering the growth of a sector
before it can be concluded that it is committed to the
growth of the sector (Supple, 1976).

The amount of

resources states can commit to industrialization

are

limited and therefore careful prioritization is often
necessary.

Researchers have used a number of different measures of
state commitment.

Delacroix and Ragin (1981) use per capita

government investment in a sector as a measure of
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commitment.

The problem with this measure is that it

provides no indication of the relative priority of a sector.
Rao (1983) used total governmental expenditure in a sector
to measure Commitment.

Again, this is an isolated measure.

Moreover, expenditure measures are more subject to annual
budgetary constraints than investment measures.

To provide

a comparative estimate, state commitment (Invest) was
operationa1ized as total annual government investment in
telecommunications as a proportion of total annual
government investment.

The growth rate of this variable is

called Commit in the tables.

Economic Variables

Income Characteristics:

GNP and GNP/capita, are the most

commonly used indicators of economic development in both
economic and telecommunication studies.

As already

indicated, measures of telecommunication density are
generally highly correlated with GNP and GNP/capita.

GNP

measures the total domestic and foreign value added claimed
by residents.

It comprises the total output of goods and

services for final use produced by residents and nonresidents plus net factor income from aboard, which is the
income residents receive from abroad for factor services
(labor and capital) less similar payments made to non-
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residents who contributed to the domestic economy.
figures

GNP

(GnpCap) used here are those reported by the World

Bank (World Tables, 1990) using the Atlas method. 18

Structural Characteristics:

The relationship between the

structural characteristics of national economies and
telecommunication development was established in Chapter 3.
There are two ways in which the structural characteristics
of the composition of economic activity can be described: an
industry approach and an occupational approach.

The

occupational approach involves describing the composition of
economic activity in terms of the number of employed persons
in industry, agriculture and services while the industry
approach focuses on the value-added by each sector to the
national product.

The occupational approach, while useful for describing the
relative size of different sectors of the economy may not be
very useful in this study.

The objective of this study is

to evaluate the impact of telecommunication pOlicies on the
growth and development of the sector.

The structural

characteristics of economies are being included because
there is considerable evidence in the literature that they
condition the relationships between policies and outcomes in
the sector.

But those characteristics pertain more to the

capacity of different sectors to generate demand for
18. Details of the method are provided in Appendix II.
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telecommunications (because of the differential importance
of telecommunications as inputs into the production process)
than to the extent of employment in different sectors.

In

other words, sector structures are important because of the
value-added by telecommunications to different sectors and,
in turn, the value-added by different sectors to the
national product. 19

Consequently the structural

characteristics of national economies were described in
terms of the composition of economic activity with respect
to the share of agriculture, industry and services in the
GNP.

Agriculture covers forestry, hunting, and fishing as well as
cultivation.

In developing countries with high levels of

subsistence farming, much of agricultural production is
either not exchanged or not exchanged for money.

This

increases the difficulty of measuring the contribution of
agriculture to GNP and reduces the reliability and
comparability of such numbers.

Industry comprises values

added in mining, manufacturing, construction, and
electricity, water and gas.

Value-added in all other

branches of economic activity are categorized as Services.

19. For more detailed discussion of the suggestion that the
development, use and potential benefits of
telecommunications are sector specific see the discussions
of input-output analyses on pp. 55-56.
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Data

The study involved the analysis of secondary data which was
collected from a number of different sources.
Telecommunications outcome data were gathered from two
primary sources: the ITU's Yearbook of Common Carrier
Statistics and AT&T's World Telephones, which have annual
coverage for the years 1977 to 1988.

Telecommunications

policy related data were obtained mostly though country
reports maintained by the CCITT.

These were cross-checked

and supplemented by country profiles maintained by the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Data on economic and political characteristics were obtained
mainly from the World Bank's World Development Report and
the U.N. 's Yearbook of National Account Statistics.

In

addition, the Compendium of Data for World System Analyses
provided a useful sourcebook for cross-checking and
supplementing the main sources for cross-country
comparability.

As might be expected, it was not possible to collect data on
all the variables for all the countries under analysis from
the above sources alone.

However, a careful examination of

the descriptive statistics did manage to rule out the
possibility that there exist systematic trends related to
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the type of variable or kind of country for which the data
were missing.

This enabled the use of a listwise deletion

of missing cases in all the analyses without fear that
missing cases would introduce biases in the estimations.
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Research Design

A review of cross-national studies in social science
research reveals that there are seven major research designs
utilized in these kinds of studies: cross-sectional; pooled
cross-sectional; cross-sectional with a percentage growth
rate as the dependent variable; cross-sectional with a
lagged dependent variable; pooled cross-sectional with a
percentage growth rate as the dependent variable; panel
regression; and, time-series analysis.
A simple cross-sectional design compares measures of
variables at one point in time without attempting to measure
change overtime in any of the variables
1968; Marsh, 1976; Shapiro, 1976).

(Jipp, 1963; lTU,

The lTU's CClTT used

cross section data from thirty industrial and developing
countries in its Gas-5 studies to examine the relationship
between telephone densities and per capita GDP.

Correlation

coefficients, computed separately for the years 1955, 1960
and 1965 were 0.91, 0.91 and 0.92 respectively.
A pooled cross-sectional design combines cross-sections for
different years, but again no measure of change is used for
any of the variables (ITU, 1972).

The 1972 edition of the

Gas-5 handbook reports the results of several pooled crosssectional studies of telephone densities and GNP/capita for
both developed and developing countries.

Despite the
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variation in design, the correlations in these studies were
very similar to those found in the earlier cross-sectional
studies.
The third and fourth designs are used most frequently in
studies of the impact of foreign investments on domestic
industrial growth.

One uses cross-sectional data with a

percentage growth rate as the dependent variable (Kaufman,
et. al., 1975; Szymanski, 1976).

The other also uses cross-

sectional data but introduces a lagged dependent variable
(measured at t-1) into a least-squares regression in order
to control for the prior levels of the dependent variable
(Ballmer-Cao, 1978; McGowan and Smith, 1975).
The fifth design involves the pooling of cross-sections with
the dependent variable being a percentage growth rate.

In

an attempt to uncover the comparative impact of
telecommunications growth and development support on GNP
growth Bebee and Gilling (1976) pooled data for three years
for 29 countries (including 13 developing countries)
regression equation.

in a

The dependent variable was the

percentage growth rate of GNP/capita over the period.
The sixth design is a panel regression, used with some
variation in this study and discussed in detail later.
final design is a time series analysis.

The

Hardy (1980, 1981)

used a cross-sectional, time-series regression to analyze
data for 37 developing countries over a 14 year period
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(1960-1973).

Using GDP as the dependent variable and

telephone densities as the independent variable, he found
that a 1 percent rise in the number of telephones per 100
persons between 1950 and 1955 contributed to a 3 percent
rise in GDP/capita between 1955 and 1962.
Except for Hardy's study none of the above designs attempts
to measure change in the independent variables.

Such a

measure is essential in a study attempting to evaluate the
consequences of changes in policies and investments.

The

different analyses conducted in the present study are
discussed in the following paragraphs.
The empirical analysis performed in this study is in three
parts.

First,

descriptive, showing the state of the

telecommunications sector in terms of policies, outcomes
(performance and distribution) and commitment in 1977 and
1988.

In the case of policies simple comparisons between

measures at these two points in time would not be very
useful in evaluating what is essentially a dynamic
phenomenon.

It is arguable that the effectiveness of

policies depends on both the number of years the policies
have been in place and the extent of changes in the
policies.

Therefore, using measures in 1977 and 1987 (since

it is not reasonable to expect that policies instituted in
1988 would be able to impact on outcomes in the same year) a
policy change variable was constructed for each of the three
policy areas (equipment, facilities and services) measuring
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both the recency and magnitude of policy changes through the
following formula:

c

=

(M * T)/10

where C = average annual rate of change
M

=

T

extent of change from 1977 to 1987 (PoI87-PoI77)
number of years policy has been in place

Growth rates were also calculated for commitment, GNP/capita
and the share of agriculture, industry and services in the
GNP, in addition to comparing the state of the variables in
1977 and 1987.

These growth rates were calculated using the

least-squares method employed by the World Bank.

The least

squares growth rate, r, is estimated by fitting a leastsquares linear regression trend line to the logarithmic
annual values of the relevant variable during the entire
time period.

More specifically, the regression equation

takes the form:
Log Xt

a + bt + e t

=

where: Xt

variable

a = constant
t

= time

e t = error term
b

Then r

=

slope coefficient
(antilog b - 1)*100 provides the least squares

estimate of the percentage growth rate.

By using the least-

squares method, all observations within the time period were
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taken into account, and the resulting growth rates reflect
general trends without being unduly influenced by cyclical
factors or exceptional variations in a particular year
(World Development Report, 1990).
However, one of the problems associated with using a least
squares regression is the assumption that the regression of
Y on X is linear.

In most countries, the growth of the

national product as well as sectoral growth is rarely
linear, even though the estimated growth rates are.

A

regression model estimating these growth rates can be
characterized

as an "intrinsically linear model" i.e., one

which is "linear in its parameters but nonlinear in the
variables"

(pedhazur, 1982, pg. 404)

Pedhazur (1982) argues that by using a logarithmic
transformation of the variables, such a model can be reduced
to a linear model. 20

The World Bank and the U.N. also

commonly use logarithmic transformations to overcome the
problem of nonlinearity in the estimation of international
economic growth rates,21 therefore, to ensure international
comparability, logarithmic transformations were used in the
regression model estimating the growth rates in this study.

20. It is important to note that the linear transformation
does not affect the proportion of variance accounted for in
the dependent variables but results in a better fitting
regression line.
21. See for instance World Development Report, 1990 and U.N.
Yearbook of National Accounts, 1989.
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The second set of analyses are bivariate, exploring the
relationships between polices and performance and policies
and distribution.

The correlational analysis in this

section is designed to reveal whether or not changes in
policies are significantly associated with changes in
telecommunication outcomes between 1977 and 1988.
Clearly, outcome variables in 1988 will be significantly
affected by the level of these variables in 1977.
Therefore, in order to control for the prior level of the
dependent variables the measures in 1988 were regressed on
the measures of 1977.

The residuals of that regression,

i.e., the proportion of variance in the dependent variables

not accounted for by the 1977 levels, were used in the
analyses.

The use of the residuals in the regression

analyses is described below.
The correlational analysis is further detailed by comparing
the relationships between polices and performance and
policies and distribution at different levels of national
income: low, middle and high.

Following the practice of the

World Bank (World Development Report, 1990) low income
countries are defined as those countries with mean per
capita incomes from 1977 to 1988 of less than $500; middle
income countries as those with GNP/capita between $500 and
$5,000 and high income countries as those with GNP/capita
over $5,000.
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The third set of analyses are multivariate, estimating
parameters of a regression model including both policy and
economic variables.

The regression model used in the study

is a variation of the panel design.

In its usual form, the

dependent variable at time t is regressed on its value at
time t-l

(the lagged dependent variable) and other

independent variables also measured at t-l.

For example, in

this study, the measures of change in telecommunication
performance and distribution variables from 1977 to 1988
(i.e., the residuals of the regression of 1988 measures on

the 1977 measures) would be regressed on the
telecommunication policy and economic variables measured in
1977.
However, to capture the dynamic nature of policy
developments as well as the impact of changes in economic
variables, growth rates of policies, GNP/capita and
composition of economic activity from 1977 to 1988 are used
instead of static variables measured in 1977.
model is in the following form:

The final
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Yt

=

a + b 1 Y t - 1 + b 2 Xri ... + b n Xrn + e

where:
dependent variable at time t
lagged dependent variable

= constant
b

unstandardized regression coefficient

= growth rates of independent variable
e

= error term

In addition to a regression model in which all the
independent variables are entered simultaneously, a
hierarchical design was also employed in order to determine
the increment in the proportion of variance accounted for by
different sets of variables.
discussed in Chapter 9.

Details of the procedure are
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Chapter 7

THE STATE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1977-1988

Telecommunication sectors have undergone considerable
changes during the eleven years spanned by this study.
Despite financial and technical bottlenecks and rapid
population increases, developing countries, as a whole,
have shown improvements in most telecommunication outcome
indicators.

Table III compares summary statistics for

telecommunication outcome variables for 1977 and 1988.

TABLE III
Summary Statistics of Telecommunication
Performance Variables 1977 and 1988

Variable

Mean

S.D.

Min

TelDen77
TelDen88

3.51
5.18

2.13
3.12

0.87
1. 12

27.80
43.97

65
67

LinDen77
LinDen88

2.44
4.07

2.12
2.89

0.57
0.82

21.02
32.36

65
67

TraDen77
TraDen88

2,122
3,145

1,017
1,417

107
143

6,138
10,319

65
67

DemPer77
DemPer88

51.98
42.10

23.41
19.21

0.68
0.31

329.66
243.69

63
67

FinPer77
FinPer88

34.51
-8.96

89.17
37.49

-30.72
-173.80

94.35
83.55

65
65

Source: Appendices IV and V

Max

N
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Telephone and line densities have increased significantly
over the period and traffic densities have also gone up.
What is perhaps surprising is that demand performance has
improved over the period with the registered demand for
lines expressed as a proportion of existing number of lines
being reduced by about ten percent.

The inability to meet

demand has been one of the main criticisms of
telecommunication entities in developing countries
(We11enius, 1989).
What is not surprising is that financial performance has
worsened over the period.

Whereas in 1977 profits were on

average about 35% of expenditures, by 1988 they were
registering an average loss of about 8%.

Clearly, what was

a once relatively profitable sector is increasingly becoming
a financial burden in a number of countries

(Nulty, 1989).

Table IV presents a similar descriptive analysis for the
five telecommunication distribution variables.
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TABLE IV
Summary Statistics of Telecommunication
Distribution Variables 1977 and 1988

Variable

Mean

S.D.

Min

UrbDen77
UrbDen88

4.51
6.12

2.01
3.56

1. 87
1. 89

35.92
46.98

61
67

RurDen77
RurDen88

1. 43
3.05

1. 56

2.78

0.18
0.20

18.42
29.47

61
67

ResDen77
ResDen88

51.83
56.57

18.38
18.16

7.00
10.00

78.00
85.00

61
67

PubAcc77
PubAcc88

726
715

189
162

23
15

11,790
9,788

78

1.50
1.51

17.18
21.45

61
61

AvgPrice77
AvgPrice88

3.12*
4.98*

N

Max

65

Source: Appendices VI and VII
Notes: Average Price figures are in constant International
Dollars; * = Median
In keeping with the increased national level line densities,
both rural and urban line densities have shown improvements
from 1977 to 1988.

However, conditions of public access

(expressed here as the number of public call offices per one
million persons) have slightly worsened.

In this case,

increases in the number of peos have not been able to keep
pace with the growth in population.

What is even more

worrying is the significant increase in the average price of
basic residential service.

The 1977 figure of about three

international dollars per year represented from 8 to 12
percent of the average annual income of most people in
developing countries, while the 1988 figure of almost five
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international dollars amounts to between 15 and 18 percent
of average annual income.

It appears that basic telephone

service may be increasingly unaffordable in many countries.
Perhaps the most important assumption on which this study is
based is that there have been significant changes in
telecommunication sector policies, specifically those
relating to equipment, facilities and services, over the
period under study.

These changes have been characterized

as a process of liberalization encompassing the two axes of
increased competition and movement toward privatization.
Table V presents summary statistics for the three policy
scales in 1977 and 1987.

TABLE V
Summary Statistics of Telecommunication
Sector Policy Variables 1977 and 1988

Variable

Mean

S.D.

Min

EqPo177
EqPo187

2.65
4.44

1. 01
2.15

1. 00
1. 00

8.00
10.00

78

FacPo177
FacPo187

1. 80
3.74

1. 27
2.89

1. 00
1. 00

7.00
9.00

65
78

SerPo177
SerPo187

1. 94
4.01

1.17
2.12

1. 00
1. 00

Max

7.00
10.00

N

65

65
78

Source: Appendices VIII and IX
Clearly, policies relating to all three areas, equipment,
facilities and services, have undergone liberalization over
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the period.

Policies relating to the manufacture and

procurement of telecommunications equipment were the most
liberalized, even in 1977, and remained so in 1987.

Service

sector policies show a clear trend toward liberalization and
there has also been movement toward liberalization in the
facilities area.

However, while Table V presents the extent

of liberalization, it does not indicate how long the
pOlicies have been in place.
An important task, therefore, involved the construction of
scales that would characterize the extent and recency of
policy changes (or what may be called the rate of policy
change)

in each of the three policy sub-sectors. 22

Summary

Statistics for these variables are provided in Table VI.
TABLE VI
Summary Statistics of Sector Policy
Changes 1977-1987
Variable

Mean

S.D.

Min

Max

N

EqCha

4.69

2.01

1.0

9.0

65

FacCha

2.22

1. 83

1.0

7.0

65

SerCha

3.46

2.14

1.0

8.5

65

Tables VI shows that policies relating to the equipment subsector experienced the highest rate of change during the
22. The procedure for constructing the three change
variables was described on pp. 139-140.
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period.

Not surprisingly, the rate of change of polices

relating to telecommunication facilities has been the
slowest.

Though there are differences in the rate of change

of policies in the three sub-sectors, it is quite probable
that the three change variables are highly correlated.

If

this is the case it may be possible to construct a single
policy change scale for use in multivariate analysis.

TABLE VII
Correlation Matrix of
Policy Change Variables

FacCha
FacCha
SerCha
EqCha

1.00
.59**
.45**

* = .05
Source: Appendix XII;

N

=

65; sig.

**

SerCha

EqCha

1.00
.70**

1.00

.01

Table VII presents the intercorrelations between the three
policy variables.

Clearly, the three coefficients are of a

fairly high magnitude.

It appears that countries that

embark on a process of liberalization do it fairly uniformly
in all three sub-sectors.

Though once again we notice that

the changes in facilities are not as highly correlated as
those between services and equipment.
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Even so, the correlations suggest that the three variables
can be combined into a single scale measuring the extent of
policy change in the telecommunications sector as a whole.
Reliability and factor analysis found that the a policy
change scale (PolCha) comprising EqCha, SerCha and FacCha
had a Chronbach's Alpha of .81 and formed a single factor
with an Eigenvalue of 2.17 explaining 72.4 percent of the
variance.

Clearly, a policy change scale is a reliable

summary measure of the changes taking place in the
telecommunications sector as a whole.
The picture of the state of telecommunications is completed
by looking at how government commitment to the growth of the
sector has changed over the period.

Table VII presents the

descriptive statistics for governmental investment in
telecommunications as a proportion of total government
investment in 1977 and 1987 (Invest77 and Invest88) and the
average annual growth rate of investments (Commit).
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TABLE VIII
Telecommunication Investment As a Proportion of
Total Government Investment 1977 and 1987

Variable

Mean

Invest77

2.66

1.11

Invest87

7.30

commit

6.40

Max

N

1.12

7.89

65

2.17

1.56

13.12

65

4.87

0.92

10.21

65

S.D.

Min

Source: Appendices VIII and IX
The almost five percentage point increase in investments in
telecommunications from 1977 to 1988 provides clear evidence
of the growing importance of the sector for developing
countries.

This represents an average annual growth rate of

almost 6.4% percent (Commit), fairly impressive when
compared to the 4.4% increase registered by GNP/capita over
the same period (Table IX).

Discussion

The rapid transformation of the telecommunications equipment
sector, away from one characterized by state controlled
manufacturing and rigid licensing and import schemes, is
striking.

One reason for this is that many developing

countries, seeking to rapidly upgrade their systems, have
looked more and more to foreign manufactures of
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telecommunication equipment and have also permitted domestic
competition, including granting permission to foreign
manufacturers (e.g., Siemens, Bechtel) to set-up
subsidiaries in their countries (Developing World

Communications , 1989).
One area in which considerable changes have occurred is in
the supply of customer premises equipment

(CPE).

A number

of countries (India, South Korea, Brazil) have permitted
private domestic companies to provide telephones,
teletypewriters, fax machines and even PBXs on a competitive
basis.

Others have permitted private domestic companies to

import, assemble and sell foreign-made equipment
Argentina)

(Mexico,

and still other have permitted the establishment

of subsidiaries of multinational manufacturers
Hongkong, Oman, UAE).

(Singapore,

Procurement arrangements have also

been considerably liberalized, characterized by a movement
away from arrangements involving tied and/or single-entity
procurement of equipment to procurement through domestic and
international competitive bidding (DCB and ICB) .
Perhaps the most remarkable development has been the
liberalization of telecommunication facilities, though
changes in this area have been less intense and slower in
coming.

Facilities could perhaps be identified as the

pivotal area in the sector as a whole, since developments
here have consequences for the other two areas.

Part of the

explanation for the higher score in this area in 1987 is, of
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course, that governments have permitted other public sector
entities (e.g., Indian Railways, Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation) to own and operate their own networks.

In many

countries where competition is still not permitted, there
has been a fragmentation of the network through the break-up
of national monopolies into regional monopolies

(e.g.,

India) .
But there is also movement to permit private enterprises to
maintain their own facilities

(Jamaica)

in addition to the

complete privatization of the facilities holding entity
(e.g.,

Ivory Coast, the Philippines).

Some countries have

even sold all or part of their telecommunication enterprises
to foreign investors (Argentina, Chile).
The liberalization of facilities would also seem to account
for the liberalization of services.
entirely correct.

But this is not

Much of the increase in liberalization of

services has come through the leasing of facilities to
private companies for providing value-added or enhanced
services (India, Pakistan).

In addition, some countries

have permitted lessees to provide basic services to thirdparties if they have excess capacities in the leased
channels (the Philippines, Chile).

The low base from which many countries are launching sector
expansion programs is part of the reason for the high growth
rate of investments in telecommunications.

Saunders and
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Dickenson (1979) report that in the early 1970s, most
developing countries were investing less than 1 percent of
their GDPs in telecommunications.

This had grown to almost

3 percent by 1985 (Yearbook of Common Carrier Statistics,
1988).

A major factor for the increasing investment in the

sector is that international development agencies are
providing more funds than ever before for the growth of the
sector (World Development Report, 1990).
This increase in international loans for sector expansion
and the increase in government investment in general is
derived from the changing perception of the role of
telecommunications in developing countries.

For years,

Governments engaged in restrictive investment practices
because of the lack of evidence of the developmental
benefits of telecommunications, the perception of
telecommunications as an urban luxury and because of the
financial requirements of international lending
institutions.
But, as detailed in previous chapters, these conditions have
changed rapidly during the 1980s, leading to an impressive
growth rate of telecommunication investments.

This is not

only true for the oil exporting countries (for example
Kuwait and Venezuela) but also for countries with relatively
lower levels of national income like Ecuador, Chile and
Malaysia.
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Chapter 8

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 1977-87

Economic developments during the period under review have
not been as pronounced or as unidirectional during the
period under study as have those relating to the
telecommunications sector.

Tables IX through XII provide

summary statistics for the level of national income and the
share of industry, services and agriculture in the GNP for
1977 and 1987 and their corresponding growth rates.

TABLE IX
GNP Per Capita 1977 and 1988
(U. S. Dollars)
variable

Median

Min

Max

N

GnpCap77

450

110

14,420

79

GnpCap87

810

100

15,770

78

4.43*
(3.3)

-1. 0

8.7

78

GnpGro

Source: Appendices X and XI; * = Mean (S.D. )

The performance of developing countries with respect to per
capita GNP has been mixed at best.

Though the median per

capita GNP has gone up from US$ 450 to 810, a little over

156

half the countries (most of them in sub-Saharan Africa and
South America) experienced negative, or close to zero,
growth over the period.

In contrast, some countries did

fairly well, particularly those in South and East Asia.
After experiencing relatively high growth rates during the
early 1980s, the economies of the oil exporting countries of
West Asia and North Africa stagnated toward the end of the
decade.
Tables X, XI, and XII show that the percentage share of
industry in the GNP has been steadily rising over the
period, mostly at the expense of the agricultural sector,
with the service sector being more or less stagnant.

The

industrial sector has also experienced the highest growth
rate, while agriculture has experienced a negative rate of
growth.

TABLE X
Percentage Share of Industry
In GNP 1977 and 1988

variable

Mean

S.D.

Min

Perlnd77

27.76

13.36

7.00

83.00

69

Perlnd88

29.31

11.78

7.00

63.00

79

5.28

4.91

3.35

9.82

69

IndGro

Source: Appendices X and XI

Max

N
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TABLE XI
Percentage Share of Agriculture
In GNP 1977 and 1988

variable

Mean

S.D.

PerAgr77

28.90

17.26

PerAgr88

26.46

AgrGro

-8.40

Min

Max

N

1. 00

72.00

69

16.64

1. 00

81.00

79

7.34

1.21

15.21

69

Source: Appendices X and XI

TABLE XII
Percentage Share of Services
In GNP 1977 and 1988

variable

Mean

S.D.

Min

Max

N

PerSer77

43.68

11.97

12.00

77.00

69

PerSer88

44.91

10.56

18.00

73.00

79

2.7

2.8

0.78

4.21

69

SerGro

Source: Appendices X and

XI
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Discussion

The growing share of industry in the GNP is an important
finding because industrialization has long been considered
synonymous with progress toward economic growth (Fisher,
1935; Clark, 1940;

Rostow, 1960).

Working with a three

sector model, consisting of the primary (agriculture,
fishing,

forestry and mining) the secondary (manufacture,

construction and utilities) and tertiary (commerce,
transportation, communication and general services) both
Fisher and Clark predicted that an increase in per capita
income would lead to a movement of the composition of
economic activity out of agriculture into industry and
subsequently into the tertiary sector.

This approach

assumed that all societies would undergo this evolutionary
process of sectoral development.
Like Fisher and Clark, Rostow viewed the process of
development as a series of successive stages through which
all countries must pass.

His "stages of growth" approach

identified all societies in terms of five stages.
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It is possible to identify all societies in their
economic dimensions, as lying within one of five
categories: the traditional society, the
preconditions for take-off into self-sustaining
growth, the drive to maturity, and the age of high
mass consumption .... These stages are not merely
descriptive.
They are not merely a way of
generalizing certain factual observations about
the sequences of development of modern societies.
They have an inner logic and continuity .... They
constitute, in the end, both a theory about
economic growth and a more general, if partial,
theory about modern history as a whole. (Rostow,
1960, pp. 3, 4, and 12)
Rostow argued that since at various times in history, the
present day developed countries have passed the stage of
"take-off" into "self-sustaining growth,"

it is possible to

repeat those experiences in the third world provided that a
certain set of rules were followed.

An important one was

the expansion of industry through mobilization of domestic
and foreign savings for investment in the sector.
Developing these earlier models, researchers like Bell
(1976) have argued that many industrialized countries have
now entered a new stage of development called the postindustrial or, more popularly, the information society.
This stage is characterized by an increasing share of the
GNP being accounted for by services, particularly those
services relating to information activities (Machlup, 1962,
1980; Porat, 1977).
With the growing evidence that a number of developing
countries, while registering relatively steady increases in
industrialization have not experienced corresponding
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increases in national income (Morawetz, 1977)

(let alone per

capita income), scholars have begun suggesting that
developing country do not, and even should not, have to go
through the "stages" of development

(Gibbs, 1988).

instance, Jussawala (1982) and Gibbs
developing countries can, and are,

For

(1988) suggest that

leapfrogging the

industrial stage and moving toward becoming what Jussawala
calls "Newly Informatics Societies."

Similarly, Katz

(1988), and Arriaga (1985) have surmised that the service
sector in developing countries, fueled by the increase in
government activity, can be expected to grow rapidly.

Some

of the reasoning for the growth of telecommunications stems
from this anticipated expansion of services.

However, as

Table XII suggests, the expected growth of services does not
appear to have materialized, at least during the period
under review.
These findings on the trends in the share of industry,
services and agriculture are important not only because
they provide evidence of the composition of economic
activity in developing countries, but also because they are
expected to have a strong bearing on the development of
telecommunications and condition the impact of policies on
telecommunications performance and distribution.

These

issues are part of the detailed analysis of telecommunication outcomes dealt with in the next few chapters.
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Chapter 9

POLICIES, COMMITMENT AND PERFORMANCE

The previous two chapters provided evidence of the changes
in the telecommunications sector as well as in the
composition of economic activity between 1977 and 1988.

The

next two chapters explore the reasons for the changes in
telecommunications outcomes.

The present chapter focuses on

telecommunication performance, while the next looks at the
changes in telecommunication distribution.
It has been established that telecommunications performance
and telecommunications policies have undergone significant
changes over the period under the review.
changes related?

But are these

The bivariate analysis begins with Table

XIII which presents the coefficients of the correlations
between policy changes and the five performance variables.
The table also presents the coefficients of the correlation
between commitment (i.e., the growth rate of governmental
investment)

in the sector and the performance variables. 23

23. The outcome measures of the performance variables and
the distribution variables in the next chapter are, of
course, the changes in outcome from 1977 to 1988 after
controlling for the 1977 levels.
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TABLE XIII
Policies, Commitment and Performance
(Correlation Coefficients)

TelDen

LinDen

TraDen

EqCha
FacCha
SerCha

.25*
.28*
.22*

.25*
.25*
.23*

.15
.12

- .13
-.18*
-.10

Commit

.32*

.30*

.27*

-.24*

N

63;

sig.

*

= .05

**

DemPer

.11

FinPer
.11

.10
.15
.16

.01

Perhaps the most noticeable fact is the lack of a
significant relationship between financial performance and
any of the policy or commitment variables.

It appears that

if one of the objectives of policy reform is to improve the
profitability of telecommunication undertakings then the
solution may lie neither in sector liberalization nor in
increasing sector investments.
But stepping up sector investments does seem to
significantly improve telephone, line and traffic densities
as well as reduce the outstanding demand for telephone
service. 24

Nevertheless, to the extent that policies

governing the ownership of telecommunication facilities have
been liberalized, this liberalization is significantly
24. Since demand performance (DemPer) is measured as the
size of the waiting list for telephones lines as a
proportion of the total number of installed lines, the
negative correlations signify a reduction in this proportion
and, hence, improved demand performance.

163

related to higher telephone, line and traffic densities as
well as better demand performance.

In contrast,

liberalization of equipment and service policies, though
significantly related to higher telephone and line
densities, do not appear to impact significantly on traffic
densities or demand performance.
Table XIV presents the correlations between the four
economic variables and telecommunication performance.

As

expected, growth rate of per capita GNP is highly correlated
with both line and telephone densities, but not with the
other three variables.

That the growth of GNP is not

significantly correlated with traffic densities is more or
less in keeping with earlier studies.

The 1968 and 1972

editions of the Gas-5 studies reported that though longdistance call traffic was positively related to GNP, local
traffic densities could not be shown to be effected by the
course of economic growth.
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TABLE XIV
Economic Development and Performance
(Correlation Coefficients)

TelDen
GnpGro
AgrGro
IndGro
SerGro

N 63; sig.

.75**
-.45**
.48**
.19

* =

LinDen

.74**
-.46**
.48**
.18

~05

TraDen

DemPer

-.14
.19
-.21
-.08

.10
-.14
.19
.20

FinPer

.12
-.10
.11

.07

** = .01

Traffic densities, demand performance and financial
performance are also not related to the growth of industry,
agriculture or services.

Industrial growth is fairly

strongly related to high telephone and line densities and,
expectedly, the growth of agriculture is negatively related
with these two variables.
What is surprising is that service growth is not related to
any of the performance variables.

In developed countries,

growth of the service sector has been closely related to the
development of telecommunications, but this does not appear
to be the case in developing countries.

The lack of such a

relationship may of course be a statistical artifact of the
lack of significant variance of the service growth measure.
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possible substantive reasons are examined in the discussion
section.
One of the important criticisms of telecommunications sector
liberalization in developing countries is based on the
argument that improvements sought to be achieved through
restructuring may be realizable only at higher levels of
national income.

Tables XV through XVII provide support for

this argument separately for the three policy variables.
Each table presents the zero-order correlations between each
of the policy variables and the five performance variables
for low, middle and high income countries.

TABLE XV
Facilities Policy Change and Performance
(correlation coefficients
at different levels of GNP/capita)

Low
TelDen
LinDen
TraDen
DemPer
FinPer
N = 63; sig.

Middle

.01
.02
.07
-.04
.04
*

.19*
.18*
.06
-.03
.12
.05

** = .01

High

.32*
.31*
.22*
-.21*
.17
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TABLE XVI
Equipment Policy Change and Performance
(correlation coefficients
at different levels of GNP/capita)

Low
TelDen
LinDen
TraDen
DemPer
FinPer
N

Middle

.03
.05
.06
-.09
.09

63; sig.

*

.17
.15
.09
-.04
.12

= .05

**

High
.22*
.21*
.11
- .13
.08

= .01

TABLE XVII
Service Policy Change and Performance
(correlation coefficients
at different levels of GNP/capita)

Low
TelDen
LinDen
TraDen
DemPer
FinPer
N

63; sig.

Middle

.07
.06
.10
-.05
.02
*

.14
.13
.10
-.06
.09
.05

**

High
.28*
.24*
.13
-.10
.07

.01
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The relationship between liberalization of equipment and
service policies and increases in telephone and line
densities noticed in Table XIII is clearly conditioned by
the level of national income.

While the coefficients are

not significant for low and middle income countries they are
for higher income countries (Tables XVI and XVII).

It

appears that if there are advantages for sector performance
to be had from liberalization in these two areas, they may
be realizable only at high income levels and not, therefore
for most developing countries.
On the other hand, liberalization of facilities policy is
significantly related to increased telephone densities in
both middle and high income countries.

But the

relationships between facilities liberalization and traffic
density and demand performance observed in Table XIII is
specified by the level of national income, remaining
significant only for high income countries.
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TABLE XVIII
Commitment and Performance
(correlation coefficients
at different levels of GNP/capita)

Low

TelDen
LinDen
TraDen
DemPer
FinPer
N

63; sig.

Middle

.19*
.18*
.03
-.35*
.10
*

.25*
.26*
.07
-.19*
.15
.05

**

High

.31*
.35*
.22*
-.26*
.08

.01

In contrast, the relationship between commitment and
performance is more consistent (Table XVIII).

Both

telephone and line densities are significantly related to
commitment at all levels of GNP/capita.

And even though the

magnitude of the coefficient between demand performance and
commitment is higher for low and high income countries than
for middle income countries, it is apparent that the
relationship holds across income levels.
Finally, the multivariate analysis attempts to determine the
independent impact of policy changes on performance after
accounting for the effect of the level of economic
development and the composition of economic activity.

Table

XIX presents the standardized regression coefficients for
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the independent regression of each of the telecommunication
performance variables on the eight independent variables.

TABLE XIX
Regression Estimates of the Effects of Economic and
Policy variables on Telecommunication Performance

GnpGro IndGro SerGro AgrGro EqCh FacCh SerCh Comm
Tel
.68** .21*
Lin .64** .22*
Tra .16
.10
Dem -.11
-.07
Fin .10
.08

.11

.12
.09
-.01
.04

-.19
-.07
-.02
.02
.07

.14
.13
.01
-14
.18

.17
.16
.07
-21*
.12

.12
.11

.06
-17
.11

R2

.31* .84**
.29* .82**
.21
.11
-23* .37*
.17
.12

Notes: standardized regression coefficients;
N = 61; sig. * = .05
** = .01

The first thing to note is that there are virtually no
significant coefficients for the three policy variables for
any of the dependent variables.

In other words, after we

account for the effect of the growth of GNP, the composition
of the GNP and the growth of government commitment, there
are no significant independent effects of any of the policy
variables on four of the five performance variables.

The

only exception to this is the effect of facilities
liberalization on demand performance.
What is clear is that the growth of GNP/capita, increase in
industrialization and government commitment together account
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for almost the entire variance in telephone and line
densities of many developing countries.

That commitment

maintains a significant independent effect on densities even
with GNP and industrial growth rates in the equation,
provides indication of the importance of governmental
investment for the growth of the sector.

In fact,

commitment, along with facilities change, are the only two
variables significantly related to improved demand
performance.

As expected the regression analysis provides

little indication of what explains the financial performance
of telecommunication sectors in developing countries.
Though the regression analysis indicates that there is
little independent impact of the three policy variables,
there is some suggestion in Tables XVI and XVII that there
may be some impact of the interaction of policies and GNP,
with policy liberalization having a significant effect at
higher levels of national income.

In fact the analysis

conducted so far has ignored the possibility of the impact
of, not only the interaction of policies and GNP, but also
the interaction of pOlicies and commitment and commitment
and GNP.
The relationship between these three sets of interactions
and the five performance variables are examined next within
a hierarchical regression design.

The hierarchical design

enables us to assess the effect of each set of variables on
the dependent variables after having controlled for the
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previous set.

In this design, the proportion of variance

accounted for by all the independent variables

(i.

e., the R2

found in the preceding regression analysis) is partitioned
incrementally by noting the "increment in the proportion of
variance accounted for by each independent variable (or by a
set of independent variables) at the point at which it is
entered into a regression analysis"

(Pedhazur, 1982 p. 177)

Critical in this process is the selection of the order of
entry of the independent variables.

In this study there are

three main sets of variables and three interaction terms.
The three main sets relate to:

(1) the structure of economic

activity, i.e., the growth rates of GNP/capita, industry,
agriculture and services (GnpGro, IndGro, SerGro, AgrGro);
(2) political commitment, i.e., the growth rate of
governmental investment (Commit);

(3) policy changes, i.e.,

rate of overall change of telecommunication policies
(PolCha) .25

The three interaction terms were computed

multiplicati vely and comprised the interaction of:
policy change and commitment (PolCom = PolCha
GNP growth and commitment (GnpCom = GnpGro
Gnp growth and policy change (GnpPol

=

*

GnpGro

The six variables were entered in two stages.

*

(1)

Commit);

Commit);

*

(2)

(3)

PolCha) .
In the first

stage, the three sets of main effect variables were entered
in the following order: first, the four economic variables
(GnpGro, IndGro, SerGro, AgrGro); then the political
25. See Tables VI and VII, pp. 148-150.
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commitment variable (Commit); third, the policy change scale
(PolCha) .
The selection of this order of entry was based on a number
of considerations.

First, the structure of national

economies are, necessarily, the given environment within
which policy makers have to make decisions, whether the
decisions pertain to allocation of financial investment or
changes in the policy structure.

In other words, the level

and composition of economic activity are both commitment and
policy prior.

The effect of the economic structure,

therefore, needed to be controlled prior to examining the
effect of the commitment and policy variables.
The decision to control for commitment before examining the
effect of policies was based on two factors.

Decisions

pertaining to the relative investments in different
industrial sectors are usually made at levels of government
that decide on inter-sectoral priorities.

Consequently,

telecommunication policy makers usually find the investments
allocated to the sector a given constraint within which they
must make their decisions, suggesting that commitment is
sector policy prior.

Second, the main focus of this study

is to attempt to evaluate the independent impact of changes
in telecommunications policies on telecommunications
outcomes.

Both of these factors require that the effect of

commitment be controlled before entering policy changes into
the regression equation.
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The second stage of building the regression equation,
involved entering the interaction terms after the main
effects had been determined.

Whether or not an interaction

term would be entered into the equation and the relative
order of entry was determined statistically.

The

coefficients of the three interaction variables were
examined while they were still not entered into the equation
to determine whether they would contribute to a significant
increase in R2.
If only one of the coefficients was significant it was
entered into the equation and the remaining two were again
examined.

If two, or all three, of

the coefficients were

significant at the first examination, then each was entered
independent of the others into the equation.

The one which

resulted in the most increase in the R2 was entered in the
equation and the remaining two were again examined.

If none

of the interaction terms was significant then none were
entered.

Table XX gives the results of the hierarchical

regression analysis.
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TABLE XX
Hierarchical Regression of the Effect of Economic and
policy variables on Telecommunication Performance
TelDen
R2
(1 )
(2)
(3 )
(4 )
(5 )
(6 )

R2 C

.67 .67**
.S3 .16*
.S4 .01

LinDen
R2

R2 C

TraDen
R2

R2 C

.66 .66** .19 .19*
.S2 .16*
.24 .05
.S2 .00
.24 .00

FinPer

DemPer
R2

R2 C

.10
.25
.37
.56

.10
.15*
.12
.19*

R2 C

R2

.13 .13
.14 .01
.15 .02

Notes: N = 61; sig. * = .05 ** = .01; R2 C = R2 Change
(1 )
Economic Structure: GnpGro, IndGro, AgrGro SerGro
(2) = Political Commitment: Commit
(3 )
policy Liberalization: PolCha
(4) = policy & Commitment Interaction: PolCom
(5 )
GNP & Commitment Interaction: GnpCom
( 6)
GNP & policy Interaction: GnpPol
The results are very similar to the earlier findings.
Policy liberalization provides no significant increment in
the amount of variance in the dependent variables once the
economic structure and commitment variables have been
entered into the equation.

Economic structure and

commitment together explain over SO percent of the variance
in telephone and line densities, while only the set of
economic structure variables explains a significant
proportion of the variance in traffic densities.

In line

with previous analyses, no set of variables is significantly
related to changes in financial performance.
Except for the demand performance variable, no interaction
term was significant for any of the performance variables.
In the case of demand performance, commitment and the
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interaction of commitment and policies were the only two
variables to account for a significant increase in the R2.

Discussion

Though the results of the bivariate analysis suggest that
the liberalization of equipment, services and facilities
policies lead to higher telephone and line densities and
that the liberalization of facilities polices is
additionally related to improved demand performance, these
relationships are conditioned by the level of national
income.

In the case of equipment and services the

liberalization of policies is associated with high telephone
and line densities only for countries with high incomes.
In theory, liberalization of equipment manufacture and
procurement practices should provide telecommunication
entities access to improved switching and transmission
capabilities leading to improved densities.

However, the

ability to make use of advanced technology also depends on
the state of the existing infrastructure and its ability to
absorb and incorporate the new technology.

Low and middle

income countries usually have more backward facilities than
high income countries and cannot, therefore, translate
liberalized equipment policies into network expansion.
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For instance, in 1986 the Ivory Coast installed four
electronic exchanges in Abidjan (procured through
International Competitive Bidding) with 25% higher capacity
than the existing cross-bar exchanges.

However, due to the

poor state of transmission facilities, these exchanges have
not been able to operate at full capacity (Cowhey, 1991).
Liberalization of facilities is the one policy development
that is associated with improvements in line and telephone
densities as well demand performance for both middle and
high income countries.

A major reason for this is that

increases in urban densities and reduction of outstanding
demand in urban areas appear to go hand-in-hand with
liberalization of facilities policies.

A fuller treatment

of why such liberalization is associated with differential
performance in urban and rural areas is dealt with in the
next chapter.
However, the results of the regression analysis show that
when we examine the entire sample and include economic and
commitment variables in the model, the three policy
liberalization variables have no independent impact on four
of the five performance variables, the only exception being
demand performance.

There is nothing in the literature

which explains the relationship between the interaction of
policy liberalization and commitment with lower outstanding
demand for telephone service.

It appears probable that, as

in the case of telephone and line densities, this
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relationship may be accounted for by improvements in urban
areas, as discussed in the next chapter.
Clearly, the most significant finding is the importance of
government commitment to improved sector performance.
Increasing levels of government investment are particularly
important for telecommunication expansion because of the
relatively high capital requirements (Chapius, 1975) and
high capital-output ratios

(Huntly, 1967) that characterize

the sector.
Traditionally, sectors with such characteristics, for
example power, have tended to attract private investment
mainly in distribution or re-distribution activities and
rarely in infrastructura1 activities.

This accentuates the

saliency of government investment for sector growth.
Unlike liberalization of policies, increases in the
proportion of governmental investment in the sector is
associated with higher telephone and line densities at all
levels of national income.

Clearly, if developing countries

are seeking to rapidly expand basic services, then the
solution appears to lie more in stepping-up governmental
commitment to the sector, reflected in the growth of
governmental investment in telecommunications, than in the
neoclassical panacea of privatization and the operation of
factor forces.

Indeed, governmental commitment remains an

important predictor of network expansion even after
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accounting for the growth of GNP/capita, industry and
services.
In keeping with the findings of previous research the growth
of national income is an important predictor of network
expansion, as is the growth of the share of industry in the
GNP.

As the results of several input-output analyses

discussed earlier suggest, at their present state of
economic development, developing countries find the most use
for telecommunications in their industrial sector.
Examination of output coefficients of telecommunications
reveals that most of the final demand for telecommunications
comes from manufacturing.

Hence, as the share of industry

grows, there is often a corresponding growth in
telecommunications.
What is unexpected is the lack of a relationship between
service sector growth and telecommunications.

In developed

countries, growth of telecommunications has been associated
with the growth of the service sector as the sector becomes
increasingly characterized as consisting of information
related activities (Nora and Minc, 1978).

Katz

(1988),

Jussawala (1982) and others have surmised that the growth of
the service sector in developing countries would also be
associated with growth in telecommunications.
not appear to have happened.

But this does
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One reason for the lack of this relationship may the very
different nature of the service sector in developing
countries.

In developed countries a large part of the

growth of the service sector has been accounted for by the
growth of information related activities that require
improved telecommunications.

In developing countries, on

the other hand, a large part of the service sector is still
accounted for by non-information related activities

(e.g.,

domestic workers) that do not require telecommunication
facilities.
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Chapter 10

POLICIES, COMMITMENT AND DISTRIBUTION

This chapter presents the findings of the same step-by-step
analysis for the five distribution variables.

Table XXI

presents the correlations between policies and distribution.
Two sets of findings are fairly dramatic.

TABLE XXI
Policies and Distribution
(Correlation Coefficients)

UrbDen

RurDen

EqCha
FacCha
SerCha

.23*
.61**
.32*

-.21*
-.21*
-.20*

Commit

.33*

N

61; sig.

.36*
*

= .05

**

ResDen

PubAcc

AvgPri

.11

.11

.21 *
.19*

.18*
.19*

.22*
.62**
.59**

.27*

.24*

.03

= .01

First, changes in facilities, services and equipment
policies are highly correlated with average price.
Increased liberalization of policies appears to lead to
higher prices for basic residential service.

The second is

the difference in the direction of the relationships between
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policy liberalization and urban and rural densities.

While

increases in liberalization are positively associated with
higher urban densities, they are negatively associated with
rural densities.
In contrast to policy changes, increases in commitment
appears to improve both rural and urban densities.
Government investment in the sector, it appears, is related
to a more balanced expansion of the telecommunications.

At

the same time it is not related to average price, i.e.,
increasing Commitment is not associated with higher prices
for basic residential service.

TABLE XXII
Economic Development and Distribution
(Correlation Coefficients)

GnpCap
PerAgr
PerInd
PerSer

N

= sig.

UrbDen

RurDen

.67**
-.44**
.46**
.19

.51**
.32*
.36*

*

.05

.11

**

ResDen

.29*
-.26*
.29*
.17

PubAcc

.21*
-.18
.22*
.13

AvgPri

.32*
-.60**
.51**
.19

.01

Table XXII presents the bivariate relationship between the
economic variables and distribution.

Again we notice that

growth of services is not significantly associated with any
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of the variables.

Also noteworthy are the reverse

relationships for agriculture and industry.

Indeed

agricultural growth is the only economic variable related to
lower average prices.

Both GNP and industrial growth are

related to higher average price.
Tables XXIII through XXVI present the bivariate
relationships between policies, commitment and the five
distribution variables at different levels of national
income.

Looking first at Tables XXIII, XXIV and XXV we

notice that liberalization of policies is significantly
related to high prices at all levels of income, with the
coefficients being Slightly higher for low income countries.
This suggests that the adverse effect of liberalization on
prices may be exacerbated as the level of income declines.
This is also true for urban line densities.
The negative relationship between liberalization of policies
and rural densities noticed in Table XXI is now seen to hold
only for low income countries.

These relationships are

particularly true of facilities and services and slightly
less so for equipment policies.
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TABLE XXIII
Facility Policy Change and Distribution
(correlation coefficients
at different levels of GNP/capita)

Middle

Low
UrbDen
RurDen
ResDen
PubAcc
AvgPri

N

63

.31*
- .19*
-.03
.09
.41**

sig.

.25*
-.13
.05
.10
.37**

*

.05

High
.29*
.03
.07
.24*
.31**

.01

**

TABLE XXIV
Equipment Policy Change and Distribution
(correlation coefficients
at different levels of GNP/capita)

Low
UrbDen
RurDen
ResDen
PubAcc
AvgPri

N

63;

.19
-.21*
-.07
.05
.22*

siq.

*

Middle

High

.21*

.24*
.01
.05
.16
.17

-.11

.03
.09
.19*

=

.05

** = .01
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TABLE XXV
Service Policy Change and Distribution
(correlation coefficients
at different levels of GNP/capita)

Low
UrbDen
RurDen
ResDen
PubAcc
AvgPri

.23*
-.22*
- .19*
-.07
.27*

N = 63; sig.

Middle

High

.27*

.34*
.01
.05
.23*
.32*

-.11

-.07
.09
.21*

* =

.05

** =

.01

TABLE XXVI
Commitment and Distribution
(correlation coefficients
at different levels of GNP/capita)

Low
UrbDen
RurDen
ResDen
PubAcc
AvgPri
N

=

63; sig.

.21*
.17
.12
.03
.02
*

=

.05

**

Middle

High

.24*
.23*
.19
.05
.09

.30*
.27*
.15
.22*
.04

=

.01

The relationship between Commitment and distribution is also
conditioned by the level of income, but less significantly
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than for the policy variables (Table XXVI).

The

relationships between urban and rural densities and
commitment remain significant at all income levels.

More

importantly, it is apparent that low income countries
benefit more than middle and high income countries as far as
improvements in rural densities are concerned.
Table XXVII presents the results of the regression analysis
for the five distribution variables.

The most striking fact

is that almost the entire variance in average price is
accounted for by the three policy variables.

That is,

liberalization trends in all three policy areas are
important determinants of increased price.

While policy

liberalization is associated with a worsening of the
economic conditions of access to telecommunications,
commitment is associated with significant improvements in
access and availability.
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TABLE XXVII
Regression Estimates of the Effects of Economic and
Policy variables on Telecommunication Distribution

GnpGro IndGr SerGro AgrGro
Urb
Rur
Res
Pub
Avg

.52*
.56*
.31*
.34*
.16

.23*
.16
.06
.05
.12

.09
.02
.05
.07
.09

-.08
.17
-.03

.02
.04

EqCh FacCh SerCh
.07
.12
.09
-.03 -.16 -.07
.04
.11
.08
.09
.10
.07
.21*
.28*
.24*

Com

R2

.23*
.21*
.25*
.23*
.09

.77**
.71**
.39**
.29*
.65**

Notes: standardized regression coefficients;
N = 61;
sig. * = .05
** = .01

Table XXVIII presents the results of the hierarchical
regression of the five distribution variables on the three
main sets of independent variables and the three interaction
terms.
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TABLE XXVIII
Hierarchical Regression of the Effect of Economic and
Policy Variables on Telecommunication Distribution
UrbDen
R2
(1 )
(2 )
(3)
(4)
(5 )
(6 )

R2 C

.69 .67**
.86 .17*
.87 .01

RurDen
R2

R2 C

ResDen
R2

R2 C

.54 .54** .21 .21*
.82 .28*
.39 .18*
.49 .10
.84 .02

PubAcc
R2

R2 C

.22 .22*
.38 .16*
.39 .01

AvgPri
R2

R2 C

.33 .33*
.34 .01
.65 .21*

.58 .19*
.83 .18*
2
.01; R C = R2 Change
IndGro, AgrGro SerGro

Notes: N = 61; sig. * = .05 ** =
(1) = Economic Structure: GnpGro,
(2)
Political Commitment: Commit
(3) = Policy Liberalization: PolCha
(4)
Policy & Commitment Interaction: PolCom
(5) = GNP & Commitment Interaction: GnpCom
(6)
GNP & Policy Interaction: GnpPol

Again we notice that the policy scale variable adds little
additional predictive power to the regression equations
except for the case of average price.

In the case of

average price the policy scale alone adds 21 percent to the
predictive power of a model which contains the economic
structure and commitment variables, and the interaction of
policy liberalization and GNP growth contributes another 18
percent.
Contradistinguishingly, the commitment variable contributes
to significant increases in R2 for all the distribution
variables except the average price of basic telephone
service.

In addition, the interaction of commitment and GNP
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growth adds contributes to a significant increase in the
growth of public access.

Discussion

The most obvious reason for the strong and consistent
relationship between policy liberalization and higher prices
of basic residential service seems to be the increased
emphasis on commercial norms that is introduced through
privatization and competition.

There appear three main ways

through which this happens.
First, through the movement toward setting prices as close
to cost as possible that is usually part of the
liberalization process.

This tends to eliminate the

subsidies that are commonly in place for basic residential
service and consequently tends to push up prices.

In 1977,

Argentina ranked 25th among the countries in this study in
terms of the price of basic residential service.

In 1985,

the Argentine Government privatized the state owned
telecommunications company, ENTEL, by permitting a Spanish
telecommunications company to buy a majority share in the
enterprise.

At the same time, it introduced a competitive

element by allowing the few small existing private networks
to expand without prior government approval.

Perhaps, more

importantly, it also deregulated telephone prices.
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Both ENTEL and its smaller companies removed the traditional
subsidies for rural and residential service in order to
lower long-distance and international rates and capture the
lucrative market of business subscribers.

By 1988 Argentina

had the highest price of basic residential service of all
the countries in this study.
Second, in a number of countries where sector policy
liberalization involves the separation of urban and rural
services, enterprises are able to take advantage of the
outstanding demand for telephone service in urban areas by
raising prices.

In India, for instance, the establishment

of a separate public sector corporation for Bombay and Delhi
resulted in marked increases in telephone prices compared to
the rest of the country.
Finally, as Saunders, et. al.

(1983) point out, there could

also be hidden costs incurred in sector liberalization in
developing countries including inefficiencies associated
with the loss of economies of scale through network
fragmentation.

It is quite probable that part of these

costs are passed onto consumers.
Moreover, the significance of the GnpPol interaction
variable suggests that the deleterious effects of policy
liberalization on average price are compounded for countries
with higher growth rates of national income.

It is probable

that these countries are already experiencing relatively
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high inflation rates (since higher growth and higher
inflation usually go hand-in-hand) and the effect of
liberalization is correspondingly compounded.
Of equal concern is the opposite direction of the
relationships between liberalization and rural and urban
densities.

There are three main ways in which facilities

liberalization can translate into improvements in network
expansion in urban areas at the cost of rural areas.
First, through the break-up of national monopolies into
regional monopolies within the public sector.

This enables

those regional entities servicing urban areas to concentrate
on network expansion and the reduction of outstanding demand
without having to worry about transferring financial or
technical resources to the more difficult to expand in rural
areas.

In India, for instance, the establishment of a

separate public sector corporation for Bombay and Delhi
resulted in marked increases in telephone densities in both
cities.
Second, liberalized sectors are more sensitive to demand
that traditional public sector monopolies.

Though there is

a large unmet demand for telephone service in many
developing countries, this unmet demand is concentrated
almost entirely in urban areas.

Moreover, the demand for

service is much more price inelastic in rural areas than in
urban areas.

Therefore, following these market signals,
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liberalized sectors tend to concentrate on expanding urban
facilities to the neglect of rural areas.
Third, it is probable that many services, particularly in
rural areas may fail to attract private capital or
suppliers.

Liberalized sectors may be reluctant to invest

in rural areas because sunk costs are high and returns low.
For instance, in 12 World Bank financed projects in the
1980s, the average cost of installing an additional
telephone line in urban areas was about US$ 1,200; in rural
areas the cost was about US$ 4,000.
Thus Walsham (1979) suggests that the expansion of rural
service is dependent on either direct government subsidies
of financing from out of the financial surpluses generated
from urban subscribers and long distance services.

Walsham

(1979) used data from three Latin American counties to
simulate the possibility of generating extra revenue from
urban services through price increases and using it to
subsidize rural services.

The results of the simulation

showed that from 1978 to 1987 the extra revenue from urban
services would be more than the projected loss from lower
than cost prices for rural services.

Also, by 1987, rural

densities would be 30 percent higher than would have been
without the increased cross-subsidy and without any adverse
impact on the increase in urban densities.
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Developing countries, it seems, need to be particularly
concerned about the impact of liberalization especially if
keeping prices down and increasing rural penetration are
national priorities.

Nor is liberalization associated with

higher residential densities or conditions of public access.
In contrast, the growth rate of government investment is
positively related to expansion of the basic network in both
rural and urban areas as well as improvements in residential
penetration and public access.

The increase in densities of

public call offices is important because PCO facilities are
generally the least expensive way to provide wide telephone
access to the most people.
al.

Furthermore, as Saunders, et.

(1983) point out, the high market clearing prices

charged in the short-run for subscriber's telephones may
prohibit their acquisition by small businesses, agricultural
establishments and residences who have occasional or even
frequent use of telephones.

Public telephones provide a

means through which these entities can satisfy their needs.
However, PCOs in developing countries are loss making
facilities, with the cost of installing and maintaining
them, particularly in rural areas, far exceeding the
revenues collected from their use.

Here again expansion of

the service depends upon direct government investments or
cross subsidies.

Liberalization tends to reduce the

possibility of either.

Not surprisingly, therefore, growth
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of government commitment is related to higher PCO densities
while policy liberalization is not.
Finally, the significance of the interaction of Gnp growth
and commitment for increasing PCO densities suggests that
increasing governmental investment in telecommunications
leads to improved conditions of public access more so in
countries that have experienced higher growth rates of
national income.

This is probably because on the one hand

(as Saunders, et. al., 1983 point out) demand for PCOs and
PCO use in general varies directly with the level of
national income and, on the other hand, increasing levels of
government commitment result in the ability to satisfy that
demand.

Consequently, countries with high growths of income

and commitment perform relatively better on this measure.
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Chapter 11

CLASSIFICATION SCHEME

As discussed in Chapter 5, the objective of the
classification scheme was to attempt to construct a typology
of countries based on their economic and policy
characteristics.

The eight independent variables, viz.,

growth rates of GNP/capita, growth rates of the share of
industry, services and agriculture, growth rate of
commitment and changes in facilities,

services and equipment

policies, were used to build the groups.

The classification scheme was constructed using a cluster
analysis procedure.

Cluster analysis examines similarities

among countries rather than variables.

Numerous cluster

algorithms exist (Everitt, 1982; Lorr, 1985).

Rather than

select a single clustering algorithm, a two-step procedure
was used.

First, Ward's (1963) hierarchical clustering

method was used to form clusters.

Ward's procedure combines

cases into clusters so as to minimize the total within
cluster variance (i.e., the error sum of squares).

"At each

step in the analysis, union of every possible pair of
clusters is considered and the two clusters whose fusion
results in the minimum increase in the error sum of squares
is combined"

(Everitt, 1982, p. 31).
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In the second step, the clusters obtained using Ward's
method served as starting points for an iterative
reallocation clustering.

This procedure moves cases from

cluster to cluster until a goodness-of-fit criterion, in
this case the error sum of squares, is optimized.

This two-stage analysis has several advantages.

First, the

use of iterative partitioning overcomes a limitation of
hierarchical algorithms, namely, that a case cannot be
reassigned to a different and more suitable cluster at a
late stage in the analysis (Fleishman, 1986). Second, using
the results of the hierarchical clustering as input to the
iterative algorithm avoids the drawback of forming a
starting configuration of clusters on an arbitrary basis.

A

poor starting configuration can result in a local, rather
than a global, minimum of the goodness-of-fit criterion.
Making the starting configuration less arbitrary reduces the
likelihood of a misleading result

(Milligan, 1980).

Two criteria were used for determining the optimal solution
for the final number of clusters or groups.

The first

criterion used was the increment in the dissimilarity of
clusters merged at each step in the procedure.

When the

dissimilarity of the merged clusters increases sharply in
magnitude, relative to the dissimilarity of clusters merged
at prior steps, then a stopping point for the hierarchical
fusion process is indicated (Lorr, 1983).
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In the present analysis, the distances between least
dissimilar clusters for the 10 through 2 cluster solutions
were as follows:

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3

2

cluster
cluster
cluster
cluster
cluster
cluster
cluster
cluster
cluster

= 13.94
= 14.32

15.06
17.58
19.27
= 20.81
27.53
= 39.27
= 52.05.

The dissimilarity begins to rise sharply at four clusters
suggesting a five cluster solution.
The second criterion for determining the number of clusters
was proposed by Mojena (1977).

Mojena standardizes the

distance coefficients between clusters that were merged at
each step in the hierarchical process.

Results of Mojena's

Monte Carlo study suggest that standardized scores in the
range of 2.75 and 3.50 can be used to decide when to
terminate hierarchical fusion.

In the present analysis, a

five cluster solution has a standardized score of 3.19
whereas a four cluster solution has a score of 4.09,
indicating a five cluster solution.

Thus, both criteria,

the increment in the distance coefficient and Mojena's
standardized coefficient, indicate a five cluster solution.
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The ensuing grouping of countries from the cluster analysis
are presented in Table XXIX.

Table XXX presents summary

statistics of group characteristics for the clustering
variables.

TABLE XXIX
Group Membership

Groupl

Group2

Group3

Group4

GroupS

Benin
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cent Af Rep
Chad
Egypt
Ethiopia
Guatemala
India
Indonesia
Kenya
Lesotho
Madagascar
Mauritania
Mozambique
Nepal
Niger
Pakistan
Rwanda
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Zaire

Bolivia
Botswana
Colombia
El Salvador
Ghana
Honduras
Mauritius
Morocco
Nigeria
PNG
Paraguay
Philippines
Senegal
Thailand
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Algeria
Chile
Costa Rica
Ecuador
Malaysia
Mexico
Panama
Peru
South Korea
Syria
Tunisia

Brazil
Hongkong
Israel
Singapore
T and T
Venezuela
Saudi Arabia

Argentina
Kuwait
Oman
UAE
Uruguay
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TABLE XXX
Group Characteristics

Group

GnpCap

PAgr PInd

1
(N=27)

263
(120 )

40
(16 )

( 11)

39
(09 )

(1.

2
(N=15)

530
(132 )

29
(10 )

28
(09 )

44
(05 )

(1.

3
(N=l1)

993
(153)

18
(07)

31
(10 )

51
(12)

4
(N=7)

2, 917
(1,460)

05
(04)

45
(24 )

50
(22 )

5
(N=5)

6,546
(2,227)

09
(06 )

39
(06 )

(11 )

21

PSer

52

EqCha

FacCha SerCha

2.1
6)

(1.

3.0
8)

(1.

(1.

3.5
6)

(1.

3.7
(0. 9)

(1.

4.0
6)

(1.

(1.

Com

2.1
6)

1.9
(1. 1)

2.6
7)

1.8
(1.7 )

3.3
9)

(1.

1.9
7)

(1.

2.7
7)

(1.

3.3
7)

(1.

3.1
3)

(1. O)

3.0
(0.7 )

4.0
7)

4.1
(1. 5)

2.6
(0. 9)

3.4

2.1
9)

The five groups present distinct patterns and systematic
differences.

Clearly the five groups are distinguished

straight away by their level of per capita GNP.

Groups 1

and 2 are both low income groups, Group 3 is a middle income
group and Groups 4 and 5 are high income groups.

Groups 1

and 2 are distinguished from each other by the relatively
higher levels of industrialization and lower levels of
agriculture in Group 2.

More importantly, the countries in

Group 2 have markedly more liberalized policies than those
in Group 1, but both groups have similar levels of
commitment.
Group 3 countries have a fairly high proportion of GNP
accounted for by services, have relatively liberalized
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policies and relatively medium levels of commitment.

Group

5 is distinguished from Group 4 by having more liberalized
policies.

However, government commitment to the growth of

telecommunications and the composition of economic activity
are very similar, though Group 5 countries do have higher
national incomes.
The important question as far as the usefulness of the
classification scheme was whether group membership could
predict differences in telecommunication performance and
distribution.

Tables XXXI presents descriptive statistics

for the performance variables by group.

TABLE XXXI
Group Membership and Performance
(means and s. d. )

DemPer

FinPer

TelDen

LinDen

TraDen

Group 1

1. 56
(0.60 )

1. 41
(0.47)

1,602
(980)

35.11
(23.26)

-18.39
(12.36)

Group 2

2.09
(1. 86)

1. 44
(1.41)

1,825
(1,052)

43.84
(26.09)

17.44
(13.67)

Group 3

7.95
(5.67 )

5.75
(4.60)

2,311
(2,769)

50.12
(79.48)

-232.59
(195.09)

Group 4

18.33
(17.31)

13.04
(12.42)

3,236
(1,443)

48.34
(45.34)

101.78
(93.25)

Group 5

17.34
(7.20)

15.64
(9.44)

3,114
(1,479)

32.63
(17.33)

130.69
(88.24)
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The first thing to notice that there appear to be no
systematic or significant differences among the groups as
far as demand performance and financial performance are
concerned and only slight differences in traffic densities.
with respect to telephone and line densities, Groups 1 and 2
differ from each other only slightly, as is the case between
Groups 4 and 5.
two leaps.

Differences between the groups are seen in

First, Group 3 countries perform better on all

three variables than countries in Groups 1 and 2.

In the

second leap, Group 4 and 5 countries have considerably
higher densities than those in Group 3.
While the descriptive statistics seem to indicate that there
are systematic differences between the groups on some of the
performance variables, two additional analyses are performed
to determine, first whether the groups are significant
predictors of variance in the dependent variables and
second, which of the groups are significantly different from
each other on each of the variables.
Table XXXII presents the results of the regression analysis
of the five performance variables on the four vectors
representing the five groups coded for inclusion in the
model.

The vectors were created through a process of effect

coding so named because "the regression coefficients yielded
by its use reflect the effects of the treatments of the
analysis"

(Pedhazur, 1982, p. 289).

In this procedure four

vectors were generated (number of groups minus one) and in
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each vector, members of one group are assigned Is; all
others are assigned Os except for the members of a selected
group (in this case Group3) which are always assigned -ls.
The regression coefficients represents the deviation of the
group mean with which it is associated from the overall
mean, i.e., it represents the effect of that particular
group membership.26

TABLE XXXII
Regression Estimates of the Effects of
Group Membership on Telecommunication Performance

TelDen
LinDen
TraDen
DemPer
FinPer

Groupl

Group2

Group4

Group5

-.66**
-.69**
-.22
-.09
.01

-.47**
-.52**
-.12
.09
.02

.61**
.43**
.04
.03
.10

.28**
.58**
.06
-.25
.12

R2
.49**
.53**
.13
.06
.05

Notes: standardized regression coefficients;
N = 61;
sig. * = .05
** = .01

In keeping with the descriptive analysis we see that group
membership accounts for a significant amount of variance
only in telephone and line densities: 49% and 53%
respectively.

The coefficients also reflect the findings of

the descriptive analysis: Groups 1 and 2 have significantly
lower group means than the overall sample mean while Groups
26. For a complete treatment of categorical regression
analysis, the coding of vectors and interpretation of
coefficients, see Pedhazur (1982) Chapter 9, pp. 271-333.
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4 and 5 have significantly higher means for both variables.

There are no significant differences between the groups for
traffic densities, demand performance and financial
performance.
While the significant of the F ratio for the

R2 of the

regression of line and telephone densities on group
membership leads to rejection of the null hypothesis that
there is no relation between group membership and the extent
of telephone and line densities, the analysis does not tell
us which of the groups are significantly different from each
other.

Table XXXIII presents the results of the Scheffe's

test for multiple comparisons of means.

Scheffe's test

performs comparisons between every combination of groups, is
applicable to situations where group sizes are unequal and
is also the most conservative test of multiple comparisons
of means (Pedhazur, 1982, p. 296).
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TABLE XXXIII
Multiple Comparisons of Group Means for
Telecommunication Performance Variables
(Scheffe's Test)

Significantly
TelDen
LinDen
TraDen
DemPer
FinPer
Notes:

1 & 3
1 & 4

1 & 4
2 & 4

Different

1 & 5
1 & 5

2 & 4
2 & 5

Groups

2
3
no significantly different groups
no significantly different groups
no significantly different groups

&
&

5
5

3

&

5

Significant at the .05 level

As the regression analysis has already indicated, there are
no significant differences between the groups for demand and
financial performance or traffic densities.

There are six

pairs of differences for telephone density and five for line
density.

In the case of both variables, the low GNP groups,

1 and 2, are significantly different from both the high GNP
groups, 4 and 5 and the middle income group, 3, is
significantly different from the highest income group, 5.
In addition, in the case of telephone density, Groupl is
significantly different from Group3.

The differences are

clearly related to the income levels of the groups and not
to the extent of policy liberalization, the other main
differentiating characteristic of the classification scheme.
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Tables XXXIV through XXXVI present the same three step
analysis (descriptive statistics, regression analysis and
mUltiple comparisons of means) for the five distribution
variables.

TABLE XXXIV
Group Membership and Distribution
(means and s. d.)

UrbDen

RurDen

ResDen

PubAcc

AvgPrice

Group 1

2.44
(2.60)

1. 02
(1.23)

51
(12)

2,852
(1,076)

2.25
(2.00)

Group 2

3.19
(1.17)

0.54
(0.19)

49
(17)

1,247
(916)

3.13
(2.78)

Group 3

6.45
(4.79)

3.00
(1.25)

51
(20)

4,101
(3,333)

4.41
(3.63)

Group 4

17.30
(14.08)

13.24
(11.23)

69
(13)

22,022
(7,565)

6.22
(5.59)

Group 5

25.82
(9.81)

10.09
(9.34)

68
(5 )

14,409
(12,101)

7.85
(7.81)

Looking first at Groups 1 and 2, we notice that Group 1
countries have higher rural densities, more public call
offices and lower average prices for basic residential
service.

Though Group 2 countries do have higher urban

densities, the gap between rural and urban densities in
these countries is also higher than the gap for Group 1
countries.
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As in the case of the performance variables, there are
marked improvements in distributional variables from Group 2
to Group 3 and Group 3 to Group 4.

But comparing Groups 4

and 5 we notice similar patterns of differences as those
between Groups 1 and 2.

Group 4 countries have higher rural

densities, conditions of public access and lower prices.
The difference between rural and urban densities is also
lower in Group 4 countries than in Group 5 countries.

TABLE XXXV
Regression Estimates of the Effects of
Group Membership on Telecommunication Distribution

UrbDen
RurDen
ResDen
PubAcc
AvgPri

Group1

Group2

Group4

Group5

-.68**
-.59**
-.22
-.25*
-.66**

-.50**
-.48**
- .13
-.36*
-.33

.57**
.52**
.21
.31*
.27*

.44**
.43**
.16
.25*
.43**

R2
.52**
.66**
.16
.27*
.61**

Notes: standardized regression coefficients;
N = 61; sig. * = .05
** = .01
In contrast to the performance variables, group membership
explains a significant amount of the variance in four of the
five distribution variables, the only exception being
residential density.

Moreover, almost all pairs of group

means were significantly different from each other for the
four variables.

The following pairs were significant for

all four variables and, for the sake of brevity, are
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reported here rather than in Table XXXVI

1 & 5;

Groups: 1 & 3 ; 1 & 4;

2 & 4;

2 & 5;

3 & 5.

These groups are those that are differentiated on the basis
of national income.

TABLE XXXVI
Multiple Comparisons of Group Means for
Telecommunication Distribution Variables
(Scheffe's Test)

Significantly
UrbDen
RurDen
ResDen
PubAcc
AvgPri
Notes:

1
1
1

Groups

4 & 5
3 & 4
4 & 5
no significantly different groups
2
2 & 3
4 & 5
3 & 4
2 & 3
4 & 5
2

2 & 3
& 2
&
&

Different

3

&

4

2 & 3

Significant at the .05 level

without doubt, differences between Groups 2 and 3 and Groups
3 and 4 are related to differences in national income.

But,

unlike the situation with the performance variables, the
significant differences between Groups 1 and 2 and Groups 4
and 5 provide evidence of the importance of the extent of
liberalization in distinguishing between the groups with
respect to the distribution variables.
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Discussion

The five groups constructed through the cluster analysis
present distinctive patterns.

Most obviously they are

differentiated on the basis of national income.

But while

GNP differentiates Groups 1 and 2 from 3 and 3 from 4 and 5,
it does not differentiate between Groups 1 and 2 or between
4 and 5.

Nor are there significant differences between

these pairs of groups in terms of the composition of
economic activity or the level of government commitment to
telecommunications.

The critical difference between these

groups relates to the extent of liberalization of their
telecommunication policies with Group 2 and Group 5
countries having more liberalized policies than Groups 1 and
4 respectively.
The classification scheme predicts differences in
telecommunication performance only moderately well.

While

the five groups together account for a significant amount of
the variance in telephone and line densities, they do not do
so for traffic densities, demand performance or financial
performance.

In keeping with the findings in Chapter 9,

differences relating to the telephone and line densities are
clearly related to national income.

As GNP/capita increases

from Group 1 to Group 5 so does the extent of the telephone
network.

However, there are only very slight differences

between Groups 1 and 2 and Groups 4 and 5 with respect to
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performance.

This suggests that policy liberalization has

very little impact on improving performance when we compare
groups of countries that are similar in terms of national
income.
In contrast, policy liberalization does have significant
adverse effects on access to and availability of
telecommunication service, particularly with respect to
rural densities, public access and average price of basic
residential service.

Groups 2 and 5, which have more

liberalized policies than Groups 1 and 4 do not fare as well
as the latter on these distribution measures.

In short,

while policy liberalization is not associated with
significant differences in performance between different
groups of countries, it is associated with adverse
conditions of access and availability of services.

Overall,

the classification scheme is more useful for predicting
differences related to telecommunications distribution than
performance, accounting for significant differences with
respect to four out of the five variables.
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Chapter 12

CONCLUSIONS

This study has been motivated by the fact that profound
changes are affecting the telecommunications sector in
developing countries, fueled by technological changes
coupled with the emergence of world markets.

These changes

are affecting the developed and developing countries alike.
There appears to be widespread agreement that the provision
of adequate telecommunications services is now central to
the economic success of developmental efforts the world
over.

The successes or mistakes that are made in

telecommunication policy and, through it, telecommunications
structure and organization, may affect the growth of
national economies.

However, telecommunications policies, in most countries, are
rarely analyzed in terms of their impact on sector
performance.

And in no case has there been a study of the

impact of sector policies on telecommunication distribution.
The experiences of developed countries suggest that
liberalization, injection of competition and governance of
market forces may be the best prescriptions for
restructuring telecommunications.

But there is little

evidence to suggest that these solutions are equally
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applicable to developing countries.

Nevertheless

governments allover the developing world are revamping
their telecommunication policies with the purpose of
injecting some degree of liberalization in telecommunication
sectors.

Dallas Smythe once wrote "Governments always, everywhere,
intervene in the actions of their populations.

The

immediately relevant question lies in the answers their
policies and actions give to the question: for whose benefit
are they intervening?"

(1986, p. 21)

The findings of this

study suggest that the liberalization of telecommunication
policies in developing countries leads to a systematic
worsening of conditions of access and availability of
telephone service with little corresponding gains in
improved sector performance.

If there are gains to be had

from sector restructuring they may be realizable only under
conditions of relatively high economic growth and in
countries with predominantly industrial economies.

Perhaps

more importantly, this study found clear evidence that
government commitment (as reflected in increasing government
investment) to stepping up the growth of the sector is the
most important single factor in improving both performance
and distribution at all levels of development and under all
economic conditions.

211

There is, therefore, clear indication that if sector growth
and development are important priorities for governments
than attention should be turned more toward stepping-up
investments rather than sector restructuring.

If sector

liberalization is to be considered, then perhaps it may be
effective only after certain levels of development have been
achieved.
These findings are in keeping with an emerging body of
literature which suggests that equitable development of many
sectors in the developing world, including health and
education, has been fostered mainly through the commitment
of governments to sector growth and expansion.

Many

countries that have relied on market mechanism to foster
growth have performed indifferently with respect to growth
and worse still in terms of equitable growth (Sen, 1990).
Part of this problem arises from the fact that in developing
countries, the market mechanism is inadequate for generating
and equitably distributing a number of goods and services,
particularly those that economists describe as public
goods. 27

Telecommunications, characterized by network

externalities and the fact that use of the service does not
exclude the use of it by another person, is, in many ways, a
quintessential public good.

Subjecting it to imperfect

27. Not to say that markets are any more equitable in
developed countries, only that many more of the
imperfections that vitiate market efficiencies are present
in developing countries.
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markets could prevent any possibility of equitable access to
telecommunications in the majority of developing countries.
This is not to suggest that sector liberalization in
developing countries is associated with poor distribution
efforts because of some intrinsic and irremediable
characteristics of private competition.

The experience of

developed countries like Finland suggests that open
competition can be a powerful mechanism for raising
resources, expanding the reach of basic service and lowering
prices (Nulty and Schneidewind, 1989).

But a major reason

for the success of the Finnish policy reform initiative was
the strong regulatory control and oversight exercised over
competing entities by the government.

Similarly in France,

as well as in the U.K. and the Netherlands, sector
liberalization has required the establishment of strong
regulatory bodies to oversee the competitive environment.
A significant problem in developing countries is the lack of
strong regulatory mechanisms to exercise control and
oversight over the newly liberalized sectors.

Noll

(1986)

suggests that the ability of governments to regulate
telecommunication providers depends partly on "the resources
governments officials allocate to monitoring performance of
supply organizations"

(p.

46).

The required "resources"

being not only financial, but also in terms of the expertise
of the regulators.
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Most developing countries have virtually no experience with
regulating telecommunications sectors and hence, whatever
regulatory mechanisms that are set up in the wake of
liberalization are usually woefully inadequate.

As Stern

(1989) points out, in many countries ministries and other
agencies are not staffed to deal with regulatory issues.
They often lack the interdisciplinary expertise to analyze
complex issues like tariff practices under different
conditions of supply and demand.

In fact,

in many

countries, it is difficult to determine where lies the
responsibility for sector regulation.

Liberalization in the

absence of strong regulatory mechanisms can adversely effect
both sector performance and distribution through a number of
ways.
Roger Noll (1986) in his analysis of the liberalization of
telecommunication sectors in developed countries argues that
as the separation of suppliers from political control
increases, the industry becomes more difficult to regulate
because of the magnitude of the informational and
enforcement problems.

In developing countries this can take

on two dimensions.
On the one hand, if the monopoly provider is privatized or
granted some form of significant autonomy without the
introduction of competition, the increased autonomy can lead
to greater exploitation of monopoly power.

In this case,

the purposes of reform -- efficiency, growth, affordability
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-- may be vitiated.

For instance the privatization of the

telecommunication monopoly in the Ivory Coast, through its
sale to a French multinational (without the introduction of
competitive pressures) resulted in the doubling of the price
of basic residential service in the two years from 1988 to
1990, without any corresponding lowering of the price of
business service or any additional tax revenues flowing to
governments coffers.
On the other hand, if unrestrained competition is permitted,
either (a) the dominant telecommunications entity may
destroy the competition by abusing its dominant market
position and its control over key bottlenecks (so that the
first situation cited above is recreated) or (b) competitors
may succeed in selecting only highly profitable customers,
so that the main telecommunication entity retains the loss
makers.

This situation will lead to uneven development,

undermine economies of scale available in an integrated
system, and prevent growth of a nationwide infrastructure.
The Philippines, for instance, has had telecommunication
services provided by multiple suppliers for a number of
years.

Growth of the country's telephone network over the

period reviewed has been considerably slow and services have
been largely concentrated in a few urban areas. 28

28. Recently, a high level commission has been set up to
formulate a plan to restructure the sector, improve sector
regulation and overcome these shortfalls.
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It appears that liberalization, in the first instance, can
lead to a situation in which the reformed telecommunications
entity can defeat the very purpose of the reforms that
created it and, in the second instance, a telecommunication
system that relies solely on private competitive firms may
tend to be both inadequate overall and too unevenly
distributed to meet the needs of the country as a whole.
Efforts to improve sector performance through liberalization
can often lead to difficulties in striking a balance between
considerations of commercial efficiency and social equity.
Nulty and Schneidewind (1989) argue that in order to respond
to growing technical and economic pressures governments:
"give their telecommunication systems greater
autonomy and commercial orientation. But
important national, social and economic interests
will be jeopardized by the move to more commercial
modes of providing telecommunications services"
(p.

30).

In the traditional organization of telecommunications
systems, these contradictions were reconciled directly
within the single political body that both operated the
telecommunications system and made social, national and
economic policy: the government.

But in the separation of

telecommunications from government control and in the
absence of effective regulatory bodies, the mechanisms
through which the balance between equity and efficiency were
maintained are sundered.
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States thus play a two-fold role in the development of
telecommunications in developing countries.

On the one hand

they, are the prime sources of finances for investment in
telecommunications.

The extent of governmental commitment

to the sector is the main predictor of the extent of sector
expansion.

In the second instance, governments provide the

only existing effective domain within which competing
interests can be reconciled and goals of balanced sector
growth and equitable access and availability of services can
be maintained.
This study has attempted to evaluate the impact of
telecommunication policies with an emphasis on the process
of privatization and the introduction of competition that is
underway in a number of developing countries.

While much of

the research attention has been focussed on the changes in
the telecommunications sector in developed countries, this
study has shown that a slow, quiet, but significant
revolution in telecommunications policies is taking place in
much of the developing world.
Virtually all reforms being considered by governments
involve reduction in the monopoly control of the traditional
telecommunications entity and some increase in the influence
of market forces over operations and investments in the
sector.

The reasons behind these changes are manifold.

is believed that liberalization can overcome chronic
deficiencies in investments in the sector, cope with the

It
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unmet demand for basic services, meet the needs of large
users and expand the reach of the basic network.

In short,

liberalization is perceived to be the panacea for the many
performance ills that plague the telecommunications sector
in developing countries.
But, as the findings of this study show, liberalization of
telecommunications have not been associated with significant
improvements in telecommunications performance in the decade
under review.

As the global economy becomes increasingly

integrated developing countries are looking increasingly for
new ways to effectively participate in the global electronic
marketplace.

Telecommunications are now seen as electronic

commodities essential to the expansion of national economies
(Aronson and Cowhey, 1988).

If this perception of the

vital importance of telecommunications is to be translated
into significant sector improvements, then liberalization
may not be the solution.

Instead, as already discussed,

increased government investment may be the most effective
means for significantly improving sector performance.
While the focus of policy reform has been on improving
commercial efficiency and sector performance, it must not be
forgotten that telecommunications are important public goods
with powerful consequences for the process of development.
Distributional consequences are, therefore, an important
component of policy evaluation.

The negative impact of

policy liberalization on the conditions of access to, and
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availability of services, could have grave consequences for
national development plans and programs.

Inability to

access or afford services may result in the systematic
deprivation of the potential to increase their capabilities
(and, consequently, the conditions of their lives)

for large

sections of the populations of developing countries.
However, it must be acknowledged that the actual or real
consequences of these distributional outcomes are not
directly examined in this study.

Micro-level studies are

required before we can determine with any degree of
certainty what the relative consequences of the availability
-- or non-availability -- of telecommunication services are
for the enhancement of capabilities and, by extension, the
role of telecommunications in the development process.
Along with this micro-level analysis, the other major area
of research not examined in this study, is the process of
telecommunication policy evolution.

How are international

and domestic pressures and development translated into
specific national telecommunication policies and how do
specific telecommunication outcomes affect the process of
national development.

Studies in these two areas will

greatly enhance our understanding of telecommunications
developments in the Third World.
The contribution of this study has been add to our knowledge
on the critical middle ground between these two areas: the
impact of telecommunications pOlicies on telecommunication
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outcomes.

It is hoped that its findings will provide

evidence that will help in the evaluation of the policies
that developing countries have pursued in the recent past
the impact of liberalization and government commitment on
performance and distribution.

And, on the basis of this

evaluation, also provide guidance to policy-makers in these
countries in selecting between the options available to them
for reforming their telecommunication sectors in the context
of their national economies and overall developmental
objectives.
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Appendix I

COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE STUDY

ALGERIA
ARGENTINA
BANGLADESH
BENIN
BOLIVIA
BOTSWANA
BRAZIL
BURKINA FASO
BURUNDI
CAMEROON
CENT AFRICAN REP
CHAD
CHILE
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
DOMINICAN REP
ECUADOR
EGYPT
EL SALVADOR
ETHIOPIA
GABON
GHANA
GUATEMALA
GUINEA
HAITI
HONDURAS
HONG KONG
INDIA
INDONESIA
ISRAEL
IVORY COAST
JAMAICA
JORDAN
KENYA
KUWAIT
LESOTHO
LIBERIA
LIBYA
MADAGASCAR
MALAWI

MALAYSIA
MALI
MAURITANIA
MAURITIUS
MEXICO
MOROCCO
MOZAMBIQUE
NEPAL
NIGER
NIGERIA
OMAN

PAKISTAN
PANAMA
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
PARAGUAY
PERU
PHILIPPINES
RWANDA
SAUDI ARABIA
SENEGAL
SIERRA LEONE
SINGAPORE
SOMALIA
SOUTH KOREA
SRI LANKA
SUDAN
SYRIA
TANZANIA
THAILAND
TOGO
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
TUNISIA
TURKEY
UAE
UGANDA
URUGUAY
VENEZUELA
YEMEN
ZAIRE
ZAMBIA
ZIMBABWE
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Appendix II

PROCEDURE FOR CALCULATION OF AVERAGE PRICE

The average annual price of basic residential service was
calculated through the following formula:

where:

=

=

average annual price of basic residential
service for year t in international dollars;
total average annual revenue from basic
residential service for year t;
total number of basic residential subscribers
for year t;
Atlas conversion factor for converting price in
domestic currencies to U.S.$ for year t;
international comparisons project's purchasing
power parity conversion factor.

Where (e-2,t) is calculated as follows:
(e-2,t)

= 1/3

where:
et

=

Pt

=

PSt

=

annual average exchange rate (local
currency/U.S.$) for year t;
GNP deflator for year t for GNP measured in the
local currency;
U.S. GNP deflator for year t.
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Appendix III

CODING SCHEME FOR TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY VARIABLES

Equipment Manufacturing Policy Characteristics
(permissible industry structure)

Score

Public Sector Monopoly
Autonomous Public Sector Monopoly
Public Sector Duopoly
Public Sector Oligopoly
Mixed Public- Private- Duopoly
Mixed Public- Private- Oligopoly
Private Monopoly
Private Oligopoly
Open Domestic Competition
Open Competition with Multinational Participation

Equipment Procurement Policy Characteristics
(permissible suppliers)

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Score

Single Public Sector Supplier
Multiple Public Sector Suppliers
Mixed Public- Private- Suppliers
Multiple Private Domestic Suppliers
Multiple Private International Suppliers

I

2
3
4
5

The two measures were combined into a single 10 point scale.
Cronbach's alpha for the scale was .78 and it measured a
single factor with eigenvalue of 1.64.

To test whether or

not the scale could be assumed to be a continuous measure,
correlations between it and other variables were computed
using different scores with different distances.
Differences in the coefficients were minor,

indicating that

the scale could be considered a continuous measure.

Similar
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tests were carried out for the facilities policy and
services policy scales.

Both of them could also be treated

as continuous measures.

Facilities Policy Characteristics

Government Department
Government Board or Office
State of Parastatal Enterprise
Public Sector Monopoly
Public Sector Oligopoly
Mixed Public- Private- Ownership Monopoly
Private Sector Monopoly
Private Sector Oligopoly
Open Domestic Competition
Open Competition with Multinational Participation

Services Policy Characteristics

Public Sector PTT Monopoly
Public Sector Telecommunications Monopoly
Public Sector Oligopoly
Public Sector Monopoly with Dedicated Private Networks
Public Sector Monopoly with Third Party Resale
Mixed Public- Private- Oligopoly
Private Sector Monopoly
Private Sector Oligopoly
Open Domestic Competition
Open Competition with Multinational Participation

Score

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Score

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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Appendix IV

PERFORMANCE VARIABLES 1977

COUNTRY

TelDen77 LinDen77 TraDen77

ALGERIA
1. 75
ARGENTINA
9.01
BANGLADESH
BENIN
.46
BOLIVIA
2.41
BOTSWANA
1. 34
BRAZIL
4.01
BURKINA FASO
.13
BURUNDI
.08
CAMEROON
.41
CENT AFRICAN REP
.29
CHAD
.15
CHILE
4.41
COLOMBIA
5.82
COSTA RICA
7.60
DOMINICAN REP
ECUADOR
3.03
EGYPT
1. 25
EL SALVADOR
1. 85
ETHIOPIA
.25
GABON
GHANA
.30
GUATEMALA
1. 80
GUINEA
HAITI
HONDURAS
.65
HONG KONG
27.80
INDIA
.33
INDONESIA
.26
ISRAEL
27.22
IVORY COAST
JAMAICA
JORDAN
KENYA
.90
KUWAIT
14.09
LESOTHO
.75
LIBERIA
LIBYA
MADAGASCAR
.40
MALAWI
MALAYSIA
2.89
MALI

DemPer77 FinPer77

1. 01
6.51

1986.66
2200.35

34.59
41. 25

-15.95
41.19

.22
2.08
.79
2.58
.07
.13
.27
.10
.06
3.07
3.81
5.06

1292.61
11. 36
2369.45
2002.00
2000.00
1517.37
1419.06
1581.82
1750.00
2240.00
1318.07
3606.03

8.80
87.88
24.02
163.13
25.53
57.74
2.24
37.66
38.38
45.54
51.71
3.20

-10.30
47.51
18.79
5.15
9.43
4.82
9.77
8.99
56.61
93.17
-7.51
43.25

2.53
.96
.48
.19

1637.84
1682.32
2833.35
1446.41

152.43
14.98
15.50
91. 26

-4.04
18.67
46.23
18.15

.32
1. 60

1906.16
1124.98

94.50
5.30

28.90
88.77

.61
21.09
.26
.18
19.06

1992.94
1106.43
90.58
1663.90
4460.64

.85
.43
10.88
20.21
25.51

13.60
66.76
26.35
47.52
84.67

.43
10.36
.25

1482.37

34.18
292.11
59.03

31. 24
71. 43
75.91

.19

2271.06

1. 40

82.58

1. 75

.33

.51

43.25
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COUNTRY

TelDen77 LinDen77 TraDen77

MAURITANIA
.14
MAURITIUS
3.23
MEXICO
5.86
MOROCCO
1. 50
MOZAMBIQUE
.45
NEPAL
.09
NIGER
.14
NIGERIA
.26
OMAN
1. 63
PAKISTAN
.70
PANAMA
8.43
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 1. 30
PARAGUAY
1.54
PERU
2.46
PHILIPPINES
1. 27
RWANDA
.09
SAUDI ARABIA
1. 24
SENEGAL
.56
SIERRA LEONE
SINGAPORE
19.79
SOMALIA
SOUTH KOREA
5.49
SRI LANKA
.48
SUDAN
.31
SYRIA
2.71
TANZANIA
.45
THAILAND
.88
TOGO
.42
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 6.65
TUNISIA
2.44
TURKEY
17.76
UAE
UGANDA
.41
URUGUAY
9.24
VENEZUELA
4.70
YEMEN
ZAIRE
.12
ZAMBIA
1. 06
ZIMBABWE
2.87

DemPer77 FinPer77

.14
1. 97
3.28
.74
.29
.06
.10
.16
1.20
.32
6.15
.63
1. 26
1. 63
.82
.06
.20
.24

1471.00
2401.13
4168.51

118.34
70.62
10.54

3257.80
39.53
53.88
4869.62
2708.33
338.72
4251.13
2066.85
2795.16
3007.86
26.31
3560.00
2954.25
4700.13

49.21
329.66
8.51
8.25
43.85
77.81
7.86
7.07
38.58
16.15
39.24
159.03
33.26

4.58
-3.44
-92.02
-1.62
-18.68
-7.25
-20.75
-36.24
-55.48
-2.26
30.36
13.56
-21.68
.14
31.56
5.72
-35.84
8.69

14.03

5131.43

.84

20.07

4.27
.32
.26
1. 94
.23
.60
.21
4.04
1. 33

4939.68
61. 84
2331.13
1664.02
2593.87
180.00
1858.11
1755.73

12.80
45.14
31. 36
182.12
29.37
14.94
51.60
212.18
32.62

-121. 33
71.25
9.54
6.24
-62.27
45.23
5.52
-40.59
82.53

11.76
.18
6.97
4.57

244.12
6138.10
2479.70
1974.07

21.15
76.67
19.31
.06

-89.93

.98
.55
1. 29

1.24
2425.53
1926.91

.87
42.06
9.51

-1. 04
13.00
5.79

Notes: For measurement of variables see text.

26.91
7.10
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Appendix V

PERFORMANCE VARIABLES 1988

COUNTRY

TelDen88 LinDen88 TraDen88

ALGERIA
ARGENTINA
BANGLADESH
BENIN
BOLIVIA
BOTSWANA
BRAZIL
BURKINA FASO
BURUNDI
CAMEROON
CENT AFRICAN REP
CHAD
CHILE
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
DOMINICAN REP
ECUADOR
EGYPT
EL SALVADOR
ETHIOPIA
GABON
GHANA
GUATEMALA
GUINEA
HAITI
HONDURAS
HONG KONG
INDIA
INDONESIA
ISRAEL
IVORY COAST
JAMAICA
JORDAN
KENYA
KUWAIT
LESOTHO
LIBERIA
LIBYA
MADAGASCAR
MALAWI
MALAYSIA
MALI

DemPer88 FinPer88

3.46
10.18

2.43
9.08

4236.89
3115.07

71. 02
39.00

-90.61
-145.00

.35
2.64
1. 78
8.44
.20
.16
.44
.24
.07
6.22
7.22
12.72

.29
2.30
.91
5.02
.11
.13
.28
.09
.04
4.36
5.67
7.95

5825.46
14.38
8279.60
2708.52
169.17
343.24
5719.34
3757.31
672.32
8399.71
820.61
5823.88

15.53
27.11
37.08
26.57
28.98
65.22
2.22
43.80
13 .18
40.94
31. 37
1. 51

-74.55
-21. 56
-8.29
1. 20
5.22
-13.35
-28.02
-.01
-10.58
44.76
-9.23
43.41

3.48
2.78
2.58
.03

3.03
2.14
1. 91
.22

684.82
430.42
3016.56
115.88

184.42
6.83
11.71
65.06

-3.63
-18.96
42.93
-8.47

.52
1. 47

.27 10319.19
1. 24
216.06

72.87
10.41

-61.49
83.55

1. 04
43.18
.50
.38
3.98

28.46
32.36
.39
.27
29.84

.75
2714.45
85.63
814.40
3127.60

.11
30.84
35.75
8.23

12.93
32.88
26.80
10.91
2.59

1. 30
15.50
.81

.58
11.81
.43

109.79
600.11
9589.70

37.47
1. 70
51. 28

4.69
-173.80
-.10

.40
.56
8.17

.22
.27
6.17

1225.56
305.82
840.12

3.46
19.24
12.26

-1.52
-8.75
-11.44
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COUNTRY

TelDen88 LinDen88 TraDen88

MAURITANIA
.25
MAURITIUS
5.87
MEXICO
9.10
MOROCCO
1. 36
MOZAMBIQUE
.42
NEPAL
1. 26
NIGER
.16
NIGERIA
.24
OMAN
5.31
PAKISTAN
.59
PANAMA
10.08
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
.71
PARAGUAY
2.32
PERU
2.90
PHILIPPINES
1. 37
RWANDA
.14
SAUDI ARABIA
.88
SENEGAL
.82
SIERRA LEONE
SINGAPORE
4.29
SOMALIA
SOUTH KOREA
22.11
SRI LANKA
.75
SUDAN
.33
SYRIA
5.49
TANZANIA
.47
THAILAND
1. 83
TOGO
.44
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 9.08
TUNISIA
3.73
TURKEY
7.85
UAE
23.87
UGANDA
.34
URUGUAY
12.87
VENEZUELA
8.41
YEMEN
ZAIRE
.17
ZAMBIA
1.12
ZIMBABWE
2.76

DemPer88 FinPer88

.20
3.63
4.56
1. 05
.27
1.15
.11
.18
4.25
.49
7.68
.80
2.03
2.12
.80
.08
7.73
.35

282.98
3316.58
948.02
251.71
1800.94
87.53
117.18
73.32
141.86
235.44
5018.84
1925.35
2463.48
4531.45
45.70
1978.14
3515.47
94.73

6.81
62.51
19.81
69.17
69.75
194.92
44.13
7.88
15.80
70.61
10.52
5.01
.48
46.41
36.19
45.00
24.54
32.99

4.58
-3.44
-92.02
-1. 62
-18.68
-7.25
-20.75
-36.24
-55.48
-2.26
30.36
13.56
-21.68
.14
31.56
5.72
-35.84
8.69

31.94

3933.65

.01

20.07

18.24
.55
.24
3.92
.22
1. 61
.26
5.03
2.78
5.17
15.46
.15
9.90
7.03

3251.94
3866.83
55.17
8667.08
186.39
188.07
2196.56
189.81
5027.70
1034.86
654.41
51.98
2271.36
3258.26

2.09
11. 66
37.92
243.69
122.51
32.71
25.21
239.14
46.16
76.10
.96
81. 76
21. 06
24.03

-121.33
71. 25
9.54
6.24
-62.27
45.23
5.52
-40.59
82.53

.12
.61
1. 20

189.52
62.92
76.38

14.11
59.15
23.62

-1.04
13.00
5.79

Notes: For measurement of variables see text.

-89.93
26.91
7.10
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Appendix VI

DISTRIBUTION VARIABLES 1977

COUNTRY

UrbDen77 RurDen77 ResDen77 PubAcc77 AvgPri77

ALGERIA
1. 28
ARGENTINA
5.62
BANGLADESH
BENIN
.39
BOLIVIA
4.79
BOTSWANA
BRAZIL
2.75
BURKINA FASO
.56
BURUNDI
3.87
CAMEROON
.55
CENT AFRICAN REP
.11
CHAD
.16
CHILE
2.72
COLOMBIA
4.61
COSTA RICA
8.63
DOMINICAN REP
ECUADOR
4.16
EGYPT
1.13
EL SALVADOR
.73
ETHIOPIA
1. 07
GABON
GHANA
.95
GUATEMALA
4.80
GUINEA
HAITI
HONDURAS
1. 05
HONG KONG
22.26
INDIA
.63
INDONESIA
.65
ISRAEL
19.71
IVORY COAST
JAMAICA
JORDAN
KENYA
2.14
KUWAIT
11. 72
LESOTHO
4.38
LIBERIA
LIBYA
MADAGASCAR
.70
MALAWI
MALAYSIA
3.22
MALI

.71
10.28

48
71

2400
25031

2.45
1. 34

.16
.92
2.32
.03
.05
.17
.09
.04
4.38
2.24
2.57

20
70
36
61
61
50
30
20
62
64
59
73

23
1400
100
171500
50
150
17
200
175
500
10215
4023

4.76
1. 56
2.76
1. 34
6,29
5.70
9.57
10.97
4.75
9.91
8.89
6.86

1. 35
.82
.31
.07

64
48
54
60

321
3121
1432
720

3.45
4.01
4.95
1. 78

.13
.99

56
40

125
325

1. 42

.40
10.54
.16
.08
14.66

65
77
37
62
75

235
5421
3252
3251
10211

1. 37
3.90
4.85
6.23
3.75

.19
3.24
.08

40
69
32

721
631
50

1. 04
4.72
1. 35

.09

10

125

7.47

1. 13

49

20186

3.09

6.20
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COUNTRY

UrbDen77 RurDen77 ResDen77 PubAcc77 AvgPri77

MAURITANIA
.30
MAURITIUS
MEXICO
3.18
1. 27
MOROCCO
MOZAMBIQUE
2.70
NEPAL
1.18
NIGER
.33
NIGERIA
.57
OMAN
PAKISTAN
.75
PANAMA
7.72
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 2.78
PARAGUAY
2.19
PERU
2.02
PHILIPPINES
1. 64
RWANDA
.92
SAUDI ARABIA
.27
SENEGAL
.65
SIERRA LEONE
SINGAPORE
13.46
SOMALIA
SOUTH KOREA
6.27
SRI LANKA
1. 01
.97
SUDAN
SYRIA
2.68
TANZANIA
1.10
THAILAND
2.55
TOGO
1. 01
TRINIDAD & TOBAG013.45
TUNISIA
1. 92
TURKEY
UAE
UGANDA
1. 22
URUGUAY
5.87
VENEZUELA
4.17
YEMEN
ZAIRE
1. 46
ZAMBIA
.80
ZIMBABWE
3.67

.17
4.52
.31
.69
.97
.40
.02
.11
.11

68
40
70
37
45
50
29
55
77
8
63
60
64
76
7
30

125
250
80125
1301
421
212
505
712
175
402
8271
75
675
3012
3075
221
4125
160

3.67
1. 64
3.56
2.87
4.34
2.30
1. 67
1. 84
4.54
3.56
2.94
4.84
2.83
3.47
1. 45
5.49
3.38
3.27

70.13

71

17425

4.56

2.34
.11
.08
1. 28
.14
.28
.07
1.53
.79

55
33
36
70
71
45
50
77
40

140732
415
345
212
210
13212
111
431
1031

7.56
2.43
2.45
1. 86
1. 61
4.54
3.56
6.40
3.65

.06
12.29
6.17

78
20
64
63

9432
165
2443
21291

3.45
2.84
4.47
3.54

.73
.43
.69

40
46
67

190
343
621

1. 53
3.69
4.34

.10
.61
3.46
.44
.11
.02
.07
.07

40

Notes: For measurement of variables see text.
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Appendix VII

DISTRIBUTION VARIABLES 1988

COUNTRY
ALGERIA
ARGENTINA
BANGLADESH
BENIN
BOLIVIA
BOTSWANA
BRAZIL
BURKINA FASO
BURUNDI
CAMEROON
CENT AFRICAN REP
CHAD
CHILE
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
DOMINICAN REP
ECUADOR
EGYPT
EL SALVADOR
ETHIOPIA
GABON
GHANA
GUATEMALA
GUINEA
HAITI
HONDURAS
HONG KONG
INDIA
INDONESIA
ISRAEL
IVORY COAST
JAMAICA
JORDAN
KENYA
KUWAIT
LESOTHO
LIBERIA
LIBYA
MADAGASCAR
MALAWI
MALAYSIA
MALI

UrbDen88 RurDen88 ResDen88 PubAcc88 AvgPri88
3.98
8.34

1. 22
13.62

52
75

.31
2.94
2.82
4.69
.78
1.11
.31
.08
.10
4.36
5.92
12.02

.28
1. 66
.37
6.02
.05
.06
.26
.10
.02
4.36
5.13
4.63

24
78
38
71
58
55
35
26
62
70
21
77

3.49
2.32
2.65
1. 06

2.36
1. 98
1. 33
.10

70
72
61
68

.57
2.45

.13
.65

45
70

1. 34
31. 66
.78
.70
28.53

.83
41.60
.24
.12
43.10

67
73
40
70
78

1. 79
12.06
1. 59

.24
7.09
.16

43
65
40

.58
1.18
9.48

.10
.12
3.87

18
42
69

3900
28209
721
100
2700
167
211500
100
300
17
300
672
12618
30334
8507
1880
668
4281
2826
1013
291
250
212
670
500
468
12421
10987
5774
14581
211
1037
284
982
1270
100

5.23
10.43
6.56
2.23
2.45
4.57
7.12
2.45
1. 56
1. 21
3.69
2.26
10.25
5.26
3.14
7.29
5.46
3.28
3.25
1. 85
2.49
1. 87
4.26
4.24
2.28
3.64
8.29
2.24
4.36
3.14
9.90
2.89
6.14
5.28
7.16
2.15

451
290
525
36186
420

4.24
1. 28
2.69
7.38
1. 48
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COUNTRY

UrbDen88 RurDen88 ResDen88 PubAcc88 AvgPri88

MAURITANIA
.26
MAURITIUS
5.27
MEXICO
4.50
MOROCCO
1. 41
MOZAMBIQUE
.68
NEPAL
8.94
NIGER
.26
NIGERIA
.35
OMAN
36.16
PAKISTAN
1. 06
PANAMA
9.25
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 4.55
PARAGUAY
2.69
PERU
2.52
PHILIPPINES
1. 46
RWANDA
.71
SAUDI ARABIA
8.24
SENEGAL
.63
SIERRA LEONE
SINGAPORE
31.94
SOMALIA
SOUTH KOREA
17.71
SRI LANKA
1. 98
SUDAN
.74
SYRIA
4.23
TANZANIA
.37
THAILAND
4.99
TOGO
.74
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 5.63
TUNISIA
3.45
TURKEY
7.69
UAE
18.03
UGANDA
1. 04
URUGUAY
8.74
VENEZUELA
6.18
YEMEN
ZAIRE
.17
ZAMBIA
.56
ZIMBABWE
2.44

.15
2.44
4.72
.73
.14
.38
.08
.09
.23
5.84
.14
1. 46
1. 23
.34
.03
6.12
.18

40
66
59
50
74
42
50
46
40
44
76
10
67
67
62
39
79
37

250
400
110370
3040
982
687
621
1089
366
525
12273
100
983
4450
4725
521
6281
260

5.67
2.49
7.65
2.48
1.14
2.16
4.86
2.49
6.79
7.58
4.14
9.49
4.78
8.68
7.79
5.92
6.56
5.49

31.94

73

19.41
.18
.11
3.60
.16
.11
3.81
1. 99
2.92
6.32
.05
16.50
11.17

80
34
41
77
85
62
55
73
50
59
69
24
77
70

25450
400
160732
520
594
503
784
20636
241
691
2038
29692
12573
334
4543
30291

9.38
2.93
7.49
7.95
2.46
2.89
1. 54
5.79
7.25
8.49
3.31
6.02
6.30
2.54
6.76
9.49

.10
.68
.74

43
52
85

320
414
989

1. 28
3.46
6.85

.71

.71

Notes: For measurement of variables see text.
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Appendix VIII

POLICY AND INVESTMENT VARIABLES 1977

COUNTRY
ALGERIA
ARGENTINA
BANGLADESH
BENIN
BOLIVIA
BOTSWANA
BRAZIL
BURKINA FASO
BURUNDI
CAMEROON
CENT AFRICAN REP
CHAD
CHILE
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
DOMINICAN REP
ECUADOR
EGYPT
EL SALVADOR
ETHIOPIA
GABON
GHANA
GUATEMALA
GUINEA
HAITI
HONDURAS
HONG KONG
INDIA
INDONESIA
ISRAEL
IVORY COAST
JAMAICA
JORDAN
KENYA
KUWAIT
LESOTHO
LIBERIA
LIBYA
MADAGASCAR
MALAWI
MALAYSIA
MALI

EqPo177

FacPo177

SerPo177

Invest77

2
2

1
2

1
2

1.21
1. 41

5
2
1
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
5
2

1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1

3.85
2.62
3.76
4.01
3.93
2.51
1. 76
.23
1.21
.87
1. 05
4.23

3
2
2
1

1
1
1
1

1
1
3
1

2.20
3.31
2.60
1. 39

1
1

1
2

1
4

1. 22
6.46

1
8
2
4
5

1
9
1
2
1

1
7
1
1
1

5.96
1. 47
1. 85
2.46
1. 73

1
4
1

4
4
1

3
2
1

2.59
2.32
3.58

1

1

1

2.38

4

2

2

4.41
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COUNTRY
MAURITANIA
MAURITIUS
MEXICO
MOROCCO
MOZAMBIQUE
NEPAL
NIGER
NIGERIA
OMAN
PAKISTAN
PANAMA
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
PARAGUAY
PERU
PHILIPPINES
RWANDA
SAUDI ARABIA
SENEGAL
SIERRA LEONE
SINGAPORE
SOMALIA
SOUTH KOREA
SRI LANKA
SUDAN
SYRIA
TANZANIA
THAILAND
TOGO
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
TUNISIA
TURKEY
UAE
UGANDA
URUGUAY
VENEZUELA
YEMEN
ZAIRE
ZAMBIA
ZIMBABWE

EqPo177

FacPo177

SerPo177

Invest77

2
3
4
3
2
3
3
2
2
3
2
4
2
4
3
2
4
3

2
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
2
3
2
2
1
3

2
1
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
2
3
2
4
1
3

3.06
1.28
2.05
2.37
.81
4.64
1.14
3.46
4.61
1. 53
1. 06
2.37
2.78
2.17
1. 13
1. 99
3.04
1. 87

4

1

4

6.35

3
2
3
2
2
3
2
3
4

2
2
2
1
1
1
2
3
2

2
2
2
1
1
2
2
4
3

6.56
2.28
2.02
2.70
3.65
1.26
3.44
1. 78
4.20

5
3
2
2

5
1
1
3

5
2
1
3

3.66
.47
5.48
2.55

2
2
2

1
2
3

1
3
3

2.83
3.41

Notes: For measurement of variables see text and
Appendix III

.11

234
Appendix IX

POLICY AND INVESTMENT VARIABLES 1987

COUNTRY
ALGERIA
ARGENTINA
BANGLADESH
BENIN
BOLIVIA
BOTSWANA
BRAZIL
BURKINA FASO
BURUNDI
CAMEROON
CENT AFRICAN REP
CHAD
CHILE
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
DOMINICAN REP
ECUADOR
EGYPT
EL SALVADOR
ETHIOPIA
GABON
GHANA
GUATEMALA
GUINEA
HAITI
HONDURAS
HONG KONG
INDIA
INDONESIA
ISRAEL
IVORY COAST
JAMAICA
JORDAN
KENYA
KUWAIT
LESOTHO
LIBERIA
LIBYA
MADAGASCAR
MALAWI
MALAYSIA
MALI

FacPo187

SerPo187

Invest87

7
10
1
5
3
2
5
3
2
2
2
2
10
3
4
3
6
2
2
1
5
1
3
2
2
2
10
5
8
7
7
3
7
8
8
2

4
8
1
1
2
2
4
1
2
1
1
1
5
2
1
10
1
1
1
1
6
1
9
7
2
1
10
2
4
1
10
1
5
8
8
1

5
10
8
2
1
3
5
1
2
1
1
1
10
2
2
6
4
1
3
1
3
1
5
9
3
2
7
5
2
1
8
3
5
7
5
2

5.64
7.87

5
2
2
6

1
2
1
7
2

1
1
1
8
2

EqPo187

4

6.84
6.83
6.20
9.59
5.97
5.83
5.69
5.88
6.91
6.50
6.72
8.73
6.88
8.89
7.60
5.98
5.95
8.35
9.79
10.53
5.92
8.92
9.81

5.70
10.94
5.65
7.98
8.92
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COUNTRY
MAURITANIA
MAURITIUS
MEXICO
MOROCCO
MOZAMBIQUE
NEPAL
NIGER
NIGERIA
OMAN
PAKISTAN
PANAMA
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
PARAGUAY
PERU
PHILIPPINES
RWANDA
SAUDI ARABIA
SENEGAL
SIERRA LEONE
SINGAPORE
SOMALIA
SOUTH KOREA
SRI LANKA
SUDAN
SYRIA
TANZANIA
THAILAND
TOGO
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
TUNISIA
TURKEY
UAE
UGANDA
URUGUAY
VENEZUELA
YEMEN
ZAIRE
ZAMBIA
ZIMBABWE

EqPo187

FacPo187

SerPo187

Invest87

1
3
8
3
1
3
3
2
6
7
4
8
4
8
6
2
7
7

2
2
6
1
2
1
10
2
3
2
3
10
2
5
9
2
2
7

5
1
6
1
1
1
3
2
3
5
3
9
3
7
10
4
2
7

6.99
6.81
8.68
7.78
4.92
6.56
6.69
8.63
11. 59
5.87
4.37
7.66
5.24
6.73
5.71
4.34
8.56
5.97

10
3
7
6
3
2
2
3
3
8
4
6
7
3
6
7

1
2
2
5
2
1
1
5
6
8
2
5
10
1
6
8

8
1
6
8
2
1
1
5
6
4
3
6
5
2
5
5

12.91

2
2
5

1
10
6

1
7
5

Notes: For measurement of variables see text and
Appendix III

9.78
5.87
4.58
7.56
6.98
7.83
6.80
6.37
10.57
9.98
4.32
8.92
6.88
3.89
6.68
7.89
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Appendix X

ECONOMIC VARIABLES 1977

COUNTRY
ALGERIA
ARGENTINA
BANGLADESH
BENIN
BOLIVIA
BOTSWANA
BRAZIL
BURKINA FASO
BURUNDI
CAMEROON
CENT AFRICAN REP
CHAD
CHILE
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
DOMINICAN REP
ECUADOR
EGYPT
EL SALVADOR
ETHIOPIA
GABON
GHANA
GUATEMALA
GUINEA
HAITI
HONDURAS
HONG KONG
INDIA
INDONESIA
ISRAEL
IVORY COAST
JAMAICA
JORDAN
KENYA
KUWAIT
LESOTHO
LIBERIA
. LIBYA
MADAGASCAR
MALAWI
MALAYSIA
MALI

GnpCap77 PerAgr77 Perlnd77 PerSer77
1100
1730

8
13

57
45

35
42

200
630
410
1360
130
130
340
250
130
1160
720
1240

38
17
0
12
37
64
32
37
52
10
26
21

15
29
0
37
14
14
21
36
14
29
29
25

47
54
0
51
49
22
47
27
34
61
45
54

790
320
550
110

20
28
30
52

36
30
21
15

44
42
49
33

380
220

39
0

22
0

39
0

410
2590
150
300
2850

32
2
37
31
7

27
31
25
34
40

41
67
38
35
53

270
12270
240

35
0
30

20
0
15

45
0
55

240

40

19

41

930

26

29

45
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COUNTRY
MAURITANIA
MAURITIUS
MEXICO
MOROCCO
MOZAMBIQUE
NEPAL
NIGER
NIGERIA
OMAN
PAKISTAN
PANAMA
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
PARAGUAY
PERU
PHILIPPINES
RWANDA
SAUDI ARABIA
SENEGAL
SIERRA LEONE
SINGAPORE
SOMALIA
SOUTH KOREA
SRI LANKA
SUDAN
SYRIA
TANZANIA
THAILAND
TOGO
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
TUNISIA
TURKEY
UAE
UGANDA
URUGUAY
VENEZUELA
YEMEN
ZAIRE
ZAMBIA
ZIMBABWE

GnpCap77 PerAgr77 PerInd77 PerSer77
26

37

37

10
21
56
68
47
34

36
31
12

54
48
32
23
36
33

33
23
33
35
16
29
81

23
21
26
22
31
35

1

28

83
24

44
56
41
43
53
46
12
16
48

2880

2

35

63

820
200
290
910
190
420
300
2380
860

27
39
58
17
45
27
23
3
17

35
21
15
14
16
29
31
62
32

38
40
27
69
39
44
46
35
51

14420
720
1430
2660

o

o

55
12
6

8
36
17

37
52
77

130
450
500

25
14
18

25
41
35

50
45
47

270
760
1120
550
150
110
160
420
2540
190
1120
490
730
840
450
130
6040
420

o

o

o
9

17
43

o

7

Notes: For measurement of variables see text.

o

o

o
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Appendix XI

ECONOMIC VARIABLES 1987

COUNTRY
ALGERIA
ARGENTINA
BANGLADESH
BENIN
BOLIVIA
BOTSWANA
BRAZIL
BURKINA FASO
BURUNDI
CAMEROON
CENT AFRICAN REP
CHAD
CHILE
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
DOMINICAN REP
ECUADOR
EGYPT
EL SALVADOR
ETHIOPIA
GABON
GHANA
GUATEMALA
GUINEA
HAITI
HONDURAS
HONG KONG
INDIA
INDONESIA
ISRAEL
IVORY COAST
JAMAICA
JORDAN
KENYA
KUWAIT
LESOTHO
LIBERIA
LIBYA
MADAGASCAR
MALAWI
MALAYSIA
MALI

GnpCap87 PerAgr87 Perlnd87 PerSer87
2360
2520
170
390
570
1010
2160
210
240
1010
380
160
1510
1180
1690
720
1120
660
940
100
2970
400
900
430
380
860
9220
340
440
8650
770
1070
1500
370
13400
420
990
5420
190
170
1940
230

13
13
46
40
24
3
9
39
56
26
44
47
6
19
18
23
15
21
14
42
11
49
33
36
31
25
0
32
24
22
36
6
10
31
1
21
37
5
41
37
23
49

43
44
14
13
27
55
43
23
15
30
12
18
38
34
28
34
36
25
22
17
51
16
35
32
38
21
30
30
36
43
25
42
25
20
51
28
28
63
16
18
25
12

44
43
40
47
49
42
49
38
29
44
44
35
56
47
54
43
49
54
65
40
38
34
32
38
31
54
70
38
40
35
39
52
65
49
48
52
35
32
43
44
52
39
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COUNTRY
MAURITANIA
MAURITIUS
MEXICO
MOROCCO
MOZAMBIQUE
NEPAL
NIGER
NIGERIA
OMAN
PAKISTAN
PANAMA
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
PARAGUAY
PERU
PHILIPPINES
RWANDA
SAUDI ARABIA
SENEGAL
SIERRA LEONE
SINGAPORE
SOMALIA
SOUTH KOREA
SRI LANKA
SUDAN
SYRIA
TANZANIA
THAILAND
TOGO
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
TUNISIA
TURKEY
UAE
UGANDA
URUGUAY
VENEZUELA
YEMEN
ZAIRE
ZAMBIA
ZIMBABWE

GnpCap87 PerAgr87 PerInd87 PerSer87
480
1800
1760
830
100
180
300
290
5000
350
2120
810
1180
1300
630
320
6200
650
1270
9070
170
3600
420
480
1680
160
1000
370
3350
1230
1280
15770
280
2470
3250
640
170
290
650

38
13
9
17
62
56
36
34
3
26
9
34
30
12
23
38
8
22
46
0
65
11
26
33
38
66
17
34
5
14
17
2
72

11
6
23
31
14
11

21
33
35
34
20
17
23
36
43
24
18
31
25
36
34
22
43
29
12
38
9
43
27
15
16
7
35
21
31
32
36
54
7
29
36
26
34
43
43

Notes: For measurement of variables see text.

41
54
56
49
18
27
41
29
54
49
73
35
46
52
44
40
49
49
42
62
25
46
47
52
46
27
48
45
64
54
46
44
20
60
58
50
35
43
46
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Appendix XII
CORRELATION MATRICES

INDGRO SERGRO AGRGRO FACCHA SERCHA EQCHA COMMIT
GNPGRO
INDGRO
SERGRO
AGRGRO
FACCHA
SERCHA
EQCHA

.67**

.10
.09

TELDEN
GNPGRO
INDGRO
SERGRO
AGRGRO
FACCHA
SERCHA
EQCHA
COMMIT

.75**
.4S**
.19
-.45**
.2S*
.22*
.25*
.32*

URBDEN
GNPGRO
INDGRO
SERGRO
AGRGRO
FACCHA
SERCHA
EQCHA
COMMIT

.67**
.46**
.19
-.44**
.61**
.32*
.23*
.33*

.19*
-.13
.OS

.22*
.27*
.05
.03

.2S*
.12
.09
.04
.59**

LINDEN

TRADEN

DEMPER

.74**
.4S**
.1S
-.46**
.25*
.23*
.25*
.30*

.10
.19
.20*
-.14
.15
.12
.11
.27*

-.14
-.21
-.OS
.19
-.lS
-.10
- .13
-.24*

RURDEN

RESDEN

PUBACC

.51**
.36*
.11
.32**
-.21*
-.20
-.21*
.36*

.29*
.29*
.17
-.26*
.21*
.19*
.11
.27*

.21*
.22*
.13
-.18
.1S*
.19*
.11
.24*

.32*
.21*
.11
.07
.45**
.70**

.22*
.16
.03
.04
.12
.14
.09

FINPER

.05
.06
.05
.03
.13
.09
.17
.10

AVGPRI

.32*
.51**
.19
-.60**
.62**
.59*
.22*
.03
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